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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE, TURNOVER, AND HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT: FOCUSING ON MUNICIPAL POLICE SERVICES

Regardless of whether organizations are in the private sector or in the public sector,
there is a general agreement that human resources are critical to keeping organizations
effective as well as maintaining a high level of organizational performance. While
more serious effort has been made to empirically examine how human resources
influence organizational performance (e.g., studies about turnover consequences,
studies about the relationship between human resource management practices and
organizational performance) in the private sector, it is rare to find similar empirical
studies in the public sector partly because it is hard to define public organizational
performance. In my dissertation, I basically investigate how human resources are
critical to organizational performance in the public sector with a question, “Do human
resources really matter in the public sector, too?” Focusing on the crime control
performance of municipal police departments, I examine the relationships among
turnover, police performance, and human resource management (HRM)
characteristics by surveying police departments of the U.S. cities whose population
range is between 100,000 to 500,000 (Out of 205 surveyed cities, 65 cities
participated). Firstly, I explore how human resource management practices
(individually and systematically) influence crime control performance of the police.
Based on universalistic HRM perspective (i.e., best HRM practices) and control
theory perspective, I hypothesize that commitment HRM system (and individual
practices) will have positive effect on crime control performance of the police.
Secondly, I investigate more specific questions such as if turnover has significant
effect on crime control performance and if HRM system has moderating effect on
turnover consequence. Results about turnover effect confirm human capital theory
that predicts the negative effect of turnover when employees with specific knowledge
quit. However, no significant relationships are found between commitment HRM
system (and individual practices) and organizational performance. The results might
help municipal police departments deal with sworn officers’ turnover as well as set up
proper HRM practices.

KEY WORDS: turnover, human resource management (HRM), crime control
performance, best HRM practices, human capital theory
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Introduction

I began this research with the fundamental question of how we can achieve and
maintain higher levels of organizational performance in the public sector. More
specifically, I focus on human resources that have been regarded as one of the critical
factors to achieve better organizational performance in both private and public sectors.
In fact, it is a widely held premise that people provide organizations with an important
source of sustainable competitive advantage and the effective management of human
capital may be the ultimate determinant of organizational performance (Youndt, Snell,
Dean, & Lepak, 1996). Therefore, human resources have received continuous
attention from researchers in a variety of disciplines and lots of research has been
conducted to investigate questions related to human resources especially in the public
sector. For example, researchers have been interested in how human resource
management (HRM) practices influence organizational performance, how to deal with
human resource loss (i.e., turnover), how to control human resources to achieve better
performance (e.g., control theory), and how to understand human resources in a
different situation (e.g., strategic HRM). In the public sector, however, it is true that
human resources are also perceived as critical to deliver public services effectively
but no empirical efforts have been made to confirm the critical role of human
resources.

This dissertation consists of analyses bearing on two major questions, each of
which basically investigates the critical role that human resources play in achieving
better organizational performance. The first question is about how different HRM
practices would influence organizational performance. I explore the relationships
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between organizational performance (i.e., crime control performance in this study)
and different HRM practices (individual HRM practice and HRM system) from
universalistic, contingency, and control theory perspectives. The second question
deals with a more specific HR issue. I examine if employee turnover (turnover,
hereafter) has a significant effect on organizational performance and if HRM practices
moderate (weaken or strengthen) the effects of turnover on organizational
performance. I also review the definitions of turnover and its measurement, causes,
and effects, based on classic turnover studies (e.g., Price, 1977; Mobley, 1982) that
initiated turnover research and have guided turnover studies for decades.

To answer the two major questions mentioned above, I sent questionnaires to
205 police departments in U. S. cities whose population range was between 100,000
and 500,000. In the current study, the term HRM practices generally refers to both
individual HRM practices and a set of HRM practices. But individual HRM practices
and HRM systems are also used to refer to individual HRM practices and a bundle of
HRM practices, respectively.

Although the arguments presented in this research are not new in the private
sector, this research is one of a few empirical efforts in the public sector to examine if
human resources (HR) play a critical role in improving organizational performance, if
HR loss (i.e., turnover) has a significant effect on organizational performance, and if
HRM practices moderate turnover effects on organizational performance. The results
of this research will help us to understand the critical role of human resources in the
public sector in achieving higher level of organizational performance and to set up
proper HRM policy (e.g., job designs, staffing, rewarding, retaining), especially when

2

quality employees are scarce and turnover rate is high. The results of this research
may also give us an idea if human resources need to be dealt with differently,
depending on the sector (i.e., public or private). As a foundation of the whole research,
I first review some general issues of organizational performance and measurement;
examine police organization, its goals, and performance indicators; and discuss how
human resources are dealt with in the public sector.

3

I. Organizational Performance and Measurement

1.1 Organization
According to Thompson (1967), organizations can be understood from two
perspectives: closed-system and open-system. In order to search for certainty, the
closed-system perspectives such as scientific management school 1 , administrativemanagement school 2 , and bureaucracy school 3 search for maximized economic
efficiency, assuming that they are dealing with a determinate system (pp 4-5). The
open-system perspective expects uncertainty rather than searching for certainty.
According to Daft (2001, p12), organizations are (1) social entities, (2) goal directed,
(3) designed as deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems, and (4)
linked to the external environment. Daft explained that the key elements of an
organization are not a building or a set of policies and procedures, rather the key
elements are people and their relationships with one another. Daft also emphasized
that an organization cannot exist without interacting with customers, suppliers,
competitors and other elements of the external environment.

Daft (2001) noted that one significant development in the study of
organization was the distinction between closed and open systems and provided a
good explanation of both systems. Daft (2001, p14) explains a closed system as
follows:

1

It focuses primarily on manufacturing or similar production activities, and seeks to maximize
efficiency by planning procedures to ensure conformity with standards.
2
It focuses on structural relationships among production, personnel, supply, and other service units of
the organization. It searches for efficiency by specializing tasks and grouping them into departments,
and fixing responsibility.
3
If focuses on staffing and structure as means of handling cases. For this school, efficiency can be
achieved by establishing rules for categories of activity, motivating proper performance of expert
officials, and appointing experts to offices.
4

A closed system would not depend on its environment; it would be autonomous, enclosed, and
sealed off from the outside world. Although a true closed system cannot exist, early
organization studies focused on internal systems. Early management concepts, including
scientific management, leadership style, and industrial engineering, were closed-system
approaches because they took the environment for granted and assumed the organization could
be made more effective through internal design. The management of a closed system would be
quite easy. The environment would be stable and predictable and would not intervene to cause
problems. The primary management issue would be to run tings efficiently.
Unlike a closed system, an open system must interact with the environment to survive;
it both consumes resources and exports resources to the environment. It cannot seal itself off.
It must continuously change and adapt to the environment. Open systems can be enormously
complex. Internal efficiency is just one issue.

In this paper, although it appears that many pubic organizations are still managed as if
they are sealed off from their environment, I basically see pubic organizations as open
systems as Daft (2001) suggested in the figure below.

Figure 1-1. An Open System and Its Subsystems

Raw materials
People
Products
Information
&

Transformation
resources

Input
Financial

Process

Output

Services

resources

Subsystem

Boundary

Production, Maintenance

Boundary

Spanning

Adaptation, Management

Spanning

Source: Daft (2001, p15)

In a typical municipal government, there are many departments to provide
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services such as public safety, parks and recreation, public library, road maintenance,
and so on. According to Daft’s flow chart of an open system as seen in figure 1-1, all
of those service departments belong to the “Transformation process,” whereas staff
departments such as human resources department, finance department, and public
relations belong to the “Input process” or the “Output process”. While service
departments (or production departments) of the “Transformation process” are directly
involved in providing various kinds of service to the citizen, staff departments in the
“Input process” or the “Output process” are doing boundary spanning 4 and are
indirectly involved in delivering services to the citizen.

In this study, I explore the relationships among human resource management
(HRM) practices, organizational performance, and turnover at a municipal department
level rather than at a city government level. Although a police department is one of
the service departments within a city government that directly provide services to the
citizen, we can also regard it as a separate organization that not only needs inputs,
such as human resources, information resources, and financial resources, but also
produces outputs, such as crime control, traffic control, and so on. For example, when
police departments are losing their employees for some reasons, we may guess that
there is a problem at the “transformation process” in providing safety services to the
citizen, and outputs such as crime clearance rate may decrease, consequently.
Therefore, we may say that Daft’s flow chart of an open system as seen in figure 1-1
is also applicable to the current study.

4

Staff departments that perform boundary spanning are responsible for exchanges with the external
environment
6

1.2 Organizational goals
According to Rainey (2003, p130), an organizational goal is a condition that an
organization seeks to attain but the concept of a goal has many complications, with
important implications for organizing and managing and for the debate over whether
public and private organizations differ. These complications include the problem that
goals are always multiple, that is, a goal is always one of a set of goals that one is
trying to achieve (Rainey, 1993; Simon, 1973). Rainey (2003, p132) continued that
the most often repeated observations about public organizations are that their goals
are particularly vague and intangible, compared to those of private business firms, and
that they more often have multiple, conflicting goals. For example, police chiefs must
try to find a balance between keeping the peace, enforcing the law, controlling crime,
preventing crime, assuring fairness and respect for citizen rights, and operating
efficiently and with minimal costs (Moore, 1990).

In this study, I focus on so-called official goals of municipal police
departments that are usually displayed in the mission statements. Mission is a concise
statement of the unique, fundamental, current and future public purposes of the
agency and its programs. It is also a statement of what the agency does, why it does it,
and for whom – that is, the reason for the agency’s existence (ASPA's Center for
Accountability & Performance (CAP), 2002, p12). Official goals are formal
expressions of general goals that present an organization’s major values and purposes
(Rainey, 2003). Although we may still face dilemma when we try to achieve one goal
against another if the mission statement has conflicting goals, at least, we can
understand what goals police organizations officially put first (I examine a typical
mission statement of police departments at chapter two). That is, we are going to be at
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a better position to measure goals of police organizations and evaluate how well they
are doing in achieving them once we narrow down various goals to official ones.

1.3 Organizational performance
In this study, I use the term, “organizational performance” rather than “organizational
productivity” when we evaluate how well (i.e., how effectively and efficiently)
organizations are doing in achieving their goals in their mission statements. For
example, when a police organization performs well in controlling crimes (e.g., high
crime clearance rates), we can say that their crime control performance is at a high
level. Although as Kearney and Berman (1999) explained, performance is similar to
productivity as the effective and efficient use of resources to achieve outcomes,
performance in the public sector has broader meaning than productivity, and it is
guided and assessed by multiple, equally important standards of effectiveness,
efficiency, and equity.

Even when we choose to use organizational productivity that is the subset of
the organizational performance, there still exists a problem of interpreting
productivity as Quinn (1978) pointed out. Quinn (1978) noted that one of the biggest
problems facing the public productivity movement is the assumption that everyone
shares a common definition of the term productivity. According to Quinn (1978),
while economists and industrial engineers have a precise definition (i.e., output over
input with quality considered) of productivity, administrators (or managers) have an
ambiguous definition that has to do with overall performance of an organization with
specific meaning varying from situation to situation. Since we are not free from the
interpretation concern in any case of using performance or productivity, the best way

8

might be to make the term clear at the outset, regardless whether we choose
productivity or performance.

In the current study, I measure performance rather than productivity of police
departments because while productivity focuses on the ratio of input and output,
performance covers broader aspects of police departments. In addition, performance is
a more generic term than productivity. As in Hatry’s (1980) definition that
performance measurement for government is the systematic assessment of how well
services are being delivered to a community in terms of both how efficiently and how
effectively, the term performance in this study consists of efficiency and effectiveness,
in which efficiency concerns the relation of input required to the amount of output
produced and effectiveness refers to the effects and quality of the service delivery.

1.4 Performance measurement
Why do we measure performance? Osborne and Gaebler (1992) explained a range of
good reasons for measuring performance in the public sector: (1) to improve delivery
of public services, (2) what gets measured, gets done, (3) to detect errors, (4) to
recognize success, (5) to allow for organizational learning and improvement, (6) to
mobilize support, (7) to improve accountability for budget expenditures, and (8) to
improve public communication. Behn (2003) also similarly pointed out eight different
purposes that public managers have for measuring performance – evaluate, control,
budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, learn, and improve (pp 588-593) 5 , and argued
that the characteristics for performance measurement would be different, depending
on the different purposes of measuring performance. In the same vein, Kaplan and
5

For example, public managers may use performance measurement to evaluate how well their agencies
are performing, or control their organizations (i.e., how can I ensure the subordinates are doing the
right things).
9

Norton (1996) developed the Balanced Scorecard to prevent a narrow concentration
on financial measures in business auditing and control systems in the private sector.
The Balanced Scorecard requires an organization to develop goals, measures, and
initiatives for four perspectives: (1) the financial perspective, in which typical
measures include return on investment and economic value added, (2) the customer
perspective, involving such measures as customer satisfaction and retention, (3)
internal perspective, involving measures of quality, response time, cost and new
product introduction, and (4) the learning and growth perspective, in which goals and
measures focus on such matters as employee satisfaction and information system
availability.

Although there are several reasons for assessing organizational performance as
mentioned above, selecting the outcomes that should be tracked is essentially a
judgment call (Hatry, 1999a, p43). Performance measures are objective, quantitative
indicators of various aspects of the performance of public programs or agencies.
Therefore, different kinds of performance measures are defined to track particular
dimensions of performance, such as effectiveness, operating efficiency, productivity,
service quality, customer satisfaction, and cost-effectiveness (Poister, 2003, p3). Hatry
(1999b) actually suggested such criteria as validity 6 , understandability 7 , timeliness 8 ,
potential for encouraging perverse behavior 9 , uniqueness 10 , data collection cost 11 ,
controllability 12 , and comprehensiveness 13 for selecting a set of performance

6

Does it measure what it should?
Will the measure be reasonably understandable by government officials?
8
Can the information be gathered in time for it to be useful to public officials?
9
Will the measure result in behavior that is contrary to the objectives of the organization?
10
Does the measure reveal some important aspect of performance that no other measure does?
11
What does it cost to collect and analyze the data for the measure?
12
To what extent is the measure controllable by the agency whose performance is being measured?
13
Does the set of measures cover all or most performance aspects of the organization’s functions?
7

10

measures. After all, the choice of performance measures is dependent upon our
objectives, and there are several types of performance measures such as costeffectiveness measures 14 , workload-accomplished measures 15 , outcome measures,
output measures, efficiency measures 16 , productivity measures 17 , and service quality
measures 18 (ASPA's Center for Accountability & Performance (CAP), 2002; Hatry,
1999b; Poister, 2003).

No matter how important a role measuring performance plays, especially in
managing for results, if we cannot practically put performance measurement system
into use or if we do not much use the results of measuring performance, performance
measurement would turn into merely an impractical proposition, symbolic statement,
or expensive trial. Therefore, scholars who study performance and its measurement
usually stress prerequisites or first steps before implementing performance
measurement. Hatry (1999a) pointed out three prerequisites that are highly desirable
before processing performance measurement: high-level support for the performance
measurement effort, reasonable program stability, and at least some computerized
data-processing capability. Poister (2003) also suggested as desirable a process for
designing and implementing performance measurement systems that includes
securing management commitment as a first step.

Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007
14

Unit cost to produce outcome.
Measures of the amount of workload that has been accomplished are the most commonly found
measurements collected by operating agencies.
16
Efficiency measures are defined as the relation of the amount of resources applied to a service or
input to the amount of output (i.e., input divided by output).
17
This is the converse of efficiency (i.e., ratios of output to input).
18
This is related to customer satisfaction with the goods or services.
15

11

II. Police Organization and Performance

2.1 Police evolution and environmental change
As Kelling (2003) explained in the summary of U.S. police history, during the 1970s,
social scientists increasingly undertook research into policing, stimulated in part by
pioneering fieldwork associated with President Johnson’s crime commission. One of
the studies was the Kansas City experiment in which it was found that preventive
patrol had little or no effect on citizens’ perception of personal safety or on reported
crime. In the 1980s and the 1990s, there were growing neighborhood self-help
movement and worse fiscal realities in the urban areas, which led to reductions in
police personnel. By the 1990s, police practices, research, and scholarship had come
together in “community policing.”

Although attention to problem solving and the “broken windows (Wilson &
Kelling, 1982)” 1 concept continued during the 1990s, new ideas gained favor among
policy makers and practitioners of crime control and fear reduction. Compstat 2
(derived from “computer statistics”) is one of those initiatives of crime prevention.
Compstat combines crime and problem analysis, and a geographic focus, with strict
measures of accountability. Since the 21st century began, environments surrounding
police organizations have become more unstable and unpredictable. Therefore,
Stephens (2003) noted that managing the issues associated with growth – traffic,
housing, schools, and infrastructure – consume substantial resources in many
communities, and rapid demographic and social change continues in cities and towns
1

Just as unrepaired broken windows signal that no one cares and it can lead to more serious disorder
and crime.
2
This innovation by then-commissioner William Bratton in the New York City police department was
championed by proponents as probably the most far-reaching administrative innovation in policing
during the twentieth century (Kelling, 2003)
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throughout the U. S.

Under these changing circumstances, for the police to perform better, the
doctrine of tight managerial control may need to be supplanted by doctrines of worker
participation, total quality management, and shared commitment to excellence, as
Hatry and Greiner (1986) suggested. More specifically, it may be possible to
decentralize police organizations, reduce reliance on rules and constant supervision,
and increase reliance on selection, training, and the formal statement of values to
create an organizational culture that can properly guide officers’ conduct (Sparrow,
Moore, & Kennedy, 1990). However, although decentralization in a police
organization has several advantages 3 and a number of disadvantages are involved in
centralization, it is true that centralization continues to be the dominant way of
structuring decision making in police organizations (Stephens, 2003).

2.2 Police organizational goals and mission statements
Although it is a complicated job to define police organizational goals (i.e., why they
exist), I focus on official goals that are usually displayed in the mission statement as
mentioned previously. As seen in appendix 2-1 that shows some typical mission
statements of police organizations, there are no specific forms in common. For
example, some mission statements (e.g., Dayton, OH and Indiana, IN) consist of
several sentences, whereas others (e.g., Jacksonville, FL; Atlanta, GA; Austin, TX;
and Phoenix, AZ) have only one simple sentence. In addition, some police
departments put their mission statements along with vision statement and goal (or
3

(1) It frees managers from having to spend all their time and intellectual energy on day-to-day
operational matters, allowing them to concentrate more time on strategies that will improve the
organization’s capabilities. (2) It is likely to improve operational decisions because they are made by
people who are closer to the facts to the situation. (3) It challenges more people to be creative and take
responsibility for the problems in their area.
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value) statement, others post mission statements only.

Although they are diverse in form, when we look at the contents of different
mission statements, we find that most city police organizations want to promote safety
and the quality of life for each person in the community through protecting their
citizens’ properties and lives. In doing so, some police organizations emphasize
community partnerships (e.g., Dayton, OH; Indianapolis, IN; Atlanta, GA), others
stress respecting individual rights, human dignity, and community values
(Indianapolis, IN; Jacksonville, FL) according to their mission statements. In addition,
when we look at the goal in the goal (or value) statements that are usually under
mission statements, we also find that most city police departments have similar goals
that they are officially pursuing. That is, most police organizations have such general
goals as crime fighting (i.e., traditional purpose), crime prevention, and reducing fear
and enhancing security (Stephens, 2003). That is, through accomplishing these goals
(i.e., mainly crime control and prevention), police may provide high quality of life to
their citizens after all.

2.3 Performance measurement and performance indicators
Even after we narrowed down organizational goals (or purpose) of municipal police
departments to one or two official goals, measuring how well an organization does in
achieving those goals is not simple. For one reason, goals are usually vague and
intangible in the public sector as Rainey (2003) pointed out. Therefore, as a way of
measuring performance, it is usual to develop some performance indicators, which
allow us to measure performance. For example, measuring workload is a form of
performance indicators that Ammons (1996) called “bean counting” because of easy
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measurement. However, Ammons warned that for anyone wanting to get ahead in the
bean business, it is also important to know the quality of the beans and the efficiency
with which they are grown and harvested.

Despite an abundance of potential benchmarks for police services, their use as
measuring rods for judging or comparing municipal police departments has been
controversial (Ammons, 1996). First of all, the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)
maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the most widely used crime
statistics, also has a fundamental problem - i.e., some crimes go unreported. In fact,
the most frequently used performance indicators for crime control are crime
occurrence and crime clearance rates, and in England, for example, the only
performance indicators listed in the Public Expenditure White Paper are also the
crime rates and the clear-up rates (Carter, Klein, & Day, 1995). Police agencies of
most countries are usually required to maintain those data and this leads to high
availability of those data.

Carter and colleagues (1995), however, discussed some issues including
reporting problems when we use crime rate as an indicator for measuring crime
control performance. As Harrison and Gretton (1986) raised a question about the
increased crime rate, suggesting that a large part of the increase in the official crime
rate may be due to the greater propensity of victims to report crime, rather than
reflecting a rise in the actual level. That is, recent changes such as greater telephone
ownership, wider insurance cover, better recording practices, and changing public
attitudes are likely to contribute to increasing propensity to report crimes. Therefore,
Carter and colleagues (1995) concluded that the most useful figure was the clear-up
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rate per sworn officer 4 (HM Treasury, 1990), considering that it can more reflect the
efforts the police have made to control crimes and it is not affected by environmental
changes including greater propensity of victims to report crimes.

Now, I take a brief look at the English government’s efforts to develop proper
performance indicators of crime control, which may show us how hard it is to define
and measure police performance, based on Carter and colleagues (1995). Since
Financial Management Initiative (FMI) 5 of England provided an opportunity for each
center (e.g., Home Office in this case) to develop systems, a ‘financial information
system’ based on a system of functional costing was constructed and costs were
allocated to eight functional categories of the police. That is, as an operational activity,
the functional categories are patrol, crime, traffic, public order, community relations,
and others; and as a non-operational activity, the functional categories are training and
management. Later, to provide a guide to matters of efficiency in the principal
functional areas for police activity, the matrix was developed, consisting of 435
indicators. For example, there were 43 indicators in the traffic category, including the
number of officers dedicated to traffic duty, the number of police vehicle accidents,
the number of breath tests conducted, and so on. Although unrealistic and unfair
comparisons were made at the initial stage, subsequently more useful national
comparisons across regions could be possible between ‘families’ of forces with a
similar sized establishment, or on urban/rural lines or various other demographic and
geographical dimensions.

4

One of the questions about clear-up rate was why the clear-up rate has remained constant over a
period (1984-1988) in which the police benefited from extra staff, new technology, and improved
training (HM Treasury, 1990).
5
In 1982, the Thatcher administration of England launched this initiative with the question, ‘where is
the money going and what are we getting for it?’ According to Carter and colleagues (1995), it was as
dramatic as the French Revolution.
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In the U.S., there has been also an effort to develop a set of good performance
indicators for each category of service (e.g., police service) at the local government
level. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) recommended a set of
indicators for police performance as part of its series on Service Efforts and
Accomplishments (SEA) (Drebin & Brannon, 1992). GASB recommended input
measurement indicators such as budget expenditures, equipment, facilities, vehicles;
number of personnel, and hours expended; output measurement indicators such as
hours of patrol, responses to calls for service, crimes investigated, and number of
arrests; and outcome measurement

indicators such as death and bodily injury

resulting from crime, value of property lost due to crime, crimes committed per
100,000 population, crime clearance rate, response time, and citizen satisfaction.

To measure effectiveness of crime control services, Hatry and his colleagues
(1992) also suggested more extensive indicators in the areas of crime prevention,
offender apprehension, responsiveness, security feeling, and fairness and courtesy. For
example, Hatry et al. developed a set of performance indicators to measure
effectiveness of apprehending offenders in several quality practices. To measure
crimes solved at least in part, they suggested performance indicators such as
“percentage of reported crimes cleared by type of crime and whether cleared by arrest
or by exception 6 .” To measure the completeness of apprehension, they suggested
“percentage of person-crimes

7

cleared by type of crimes.” To measure

quality/effectiveness of arrest, they suggested “percentage of adult arrests that survive
6

Cases are said to be “cleared by arrest” when primary suspects have been arrested for that offense and
turned over to the court. Cases are said to be “cleared by exception” when the victim refuses to
cooperate, extradition is denied, the offender is deceased, or other extraordinary circumstances
preclude the placing of charges.
7
If one person committed three crimes, it would be three “person-crimes.”
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preliminary court hearing by type of crime, and percentage of adult arrests resulting in
conviction.” To measure stolen property recovery, they suggested “percentage of
stolen property (vehicles and other property) that is subsequently recovered.”

As seen in the efforts of the Home Office of England and suggestions by
GASB and Hatry et al., we need many performance indicators to measure even one
aspect (e.g., crime control) of police performance. In addition to developing a proper
set of performance indicators to measure a specific aspect of organizational
performance, we also need to consider whether or not we can measure those
developed performance indicators with reasonable time and costs. If too much time
and costs are required for collecting the data to measure a set of developed
performance indicators, the performance measurement system would lack feasibility
and we are likely to abandon efforts for measuring performance at some point. As
Hatry (1999b, p43) noted, selecting the outcomes that should be tracked is essentially
a judgment call. Likewise, selecting the performance indicators (i.e., what
performance indicators and how many performance indicators) can be also dependent
on the purpose of measurement and management commitment. Therefore, Behn
(2003) argued that difference purposes require different measures 8 . For example, the
organization might need to measure outcomes, combined with inputs and with the
effects of exogenous factors if they want to evaluate how well it performs. But when
executives want to motivate line staff and middle managers to do the things necessary
to improve performance, they might need to measure almost-real-time outputs,
compared with production targets.

8

According to Behn (2003), there are eight purposes that pubic managers have measuring performance:
evaluate, control, budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, learn, and improve. (see pp 588-592 for more
details).
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2.4 Crime rates and clearance rates
In the current study, I chose crime clearance rates as a measure (i.e., performance
indicator) of municipal police’s crime control performance (I discuss police
performance measures in more depth at chapter eight). Although crime rates are also
widely used measures, there is a concern of controllability – to what extent is the
measure controllable by the agency whose performance is being measured? Therefore
I followed Hatry’s (1980) suggestion about performance measures that the more
control government managers have over a measure, the more the agency can be held
accountable for it, other things being equal. For example, Sir Kenneth Newman, then
Chief Constable of the Metropolitan Police, deflected criticism about large increases
in London crime figures during 1986 by pointing to the effect of environmental
factors on levels by saying, “figures that are supposed to be performance measures of
the police are in fact a performance measure of society as a whole” (Carter et al.,
1995). In fact, several external factors may be involved in crime occurrence such as
the poverty level, unemployment rate, demographic ratios, and so on.

Although crime clearance rates are better performance measures of municipal
police departments than crime rates, especially when we are interested in how well the
police are performing and how hard they work to reduce crimes, we cannot measure
crime control performance with only one measure. As Behn (1996) warned, the search
for the one best measurement is just as futile as the search for the one best way.
Kaplan and Norton (1992) also warned that no single measure of performance
answers the questions from different perspectives 9 . Now I need to go back to the
9

They want performance measures that answer four questions from four different perspectives:
• How do customers see us? (customer perspective)
• What must we excel at? (internal business perspective)
• Can we continue to improve and create value? (innovation and learning perspective)
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question raised by Behn (2003), “What is the purpose of measuring the
performance?” because the characteristics of performance measures may vary,
depending on the answer to this question. In this study, I am basically interested in
how human resource management characteristics and turnover influence police
performance. Although it is desirable to look at the several aspects of police
performance to be sure of the real influence of those HR related factors, I narrowed
down the scope of police performance to crime control performance, and chose crime
clearance rates among various suggested measures (e.g., GASB, 1992; Hatry et al.,
1992) mainly due to data availability 10 .

Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007
• How do we look to shareholders? (financial perspective)
10

Other than crime clearance data were not available at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In most
cities, even crime clearance data were not available according to the survey I conducted.
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III. Human Resources and Effectiveness in the Public Sector

Generally speaking, there is no doubt that human resources play a critical role in
effectively achieving organizational goals, regardless of sector (i.e., private and public
sectors). According to Porter (1985), human resource management (HRM) can help a
firm obtain competitive advantage by lowering costs, by increasing sources of product
and service differentiation, or by both. In this chapter, I review some efforts that
explored effectiveness (or organizational performance) and effectiveness-related
factors in the public sector to help understand how human resources are regarded in
the public sector, especially when organizational performance or effectiveness is
concerned.

3.1 Governance
According to Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2000a), governance 1 regimes, even those with
substantial extant controls, create or allow for substantial discretion at the street or
front-line levels of public organizations, where the primary work of service delivery
and regulation is performed. That is, front-line workers and their supervisors may
have substantial influence on government outcomes by virtue of their interpretations
of rules and standards and their judgments in individual cases. In the reduced form of
governance that shows what factors are involved in producing organizational
outcomes (i.e., organizational performance) as seen in table 3-1, we see that the
importance of human resources is reflected in the managerial roles and actions (M).
As examples of variables in the table show, managerial roles and actions include
1

According to Lynn et al. (2000), the term "governance" may be defined as regimes of laws,
administrative rules, judicial rulings, and practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable government
activity, where such activity is broadly defined as the production and delivery of publicly supported
goods and services
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leadership practices, monitoring and controlling of human resources, and
accountability for the outcomes. In sum, we see that the management of human
resources is regarded as critical to effective service delivery (i.e., desired level of
organizational performance) within the governance framework.

Table 3-1. Reduced Form of Governance and Examples of Its Variables

Reduced form of governance: O = f (E, C, T, S, M)
Reduced form model
components

Examples of variables

O = outputs/outcomes

Individual level or organizational level

E = environmental factors

Political structures
Level of external authority
Market structure/degree of competition
Funding constraints
Client attributes/characteristics/behavior

C = client characteristics
T = treatments (primary work
or core process or technology)

Program treatment/technology
Organizational mission/objectives
Determination of target population

S = structures

Organization type
Level of integration/coordination
Centralization of control
Administrative rules/incentives
Institutional culture/values

M = managerial roles and

Leadership practices (e.g., innovation and goal setting, worker
motivation, recognition and support, and delegation of
authority or work tasks)
Monitoring/control/accountability mechanisms

actions

Source: Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2000b)

In studying governance, however, the research problem is complicated by the
fact that effectiveness or efficient performance may or may not be the goal of a
legislative coalition. In other words, rational actors in legislatures do not necessarily
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create rational organizations to execute their mandates (Lynn et al., 2000b). Therefore,
if public organizations are inefficiently created or have structural problems that may
impede effective operation, focusing on other factors (including human resources) to
improve organizational performance may have only limited results. That is,
organizational performance (i.e., outcomes (O)) is not likely to improve by paying
attention to other factors such as environment (E), client characteristics (C), treatment
(T), managerial roles and actions (M) rather than remedying structural problems (S) if
public organizations have had structural problems since they were created.

3.2 The Government Performance Project (GPP)
The Government Performance Project (GPP) 2 began with a charge to identify and
create sustainable improvements at all levels of American government and to help
restore citizens’ trust and faith in government and government performance. It is an
unprecedented research initiative evaluating the management capacity of federal, state,
and local government entities (Beekman, 2003). Before checking how human
resources are viewed in the GPP, I briefly outline the theoretical framework of the
GPP model, based on Ingraham and Donahue’s (2000) explanation.

In the previous section, I reviewed that the importance of human resources is
reflected in the reduced form of governance as a form of managerial roles and
activities variable (M). In the GPP, Ingraham and Donahue (2000) noted that one of
the questions 3 that the GPP seeks to answer is “How management influences the

2

Beginning in 1996, under the auspices of the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University and Governing Magazine had rated the
management capacity of local and state governments and selected federal agencies in the United States.
This activity is now carried out by the coalition of universities and Governing Magazine.
3
The other two questions that the GPP seeks to answer are: (1) how well do public entities perform?
and (2) how can management be assessed?
23

performance of public entities.” According to Ingraham and Donahue (2000),
government management can be divided into two complementary sets of
organizational structures, procedures, and technology: those related to administrative
functions, and those related to policy implementation. And these distinct dimensions
of government management (i.e., administrative support and policy implementation)
operate simultaneously and interact in highly complex ways to influence a
government’s performance, and the GPP is interested in examining government’s
management capacity 4 . Figure 3-1 shows where government management is located
in the classical policy/performance equation and how management capacity is
involved in producing outputs/outcomes.

Figure 3-1. The Classical Performance Equation and Government Management

Environmental
Contingencies
(Inputs)

Policy
Design

Political
Commitment

(Outputs/outcomes)

Government Management

Management
Capacity

Government
Performance

Implementation
Technology
Policy
Outcomes

Resources

Source: Ingraham and Donahue (2000)

4

This is government’s intrinsic ability to marshal, develop, direct, and control its human, physical, and
information capital to support the discharge of its policy directions (Ingraham and Donahue, 2000).
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In the figure, government management (i.e., the center box), which was regarded as a
black box in the classical policy/performance equation, is now understood as
management capacity and implementation technology. Management capacity supports
implementation technology, which is more directly related to policy outcomes and
government performance.

When we take a closer look at management capacity, management subsystems
consist of financial management, human resources management, capital management,
and information technology management; and those subsystems are integrated by
exercise of leadership, use of information, and allocation of resources as seen in
figure 3-2. The GPP model also emphasizes the existence of managing-for-results as
the dominant mechanism by which leaders identify, collect, and use the information
necessary to evaluate the institution’s performance in pursuit of key objectives
(Ingraham and Donahue, 2000, p303). The Managing-for-results is not an isolated
function, but one that substantively interacts with the management subsystems via
activities surrounding leadership, information, and resources (p305).

As seen in figure 3-2, human resources management (HRM) is one of four
management subsystems, and HRM refers to the policies, systems, and practices that
influence employees' behaviors, attitudes, and performance, and subsequently the
performance of the organization (Selden and Jacobson, 2003: p101). A government
that does not have the right people and expertise to perform critical functions is likely
to be ineffective in delivering services and meeting citizen expectations, and highperforming governments are more likely to assume a strategic HRM plan (Beekman,
2003: p9-10). According to Selden and Jacobson (2003), a strategic perspective of
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HRM suggests that an organization should be forward thinking and consider human
capital to be valuable assets. In contemporary governance, the role of HRM
departments is shifting from a preoccupation with policing the merit system and rules
to a broader human resources focus that emphasizes collaboration and partnership
with leaders and managers to achieve government and agency goals. Selden and
Jacobson also argue that to acquire and retain the right people, governments need the
right systems, practices, and policies in place to attract them. Thus, we may say that
the HRM system plays a critical role in delivering service effectively and meeting
citizen expectations within governmental organizations, according to the GPP.
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Figure 3-2. The Government Performance Project Model
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Measurement

In order to characterize sound human resource management (HRM) in state,
city, and county governments, the GPP study used five criteria 5 (Selden and Jacobson,
p102). The key components of good HRM include workforce and strategic planning,
the ability to facilitate timely and quality hiring, sophisticated professional
development programs, meaningful reward and evaluation structures, and disciplinary
procedures. In addition, organizations with strategic human resource management are
less likely to lose skilled workers and workers are more likely to be motivated to
perform effectively in support of the government's goals. Figure 3-3 shows the
shifting trend of the HRM department’s role.

Figure 3-3. The Changes in the Role of Human Resource Management Department

Administrative

Operational

Strategic

Source: Selden and Jacobson (2003)

Selden and Jacobson explained the shifting of the HRM department’s role as follows.
Initially, HRM departments performed primarily administrative functions, such as
record keeping, pay roll, and compliance monitoring, and their general focus was on
day-to-day operations. Over time, HRM departments began to respond to and initiate
requests from their customers for developing programs, providing services, and
addressing problems. They offered a full array of personnel services and were focused
on short-term tactical goals. Most recently, the emphasis has shifted toward HRM
5

(1) government conducts strategic analysis of present and future human resources needs, (2)
government obtains a skilled workforce, (3) government maintains an appropriately skilled workforce,
and (4) government motivates the workforce to perform effectively in support of the government's
goals, and (5) government structures the workforce.
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strategic leadership, and this approach focuses on creating and implementing longterm goals, building partnerships, and aligning human capital to meet the
government’s needs.

In sum, the GPP designates human resource management as one of the
important management subsystems that comprise management capacity. Since the
GPP believes that more management capacity leads to a higher level of organizational
performance or policy outcomes, human resources (i.e., human resource management
in the GPP) are regarded as an essential component to achieve better performance.
The GPP also found that strategic management of human resources is more likely to
lead to a higher level of organizational performance than managing human resources
independently without considering or aligning with organizational goals.

3.3 Bureaucratic effectiveness theories
Wolf (1993) explored what factors most influence bureaucratic effectiveness, using
the case survey method (similar to meta-analysis) to aggregate the collective
judgments of previous case-study researchers regarding bureaucratic effectiveness and
other key practices of the U. S. cabinet agencies. After identifying effectivenessaffecting factors, Wolf (1993) tested the competing theories that explain bureaucratic
effectiveness to see which theory explains best. Although different theories have been
tried to explain bureaucratic effectiveness, little agreement has been reached at the
theoretical level as to which practices of an agency most contribute to performance.
The arguments of each school of thought are summarized in table 3-2.
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Table 3-2. Schools of Thought Regarding the Effectiveness of America’s
Bureaucracies
School
of
Thought

Arguments

Scholars

Agency
Life Cycle

The influence of distributional coalitions (interest groups) in bureaucratic decisionmaking biases decisions, causing ineffectiveness.

Quality
Leadership

Therefore, inspired bureaucrats eventually capitulate and the effectiveness of the
agency declines.
Agency effectiveness is largely attributed to the leadership skills, styles, and
characters of their chiefs.

Bernstein (1955),
Downs (1967),
Lowi (1979),
Moe (1989),
Olson (1982)
Barnard (1938),
Machiavelli
(1965),
Nash (1952)
Weber (1965),
Goodnow (1900),
Wilson (1887)

Weberian
Institutionalism

Professionalism

The ideal type of Weberian bureaucracy is separate from politics and is
characterized by a rigid hierarchical structure; functional specialization; separation
of professional from private life; and behavior based on general, stable, strict,
exhaustive, learnable rules.
The Weberian ideal of the “rational-legal” bureaucracy remains a viable theory of
bureaucratic effectiveness.
Professionalism describes the ideal bureaucracy as composed of careerists who
operate freely based on an institutional memory and their own extensive
professional training.
Careerists are motivated by a strong “sense of mission”

Economic
Responsiveness

Inspired by economists and public choice scholars, this school of thought argued
that the ideal bureaucracy is characterized by the alignment of incentives within the
agency to those of its owners (i.e., taxpaying citizens in the governmental context).
Therefore, The proper alignment of incentives is enforced by the effective
monitoring of the agency by citizens or their representatives.

Population
Ecology

Political
Theory
of the Firm
Natural
Selection

Barnard (1938),
Bernstein (1955),
Kaufman (1960),
Simon (1976),
Heclo (1977),
DiIulio (1987)
Downs (1967),
Hirschman
(1970),
Niskanen (1971),
Tullock (1965)

Due to collective action problem, there is no incentive for individual
owners/citizens to monitor bureaucratic activities. In this situation, performance is
enhanced through mechanisms that foster competition between agencies,
particularly if they allow clients to “vote with their feet.”
Organizations are imbued with their essential characteristics at the time of their
founding.

Lawrence and
Lorsch (1986)

Their survival and performance depend on the characteristics of their environment
or their capacity to manage change
Agencies that are politically autonomous and possess key political resources such as
executive support are best able to manage change effectively.

Peterson (1989),
Chubb (1990)

Competition from other institutions and strong sense of mission will motivate
employees to succeed, not just to survive.
Agencies survive and thrive when their characteristics match a volatile
environment.

Kaufman (1985)

Blind chance, not skill or flexibility, determines an agency’s ability to match.
Source: Adapted from Wolf (1993)

To identify factors that are likely to affect bureaucratic effectiveness, Wolf
(1993) employed case survey method and selected fourteen independent variables,
based on two criteria: (1) whether they were crucial to one or more of the schools of
thought on bureaucratic effectiveness, and (2) whether there was disagreement among
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theories as to their likely effect. From forty-four cases 6 that were randomly selected
from an extensive bibliography of four thousand executive branch studies (Goehlert &
Reynolds, 1989), Wolf identified the following independent variables:

(1) Age of the organization
(2) Leadership skills of agency head
(3) Political autonomy 7
(4) Hierarchical structure
(5) Formalization
(6) Identification with the agency 8
(7) Government monopoly on mission
(8) Sense of mission 9
(9) Resources targeted on critical task
(10) Delegation of operational decision-making authority
(11) Adaptability 10
(12) Difficulty of agency mission
(13) Controversial mission 11
(14) Presidential support

6

Each case had to (1) be a study of a U.S. federal agency, (2) not be authored by a current employee of
the agency, (3) contain a distinct effectiveness evaluation, (4) have a source with citation and/or a
bibliography.
7
The extent to which the agency had universal political support
8
Based on the factors such as careerism, living on the jobsite, uniforms/badges, and other indicators
that the agency was an integral part of all aspects of the person’s life
9
Based on evidence that agency personnel saw their work as important and were zealous in executing
it
10
Based on indications that the agency used innovative approaches on the application of agency
functions to new missions.
11
Extent to which necessary agency policies and operations clashed with long-held American traditions
or threatened entrenched interested.
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Among these variables, some factors such as (2) leadership skills of agency head, (8)
sense of mission, (9) resources targeted on critical task, and (10) delegation of
operational decision-making authority, are related to human resource management. As
we reviewed previously, leadership is emphasized by the Government Performance
Project (GPP) model because it integrates different subsets of management and leads
to good management capacity. The delegation of operational decision-making
authority and sense of mission among Wolf’s (1993) identified variables can be also
understood from the viewpoint of strategic human resource management in the GPP.

After identifying important variables that are likely to influence bureaucratic
effectiveness, Wolf (1993) tested competing theories of bureaucratic effectiveness as
seen in table 3-2 and found that "Political theory of the firm" is most likely to explain
bureaucratic effectiveness in the U.S. federal government agencies. According to
Wolf (1993), the political theory of the firm is a newly formulated theory that draws
heavily from population ecology and supplements this core with the principles of
professionalism and the economic responsiveness. Population ecology theory explains
that an organization's survival and performance depends on the practices of its
environment or its capacity to manage change (Lawrence et al., 1986). As the results
of maximum likelihood estimation, five independent variables such as autonomy,
monopoly, sense of mission, adaptability, and presidential support are significantly
related to the effectiveness of an agency. Citing Chubb and Moe (1990), Wolf (1993)
explained that strong sense of mission and competition from other agencies provide
incentives for superior performance and adaptability enables agencies to maintain or
increase these and other conditions that contribute to effectiveness.
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3.4 Government agency effectiveness model
Although the topic of organizational effectiveness is not simple and involves different
kinds of models such as goal models, internal process models, and stakeholder models,
Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) used a relatively straightforward definition of agency
effectiveness in their study: the agency performs well in discharging the
administrative and operational functions pursuant to the mission. Therefore, the
concept of effectiveness in their study refers to whether the agency does well what it
is supposed to, whether people in the agency work hard and well, whether the actions
and procedures of the agency and its members are well suited to achieving its mission,
and whether the agency actually achieves its mission.

In order to develop government agency effectiveness model, Rainey and
Steinbauer (1993) formulated some propositions about agency effectiveness drawing
on government effectiveness studies. Before reviewing the propositions Rainey and
Steinbauer (1999) developed, I take a brief look at the characteristics of leadership
and managing employees that effective government agencies tend to have, based on
Rainey (2003) and Hale’s (1996) literature review of high performance government
agencies. Gold (1982) found that effective government agencies focus on treating
employees fairly and respectfully through honest and open communication,
emphasize delegation of responsibility and authority as widely as possible, and
emphasize innovative ways of managing. Wilson (1989) summarized that in an
effective government agency, discretionary authority for operators is maximized, and
leaders have a bottom-up implementation perspective. Denhardt (1993) found that
manager clearly articulates values and employees accept responsibility and
performance accountability in effective government agencies. Holzer and Callahan
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(1998) noted that effective government agencies develop human resources, empower
employees through team building, recognition, and balancing employee and
organizational needs. In sum, effective government agencies appear to have
commitment human resource management (HRM) practices 12 .

According to propositions about high performance government agencies that
Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) developed, public agencies are more likely to perform
effectively when there are higher levels of the following conditions:

- Relations with oversight authorities are attentive, supportive, and delegative
- Relations with other stakeholders are characterized by general public support, effective
relations with partners and suppliers, effective negotiation network
- Autonomy in operationalization and pursuit of agency mission
- Mission valence (the attractiveness of mission) including difficult but feasible,
reasonably clear and understandable, worthy/legitimate, interesting/exciting, and
important/influential
- Strong organizational culture, linked to mission
- Leadership characterized by stability, commitment to mission, effective goal setting,
and effective coping with political and administrative constraints
- Task design characterized by intrinsic innovation and extrinsic rewards
- Development of human resources such as effective recruitment, selection, placement,
training, and development

- Professionalism among members: commitment to task and mission accomplishment
- Motivation among members: public service motivation, mission motivation, and task
motivation.

12

I define and explain the kinds of HRM practices such as control and commitment HRM practices at
chapter five. Simply put, in an organization with commitment HRM practices, employees are regarded
as valuable assets and we can expect high level of investments in employees. In addition, employees
are encouraged to participate in various issues of organizations.
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In these propositions, we observe that Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) emphasized
leadership, motivation of employees, and human resource development in addition to
relationships with oversight authorities and stakeholders; and task design, missionrelated propositions. Again, Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) also regarded the
management of human resources as critical to becoming an effective government
agency. That is, human resources need to be treated as valuable assets and something
must be done to increase employee’s motivations such as public service motivation 13 ,
mission motivation 14 , and task motivation 15 . Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) suggested
specific relationships among factors emphasized in the propositions, which leads to a
suggested government agency effectiveness model as seen in figure 3-4.

13

This can be defined as a general altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people,
a state, a nation, or humankind
14
While public service motivation focuses on altruistic service that benefits a community or a larger
population, mission motivation has as its target or objective the mission of the agency. Therefore, when
motivated, an individual will extend effort and seek to perform well in ways that he or she perceives to
be related to accomplishing the mission.
15
This is about the influence of the relatively specific and immediate extrinsic and intrinsic rewards
available through the person's role in the organization.
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Figure 3-4.

The Effectiveness Model of Government
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External Stakeholders
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Source: Rainey and Steinbauer (1999)
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In the effectiveness model, we observe that the employee motivation is located
closest (i.e., most directly related) to agency effectiveness. This might mean that if
employees in a government agency are not motivated enough, it is hard to expect a
high level of effectiveness in the agency. The model also suggested that motivation
level is affected by various factors such as organizational culture, leadership, mission
valence (attractiveness of the mission), and task design. In sum, the Rainey and
Steinbauer effectiveness model considers human resources not as replaceable parts
but as specific and valuable assets that managers need to pay special attention to if
they want their agencies effective in delivering services.

3.5 Summary
In this chapter, I reviewed how human resources are regarded in the different efforts
to understand effective public organizations. After reviewing the arguments from the
different perspectives such as governance frame, the Government Performance
Project, government agency effectiveness theories, and the effectiveness model of
government organizations, we found that human resources are commonly regarded
as a critical factor to becoming an effective organization in the public sector.

As seen in the reduced form of governance equation, the importance of
human resources in producing outcomes is reflected in managerial roles and
activities (M). However, as Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2000b) pointed out,
effectiveness or efficient performance may or may not be the goal of a legislative
coalition. That is, if public organizations are inefficiently created, organizational
performance (i.e., outcomes (O)) is not likely to improve by paying attention to other
factors rather than remedying structural problems (S).
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In the Government Performance Project (GPP) model, human resource
management (HRM) is one of the major subsystems of management that comprise
management capacity, and HRM refers to the policies, systems, and practices that
influence employees' behaviors, attitudes, and performance, and subsequently the
performance of the organization. The GPP also emphasizes leadership that helps to
integrate different management subsystems, such as financial management, human
resources

management,

capital

management,

and

information

technology

management, and leads to good management capacity. According to the GPP model,
a government that does not have the right people and expertise to perform critical
functions is likely to be ineffective in delivering services and meeting citizen
expectations. Since the HRM system plays a critical role to making governmental
organizations effective, the GPP model indicates that governments need the right
systems, practices, and policies in place to attract and retain the right people.

From the forty-four cases that were randomly selected from an extensive
bibliography of four thousand executive branch studies, Wolf (1993) identified
fourteen variables that were likely to affect government agency effectiveness.
Among them are three HRM-related factors: leadership skills of agency head,
resource targeted on critical tasks, and delegation of operational decision-making
authority. After identifying effectiveness-related variables, Wolf (1993) tested
competing theories of bureaucratic effectiveness to examine which theories best
explained those effectiveness-related variables and confirmed that "Political theory
of the firm" best explained bureaucratic effectiveness in the U.S. federal government
agencies. The political theory of the firm is a newly formulated, drawing heavily
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from population ecology and supplementing with principles of professionalism and
economic responsiveness.

Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) developed propositions about effective
government organizations by drawing on government effectiveness studies. In the
propositions, we observe that as a critical factor to being effective, Rainey and
Steinbauer (1999) identified leadership, motivation of employees, and human
resource development in addition to relationships with oversight authorities and
stakeholders, task design, mission-related propositions. In the suggested model of
government effectiveness, employee motivations are located closest (i.e., most
directly related) to agency effectiveness. Therefore, effectiveness is less likely to be
achieved within government organizations if employees are not highly motivated.

Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007
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IV. Human Resource Management (HRM) and Organizational Strategy

According to Wright and McMahan (1992), the human resource management (HRM)
field has sought to become integrated into the strategic management process through
the development of a new discipline referred to as Strategic Human Resource
Management (SHRM). This is defined as the pattern of planned human resource
deployments and activities intended to enable an organization to achieve its goals. In
this chapter, I review some of the widely cited SHRM studies (e.g., Jackson &
Schuler, 1995; Lengnick-Hall & Lengnick-Hall, 1988; Miles & Snow, 1984; Schuler
& Jackson, 1987; Wright et al., 1992) and identify their arguments (including
typologies) about human resources from a strategic point of view, hoping that the
concept of relationships between HRM practices and organizational strategies may
help to understand the results of my study since I explore if HRM characteristics of
the municipal police departments have effects on crime control performance and
turnover effects in the dissertation.

Human resource management (HRM) 1 consists of the various practices used
to manage people in organizations. These practices commonly have been grouped
into subdisciplines of selection, training, appraisal, and rewards (Fombrum, Tichy, &
Devanna, 1984). Wright and McMahan (1992) argued that whereas each function of
HRM has evolved through technical innovations generated primarily from a microperspective that focuses only on the particular function, strategic human resource
management (SHRM) studies have begun to examine the determinants of HR
practices from a strategic perspective. According to Wright and McMahan (1992),
1

According to Jackson and Schuler (1995), HRM encompasses (a) specific human resource practices
such as recruitment, selection, and appraisal; (b) formal human resource policies; and (c) overarching
human resource philosophies.
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SHRM is different from traditional HRM at least in two dimensions: First, vertically,
it entails the linking of HRM practices with the strategic management process of the
organization, and second, horizontally, SHRM emphasizes the coordination or
congruence among the various human resource management practices through a
pattern of planned action.

4.1 Determinants of human resource management practices
In this section, I briefly review Wright and McMahan’s (1992) theoretical models 2
that

explain why an organization has a certain kind of HRM practices (i.e., the

determinants of HRM practices).

In figure 4-1, Wright and McMahan (1992) explained that the four models
(model 1 through 4) are strategic models (or theories) of HRM that view HRM
activities as being determined by proactive, strategically intended decisions, and the
remaining two (model 5 and 6) are non-strategic models (or theories) of HRM,
which tend to explain non-strategic and possibly even dysfunctional determinants of
HRM practices.

2

Jackson and Schuler (1995) also provided the similar summary of these models before suggesting
internal and external contextual factors of HRM practices.
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Figure 4-1. A Conceptual Model of Theoretical Framework for Studying Strategic
Human Resource Management

Firm Strategy

Institutional/Political Forces
(5) Resource dependence
(6) Institutional

(1) Resourcebased view

HRM practices

(2) Cybernetic,
(3) Agency/
Transaction cost

HR capital pool

(4) Behavioral approach

HR behavior

Firm-level
outcomes:
Performance
Satisfaction
Absenteeism

Source: Wright and McMahan (1992)

The resource-based view of the firm (i.e., model 1) emphasizes the link
between strategy and the internal resources of the firm. It sees human resources as
the essential asset to have sustained competitive advantage. Therefore, training and
investment in human resources are expected from this perspective. The cybernetic
systems model (i.e., model 2) sees organizations as input, throughput, and output
systems in transactions with a surrounding environment. Therefore, HR input such as
HR Skills, Knowledge, and Abilities (SKAs) affects HR throughput, which in turn
affects HR outputs, while both input and throughput are influenced by firm strategy,
and firm strategy got feedback from output such as productivity, satisfaction, and
turnover. In sum, HRM practices are influenced and decided by various factors such
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as a surrounding environment, firm strategy, and HR input, throughput and output.
The agency/transaction cost theory (i.e., model 3) is based on the assumption that
employees have strong incentives to shirk (i.e., reducing their performance) and free
ride (i.e., relying on the efforts of others in the group) and no incentive to increase
their performance unless task conditions allow employees to demonstrate their
unique contributions and to benefit from those contributions (Jones, 1984). Therefore,
the role of HRM practices is to allow for the measurement of unique contributions
and to provide adequate rewards for individual employee performance. The
behavioral approach (i.e., model 4) focuses on employee behavior as the mediator
between strategy and firm performance and assumes that the purpose of HRM
practices is to elicit and control employee attitudes and behaviors. In this approach, it
is also assumed that strategies lead to HRM practices, which elicit employee role
behaviors, and those desirable role behaviors eventually lead to a number of
outcomes that provide benefits to the firm.

Wright and McMahan (1992) also suggested non-strategic models (models 5
and 6) of HRM in order to fully understand the ways in which HRM practices can
either support or fail to support a firm’s strategy. According to Wright and McMahan
(1992), the determinants of HRM practices in these non-strategic models are not the
results of rational strategic decision-making processes, but rather derived from
institutional and political forces. The resource dependence model (i.e., model 5 in the
figure) focuses on power relationships within and among organizations and assumes
that all organizations depend on a flow of valuable resources (e.g., money,
technology, skills) into the organization in order to continue functioning. Therefore,
the ability to exercise control over any of these valued resources provides an
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individual or group with an important source of power (Pfeffer, 1981). In sum, the
resource dependence model sees that those power relations tend to affect investments
in certain HRM practices. The institutional approach (i.e., model 6 in the figure) sees
that many structures, programs, and practices in organizations attain legitimacy
through the social construction of reality. According to this view, many HRM
practices may be the result of social construction processes whereby external entities
influence the creation.

4.2 Contextual factors of human resource management practices
As determinants of HRM practices, Jackson and Schuler (1995) also identified
internal and external contextual factors. As internal factors, they identified (1)
technology, (2) structure, (3) size, (4) life cycle stages, and (5) business strategy. As
external factors, they identified (1) legal, social, and political environments, (2)
unionization, (3) labor market conditions, (4) industry characteristics, and (5)
national culture.

(1) Technology refers to a system’s processes for transforming inputs into
usable outputs. For example, Jackson and Schuler argued that HRM practices would
be directly influenced by the presence of advanced manufacturing technology
(AMT) and total quality management, based on Snell and Dean’s (1992) study. For
example, Snell and Dean found that firms using traditional technologies were less
likely than firms using AMT to engage in selective hiring, comprehensive training,
and externally equitable compensation. (2) Organizational structure describes the
allocation of tasks and responsibilities among individuals and departments, and the
impact of structure on HRM practices is particularly evident in discussion of
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multinational firms and international joint ventures. With respect to (3) size, based
on institutional theory, Jackson and Schuler (1995) noted that larger organizations
should adopt more sophisticated and socially responsive HRM activities because
these more visible organizations are under more pressure to gain legitimacy. Based
on economic theories, Jackson and Schuler also argued that because of the costs
associated with many aspects of HRM, acceptable economies of scale must be
reached before sophisticated HRM systems can be implemented. (4) Organizational
life cycle stages are associated with changing managerial priorities, and these
changing priorities, in turn, have implications for HRM. For example, Jackson and
Schuler argued that selection criteria and assessment methods for top-level
executives need to be matched to life cycle stages, based on Gerstein and Reisman
(1983). (5) Business strategy also affects HRM practices. Citing Miles and Snow’s
(1978) typology of business (i.e., prospectors, analyzers, and defenders), Jackson and
Schuler (1995) argued that the postures toward the environment should have
implications for the quantity and pace of human resource flows. For example,
defenders who seek to maintain the same limited product line with emphasis on high
volume and low cost, are less concerned about recruiting new applicants externally
and more concerned about developing current employees.

As a first external contextual factor, Jackson and Schuler (1995) identified
the legal, social, and political environments and argued that those environments
affect almost all aspects of HRM, based on institutional and resource dependence
theories 3 . Taking an example that in the U.S., unionized employees have received
wages about 33% greater than those of nonunion employees, Jackson and Schuler

3

I explained these theories when Wright and McMahan (1992) was reviewed in the previous section.
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identified unionization as a second external contextual factor and noted that unions
give voice to their members; establish policies and procedures for handling wage and
working condition grievances; provide for job security; and secure health and
retirement benefits. As a third external contextual factor, labor market conditions can
be characterized by unemployment levels, labor diversity, labor market structure, etc.
For example, when unemployment rate is high, recruiting process is likely to be
more selective due to abundant applicants. Industrial characteristics, as a fourth
external factor, differ depending on the sectors (i.e., the private and the public
sectors), the extent of regulations, and so on. For example, the definition of
effectiveness or behaviors evaluation is different depending on whether
organizations are in the private sector or in the public sector. National culture is also
identified as an external contextual factor since multinational enterprises have long
before appeared and national economies are not within their national boundaries any
more.

4.3 Organizational characteristics and human resource management practices
Miles and Snow (1984) explored relationships between organizational characteristics
and HRM practices, and suggested three types of organizational characteristics. After
investigating several hundreds companies in a dozen different industries, Miles and
Snow observed that there were three types of organizational characteristics (or
strategic behavior): defenders, prospectors, and analyzers. Defenders have narrow
and relatively stable product-market domains and devote primary attention to
improving the efficiency of their existing operations. Defender characteristics
include a limited product line, capital-intensive technology, a functional structure,
and skills in product efficiency. Prospectors continually search for product and
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market opportunities and regularly experiment with potential responses to emerging
environmental trends. Prospector characteristics include a diverse product line;
multiple technology; geographically divisionalized structure, and skills in product
research and development. Analyzers operate in two types of product-market
domains – one is relatively stable, and the other is changing. Analyzer characteristics
include a limited basic product line; search for a small number of related product;
mixed structure; and skills in production efficiency, process engineering, and
marketing. After three types of organizational characteristics were proposed, Miles
and Snow (1984) called organizations reactors if strategy-environment inconsistency
exists, and strategy, structure, and process are poorly aligned in organizations.

Table 4-1 shows how HRM practices can be different depending on
organizational characteristics, and Miles and Snow (1984) argued that because the
demand for human resources services derives from strategic considerations in most
organizations, the development of HRM systems has tended to lag behind
developments in strategy and structure.

47

Table 4-1. Organizational Characteristics and HRM Practices

Defender

Prospector

Analyzer

Basic HRM
Strategy

Building
Human resources

Acquiring
Human resources

Allocating
Human resources

Recruitment,
Selection,
& Placement

Emphasis: “make”
Little recruitment above
entry level
Selection based on weeding out
undesirable employees

Emphasis: “buy”
Sophisticated recruiting
at all levels
Selection may involve
psychological testing

Emphasis: “make and buy”
Mixed recruiting and selection
approaches

Staff Planning,
Training,
& Development

Formal, extensive skill building
Extensive training programs

Informal, limited skill
identification and acquisition
Limited training programs

Formal, extensive skill building
and acquisition
Extensive training programs

Performance
appraisal

Process-oriented procedures
Identification of training needs
Comparison with previous
years’ performance

Results-oriented procedures
Identification of staffing needs
Comparison with other
companies during the same
period

Compensation

Oriented toward position in
organization hierarchy
Internal consistency
Compensation driven by
superior/subordinate
differentials

Oriented toward performance
External competitiveness
Compensation driven by
recruitment needs

Mostly process-oriented
procedures
Identification of training and
staffing needs
Mostly comparison with
previous years’ performance,
some comparison with other
companies
Oriented toward hierarchy, some
performance
Internal consistency and
external competitiveness
Compensation driven by
superior/subordinate
differentials and recruitment
needs

Source: Adapted from Miles and Snow (1984)

4.4 Strategic situation and human resource management practices
Arguing that achieving competitive advantage through human resources requires that
theses activities be managed from a strategic perspective, Lengnick-Hall and
Lengnick-Hall (1988) explained why it is desirable to integrate human resources
management and strategic choice as follows. First, integration provides a broader
range of solutions for solving complex organizational problems. Second, integration
ensures that human, financial, and technological resources are given consideration in
setting goals and assessing implementation capabilities. Third, through integration
organizations must explicitly consider the individuals who comprise them and must
implement policies. Finally, reciprocity in integrating human resource and strategic
concerns limits the neglect of human resources as a vital source of organizational
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competence and competitive advantage.

Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988) proposed a typology for strategic
management of human resources through the “Growth/Readiness” matrix shown in
figure 4-2, and contended that movement from one strategic situation to another (i.e.,
from one quadrant to another in the figure) results from an interaction between
environmental conditions and organizational choice.

Figure 4-2. Growth / Readiness Matrix

High
Expansion

Development

Corporate
Growth
Expectations
Productivity

Redirection

Low

High

Organizational

Low

Readiness
Source: Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988)

Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall explained that corporate growth expectations (i.e.,
Y-axis) are a proxy for the goals of the organization and high growth generally
means increased opportunities, high cash flow, and expansion. Organizational
readiness (i.e., X-axis) measures availability or obtainability of human resources
skills, numbers, styles, and experience needed for strategy implementation, therefore
it is a proxy for implementation feasibility. Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall argued
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that since current techniques or skills become less competitive over time, strategic
situations tend to change from left to right (i.e., from high readiness to obsolescence)
while growth expectation moves from top to bottom (i.e., from high growth
expectation to lower growth goals) because markets become saturated and new
competitors enter the marketplace.

Quadrant 1 (development) is characterized by high growth expectations and a
poor level of readiness between strategy and human resources skills as seen in the
figure. In this situation, a firm may choose to invest heavily in its human resources to
improve implementation feasibility or a firm may decide to change corporate goals
to reflect the lack of readiness. When an organization is located in quadrant 2
(expansion) characterized by high grow expectations and good readiness indications
between strategy and skills, the primary question involves resource allocation: what
proportion of resources should be devoted to achieving continued growth and what
proportion should be channeled into managing the effects of growth (e.g., updating
planning systems, managing information, socializing new employees). LengnickHall and Lengnick-Hall explained that the resolution to resource allocation depends
on the level of human resources investment required to maintain desired growth and
continued readiness, profitability, and other performance measures that are important
to the firm. In quadrant 3 (productivity) where characteristics includes low growth
expectation and strong readiness, the key question is how to channel the results of
productive activities because a firm in this quadrant has an established competitive
advantage and operations are highly effective and efficient. The redirection quadrant
(quadrant 4) is characterized by low growth expectations and poor readiness. Firms
located in this quadrant are typically in declining industries or have maintained
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obsolete products or manufacturing processes that are no longer competitive,
therefore they must decide whether to redirect employee activities or to alter the
business focus (i.e., exit). For example, if a firm decides to redirect employee
activities, retaining, restructuring, and realignment are needed. If a firm decided to
exit, turnover is often required. Based on MacMillan and Jones (1986), LengnickHall and Lengnick-Hall suggested that firms in this quadrant must examine
organization culture and employment philosophy because firms that reach this stage
usually have an organization culture that is firmly established and values that have
dominated during times of growth and implementation are often maladaptive. In
conclusion, Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall suggested a testable hypothesis that
firms engaging in a strategy formulation process that systematically and reciprocally
considers human resources and competitive strategy will perform better over the
long term than firms that manage competitive strategy and human resources
independently of each other

4.5 Competitive strategy and human resource management practices
Based on Porter’s (1980; 1985) discussion of a firm’s competitive advantage,
Schuler and Jackson (1987) suggested three competitive strategies and their proper
HRM practices that organizations may use to gain competitive advantage: innovation,
quality enhancement, and cost reduction. According to Schuler and Jackson (1987), a
certain type of role behavior is needed from an employee apart from the specific
technical skills, knowledge, and abilities required to perform a specific task, and this
employee role behavior is associated with HRM practices. Table 4-2 shows several
dimensions along which employee’s role behavior can vary.
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Table 4-2. Employees role behaviors for competitive strategies
1. Highly repetitive, predictable behavior

…. Highly creative, innovative behavior

2. Very short-term focus

…. Very long-term behavior

3. Highly cooperative, interdependent behavior

…. Highly independent autonomous behavior

4. Very low concern of quality

…. Very high concern for quality

5. Very low concern of quantity

…. Very high concern for quantity

6. Very low risk taking

…. Very high risk taking

7. Very high concern for process

…. Very high concern for results

8. High preference to avoid responsibility

…. High preference to assume responsibility

9. Very inflexible to change

…. Very flexible to change

10. Very comfortable with stability

…. Very tolerant of ambiguity and
unpredictability

11. Narrow skill application

…. Broad skill application

12. Low job involvement

…. High job involvement

Source: Schuler (1988)

Schuler and Jackson (1987) argued that since an organization pursuing an
innovation strategy is to be the most unique producer, conditions for innovation must
be created either formally through official corporate policy or more informally.
Therefore, the role behavior for this organization includes: a high degree of creative
behavior, a longer-term focus, a relatively high level of cooperative, interdependent
behavior, moderate concern for quality and quantity, an equal degree of concern for
process and results, a greater degree of risk taking, and a high tolerance of ambiguity
and unpredictability. Quality improvement can be possible through the employee’s
commitment to work, changing processes of production, and others, therefore an
organization with a quality-enhancement strategy needs the employee’s role behavior
such as relatively repetitive and predictable behaviors, a more long-term focus, a
modest amount of cooperative, interdependent behavior, a high concern for quality, a
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modest concern for quantity of output, high concern for process, low risk-taking
activity, and commitment to the goals of the organization. Since a firm with costreduction strategy typically attempts to gain competitive advantages by being the
lowest cost producer, Schuler and Jackson (1987) argued that the profile of employee
role behaviors includes relatively repetitive and predictable behaviors, rather shortterm focus, primary autonomous and individual activity, high concern for quantity of
output, primary concern for results, low risk-taking, and a relatively high degree of
comfort with stability.

Based on role behaviors in each competitive strategy (i.e., innovation,
quality-enhancement, and cost-reduction), Schuler and Jackson (1987) suggested
proper HRM practices in each case. Firms pursuing innovation strategy are likely to
have the following HRM characteristics: (1) jobs that require close interaction and
coordination among groups of individuals, (2) performance appraisals that are more
likely to reflect longer-term and group-based achievements, (3) jobs that allow
employees to develop skills that can be used in other positions in the firm, (4)
comparison systems that emphasize internal equity rather than external or marketbased equity, (5) pay rates that tend to be low, but that allow employees to be
stockholders and have more freedom to choose the mix of components, and (6) broad
career paths to reinforce the development of a broad range of skills. The key HRM
practices in a firm with quality-enhance strategy are: (1) relatively fixed and explicit
job description, (2) high levels of employee participation in decisions relevant to
immediate work conditions and the job itself, (3) a mix of individual and group
criteria for performance appraisal that is mostly short term and results-oriented, (4)
relatively egalitarian treatment of employees and some guarantees of employment
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security, and (5) extensive and continuous training and development of employees.
An organization with cost-reduction strategy is likely to have HRM practices such as
(1) Relatively fixed and explicit job descriptions that allow little room for ambiguity,
(2) narrowly designed jobs and narrowly defined career paths that encourage
specialization, expertise, and efficiency, (3) short-term, results-oriented performance
appraisals, (4) close monitoring market pay level for use in making compensation
decisions, and (5) minimal levels of employee training and development. Schuler
and Jackson (1987) concluded that although all firms are not seeking to gain
competitive strategy, for those attempting to do so, the experiences of other firms
suggest that effectiveness can be increased by systematically melding HRM practices
with the selective competitive strategy.

4.6 Summary
So far I reviewed some strategic human resource management (SHRM) studies in
which human resources are understood from the strategic perspective. Although
these studies mainly focus on organizations in the private sector, we may get some
hints about how to understand HRM characteristics and HRM practices that
municipal police departments may have. For example, we may interpret the
influence of HRM practices and characteristics on crime control performance (i.e.,
performance indicator in this study) in the municipal police departments from the
strategic viewpoint. If we find a significant relationship between HRM
characteristics and crime control performance, we may interpret that HRM
characteristics are well tuned to organizational strategies. Likewise, if no significant
results are found, we may interpret that there might be inconsistency between HRM
practices and their organizational strategies or that HRM practices are irrelevant for
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crime control performance.

Schuler and Jackson (1987) argued that HRM practices are associated with
expected role behaviors that are different depending on competitive strategies (i.e.,
innovation, quality enhancement, and cost reduction) that an organization pursues.
According to Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988), HRM practices would be
different depending on strategic situations (i.e., development, expansion, productivity,
and redirection), that can be explained with corporate growth expectation and
organizational readiness. Miles and Snow (1984) observed three basic types of
organizational characteristics (i.e., defenders, prospectors, and analyzers) and
suggested appropriate HRM practices for each type of organizational characteristics.
For example, defenders are likely to have little recruitment above entry level
whereas prospectors are likely to have sophisticated recruiting at all levels.

Wright and McMahan (1992) summarized HRM literature and answered the
question, “what determines HRM practices?” by suggesting strategic and nonstrategic models. Strategic models of HRM practices view HRM activities (or
practices) as being determined by proactive and strategically intended decisions, and
Wright and McMahan (1992) suggested four strategic models: resource-based view,
cybernetic system, agency/transaction cost, and behavioral approach. The authors
also suggested non-strategic models that do not see HRM practices as the results of
proactive decision-making. Instead, in non-strategic models, HRM practices are
viewed as results of institutional and political forces that do not consider
organizational goals or strategic end. In addition to Wright and McMahan’s (1992)
strategic and non-strategic models that explain the determinants of HRM practices,

55

Jackson and Schuler (1995) argued that HRM practices are also influenced by
contextual factors of an organization. That is, they identified internal contextual
factors (i.e., technology, structure, size, life cycle stages, and business strategy) and
external contextual factors (i.e., legal, social, and political environments,
unionization, labor market conditions, industry characteristics, and national culture),
both of which are likely to influence HRM practices an organization adopts.

Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007
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V. HRM Practices, Organizational Performance, and Hypotheses

From the perspective of strategic human resource management (SHRM), HRM
practices may be determined according to organizational characteristics (i.e., Miles
and Snow, 1984: defender, prospector, and analyzer), strategic situations (i.e.
Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 1988: development, expansion, productivity, and
redirection), or competitive strategies (i.e., Schuler and Jackson, 1987: innovation,
quality-enhancement, and cost reduction). While those typologies are suggested as
strategic models, Wright and McMahan (1992) also suggested non-strategic models
since sometimes HRM practices can fail to support a firm’s strategy. According to
Wright and McMahan, the determinants of HRM practices in some organizations
(especially public organizations) may not be the results of rational strategic decisionmaking processes, but rather derived from institutional and political forces.

In this chapter, I review HRM practices from both universalistic and
contingency perspectives, focusing on the link between HRM practices and
organizational performance. From the universalistic perspective, there are HRM best
practices that always lead to better organizational performance in any circumstances,
whereas the contingency perspective argues that we can expect better performance
only when HRM practices are integrated with organizational strategy because
different employee behaviors are required under different organizational strategy and
different HRM practices will elicit and control employees’ behaviors. After
reviewing arguments of both universalistic and contingency perspectives, I review
some empirical studies that tested if HRM practices are correlated with
organizational performance from the universalistic and the contingency perspectives.
Since control theories also appear to explain the link between HRM practices and
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organizational performance, I also review some arguments from the control theory
perspective, too. At the end of this chapter, I establish some hypotheses that predict
the relationships between HRM practices and crime control performance, based on
the arguments of universalistic, contingency, and control theory perspectives.

5.1 The universalistic perspective on HRM practices
There are generally two primary perspectives to describe the link between HRM
practices and organizational performance; one is the universalistic (or best practices)
and the other is the contingency (Youndt et al., 1996). In this section and the next, I
outline these two perspectives based on HRM studies that provide summaries about
either one of those perspectives or both (e.g., Arthur, 1992; Becker & Gerhart, 1996;
Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Delery & Doty, 1996; Walton, 1985; Youndt et al., 1996).

The universalistic approach has an assumption that certain HRM practices
have positive and direct effects on organization performance. In fact, a fair amount
of empirical evidence that supports this assumption has been accumulated. Some
studies (e.g., Bartel, 1994; Becker & Huselid, 1992; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992;
Ichniowski, 1986; Wagner, 1994) focus on the effect of individual HRM practices,
others (e.g., Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Walton, 1985),
especially recently, focus on bundles or systems of HRM practices. For example,
some studies focus on individual HRM practices such as selectivity in staffing (e.g.,
Becker et al., 1992; Schmidt, Hunter, McKenzie, & Muldrow, 1979), training (e.g.,
Bartel, 1994; Knoke & Kalleberg, 1994), incentive compensation (e.g., Gerhart et al.,
1992), formal grievance procedure (e.g., Ichniowski, 1986), and employee
participation (e.g., Wagner, 1994), and found that each of those individual HRM
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practices has positive effects on organizational performance.

More recently, researchers have found that bundles, or systems, of HRM
practices have more influences on organizational performance than individual
practices working in isolation (e.g., Youndt et al., 1996). For example, Arthur (1992;
1994) found that commitment-maximizing HRM systems have more positive effects
on manufacturing performance than cost-reduction HRM systems. According to
Arthur (1992, 1994), the commitment-maximizing HRM system is characterized by
broadly defined jobs, high level of employee participation, formal dispute resolution,
regularly share business information with employees, more extensive general
training, and relatively high wages. Youndt et al. (1996) and Becker and Gerhardt
(1996) similarly argued that there are the best HRM practices that lead to better
organizational performance, but they noted that those best HRM practices may vary
depending on researchers. Table 5-1 shows some examples of the best HRM
practices that are suggested by different researchers.

Although there are some variations in defining the best HRM practices
depending on the studies, Youndt et al. (1996) observed that at their roots, most
studies focus on enhancing the skill base of employees through human resource
activities such as selective staffing, comprehensive training, and broad
developmental efforts like job rotation and cross-utilization as seen in the table.
Youndt et al. (1996) explained the reasons why those best HRM practices might
result in high performance, based on two different theories. According to human
capital theory, people who possess Skills, Knowledge, and Abilities (SKAs) are
valuable to firm, so HRM practices that help improve employees’ SKAs are more
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likely to increase organizational performance.

Table 5-1. Summaries of HRM Best Practices
Authors

HRM best practices

- Flexible definition of duties
- Frequent use of teams as accountable unit
- Flat organization structure with mutual influence system
- Management emphasis on problem solving and relevant expertise
- Individual pay linked to skills and mastery
Walton (1985)
- Job security
- Priority for training
- Employee participation encouraged on wide range of issues
- Business data shared widely
- Mutuality in labor relations/joint planning on expanded agenda
- Employment security
- Selective recruiting
- High wages/Incentive pay
- Employee ownership
- Information sharing
Pfeffer (1994)
- Participation
- Empowerment
- Job redesign/teams
- Training and skill development/Cross-training
- Wage compression
- Promotion from within
- Personnel selection
- Performance appraisal
- Incentive compensation
- Formal grievance procedures
Huselid (1995)
- Information sharing
- Labor/management participation
- Recruiting intensity
- More training hours
- Work teams
- Problem-solving groups
- Job rotation
MacDuffie (1995)
- Decentralization
- Recruitment and hiring
- Contingent compensation
- More training hours
- Self-directed work teams
Kochan and Osterman
- Job rotation
- Problem-solving groups/quality circles
(1994)
- Total Quality Management
- Self-directed work teams
- Problem-solving groups/quality circles
Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991)
- Feedback on production goals
- Formal conflict resolution
Source: Adapted from Walton (1985), Youndt et al. (1996), and Becker and Gerhardt (1996)
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Youndt et al. (1996) also explained with resource-based theory.

The

resource-based theory emphasizes that internal resources like employees play a
critical role to developing and maintaining a firm’s competitive capabilities (see
Wright and McMahan’s (1992) determinants of HRM practices). Researchers (e.g.,
Barney, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994; Ulrich & Lake, 1991; Wright et al., 1992) noted that
people may be the ultimate source with which we can sustain competitive advantage
because other sources such as technology, financial capital, and scale economies can
be easily imitated and have been weakened by globalization and environmental
changes.

5.2 The contingency perspective on HRM practices
The contingency perspective posits that the impact of HRM practices on
organizational performance is conditioned by organizations’ strategic postures that
may be determined by organizational characteristics, strategic situations, or
competitive strategies. Therefore, if a firm’s approach to competition does not rely
on the talents and capabilities of employees, HRM practices may not have an effect
on organizational performance (Youndt et al., 1996).

Delery and Doty (1996) noted that contingency arguments are more complex
than universalistic arguments because contingency arguments imply interactions
rather than the simple linear relationships incorporated in universalistic theories.
According to Delery and Doty (1996), the organization’s strategy is considered to be
the primary contingency factor, therefore a contingency perspective requires a
researcher to select a theory of firm strategy and then specify how the individual
HRM practices will interact with firm strategy to result in organizational
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performance.

Youndt et al. (1996) explained the link between contingency approach to
HRM practices and a high level of organizational performance from two
perspectives: the behavioral perspective and control theory perspective. From the
behavioral perspective, organizational characteristics or strategies require unique
attitudes and role behaviors if performance is to be effective. According to this
perspective, HRM practices can be the means to elicit and reinforce the kinds of
employee behaviors that an organization needs. That is, strategic context influences
individual HRM practices such as employee selection (e.g., Hambrick, 1983), job
design (e.g., Keefe & Katz, 1990), and performance appraisal and compensation (e.g.,
Kerr, 1985). For example, under the cost reduction strategy in which organizations
can create customer value by reducing costs, emphasis is placed on efficiently
managing a low-skilled, manual workforce. Therefore, in that situation,
comprehensive employment testing to find the best qualified candidates (e.g.,
Hofstede, 1978) or elaborate training system (e.g., Cascio, 1991) may have a
negligible impact on organizational performance. However, under the quality
strategy that focuses on continually improving manufacturing processes to increase
product reliability and customer satisfaction, the ultimate determinants of
organizational competitiveness may be the intellectual capital of organizations.
Therefore, human-capital-enhancing HRM systems with such features as selective
staffing, comprehensive training, developmental behavior-based performance
appraisal, and group incentives are likely to have positive impacts on organizational
performance (Youndt et al. 1996).
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5.3 HRM practices and organizational performance
As we reviewed in the previous sections, some strategic HRM (SHRM) researchers
argued that there are so-called best HRM practices (i.e., universalistic HRM
practices) which may lead to a high level of organizational performance, whereas
other SHRM researchers argued that HRM practices need to be integrated with
organizational strategies to be effective (i.e., contingency perspective). In this section,
I review some empirical research that explored the relationships between HRM
practices and organizational performance from either universalistic or contingency
perspectives.

As one of the first empirical efforts to evaluate the effect of HRM system on
organizational performance from the strategic viewpoint, Arthur (1994) investigated
the effects of HRM practices on organizational performance, using an empirical
taxonomy of HRM practices such as control and commitment HRM categories.
Arthur found that an organization with commitment HRM practices had higher
organizational performance than an organization with control HRM practices. With a
sample of 30 existing U.S. steel minimills where they begin the steel making process
with steel scrap instead of iron ore, Arthur (1994) categorized their HRM practices
into control and commitment HRM systems (or bundles of HRM practices),
compared their organizational performance (i.e., scrap rate and labor hours) among
minimills with different HRM systems, and found that minimills with the
commitment HRM system had fewer labor hours per ton and fewer scrap rate (i.e.,
higher performance). Although Arthur (1994) found that HRM system had a
significant effect on organizational performance in this study, he raised a question if
HRM system has similar effect in the public sectors.
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Huselid (1995) argued that if superior HRM practices (i.e., the best HRM
practices) increase employees’ discretionary effort, their use would increase a firm’s
productivity, drawing on the theoretical literature (e.g. Barney, 1991) that suggests
HRM practices can affect individual employee performance through their influence
over employees’ skills, motivation, and organizational structures. Huselid also
argued that complementarities among HRM practices (i.e., internal fit) and alignment
of HRM practices with a firm’s competitive strategy (i.e., external fit) would
increase a firm’s productivity, too. Testing with a sample consisting of 968 firms that
had more than a hundred employees in the U. S., Huselid found that best HRM
practices led to increased productivity (i.e., sales per employee in the study).
However, the results did not support the external fit argument (i.e., contingency
argument) and showed only modest support for the effect of internal fit among HRM
practices on productivity.

Based on Levine and Tyson’s (1990) study, MacDuffie (1995) argued that
three conditions must be met for any HRM system to contribute to improving
performance: (1) when employees possess knowledge and skills that managers lack;
(2) when employees are motivated to apply these skills and knowledge through
discretionary efforts; and (3) when the firm’s business or production strategy can
only be achieved when employees contribute such discretionary effort. Between two
historical production strategies (i.e., mass production and flexible production
strategies), Macduffie (1995) argued that under flexible (or lean) production strategy
workers are given a more central role in the production system, and extensive
training, broad job classifications, and job rotations are required for employees to
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develop skills for problem-solving. He also argued that workers would only
contribute their discretionary efforts to problem-solving if they believe that their
individual interests are aligned with those of the company, and that the company will
make a reciprocal investment in their well-being. Using an international data set
comprising 62 automotive assembly plants, MacDuffie (1995) tested his argument
that HRM system contributes more to productivity 1 and quality 2 of assembly plant
when HRM system is integrated with manufacturing policies from contingency
perspective. The result showed that flexible production strategy consistently led to
better performance than the mass production approach, and that result confirmed the
universalistic arguments rather than contingent approach about the effects of HRM
practices. That is, the argument that either mass or flexible production plants with a
good fit between their HRM systems and production strategies would better perform
was not supported.

With the data collected from about 200 banks, Delery and Doty (1996) tested
three modes of SHRM theories to see the effects of HRM practices on financial
performance: universalistic, contingency, and configurational. As reviewed
previously, the universalistic view refers to best HR practices that lead to better
performance if an organization adopts them, and the contingency view means HRM
practices need to be consistent with business or production strategy if high
performance is to be achieved. According to Delery and Doty, while the contingency
view focuses on individual HRM practices, the configurational view is more
concerned about the pattern of multiple independent variables (i.e., internal fit
between HRM practices) – that is, synergistic effects are expected if there is
1
2

Labor productivity is defined as hours of actual effort required to build a vehicle.
Consumer-perceived quality, defined as defects per 100 vehicles.
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consistency among HRM practices. Drawing on SHRM literature (e.g., Miles et al.,
1984; Osterman, 1987; Pfeffer, 1994), Delery and Doty identified seven strategic
HRM practices: internal career opportunities, formal training systems, appraisal
measures (behavior or results based), profit sharing, employment security, voice
mechanism (formal grievance and participation in decision making), and job
definition. According to the results in their study, the universalistic view was
relatively more supported than the other views, and especially, three HRM practices
such as job security, profit-sharing, and results-oriented appraisal had strong and
positive relationships with organizational finance performance. The results also
provided some support for the contingency perspective by revealing the links
between financial performance and three HRM practices such as performance
appraisal, employee participation, and internal career opportunity when they were
consistent with organizational strategies. For example, banks that were able to align
their HRM practices with strategy were estimated to have nearly 50 percent higher
financial performance (e.g., return-on-assets in the study) than other banks whose
HRM practices were one standard deviation out of alignment. In addition, the results
also showed some support for the configurational view. For example, the more
closely a bank’s employment system resembled the market-type system 3 , the higher
level its performance reached. In sum, the results showed that all the three
perspectives of HRM practices had positive effects on organizational performance
(i.e., financial performance in the study).

The universalistic and the contingency views of the effects of HRM practices
3

The market-type system is characterized by hiring from outside an organization, providing little
training, and evaluating performance through the use of results measures. Oppositely, the internal
system is characterized by hiring from internal labor market, and extensive training and socialization
(Delery and Doty, 1996, p809-810)
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on performance were also tested by Youndt, Snell, Dean, and Lepak (1996). With the
sample comprising manufacturing plants in metal-working industry (100 – 150
managers at different positions participated), Youndt et al. focused on the
relationships between organizational performance – customer alignment, machine
efficiency, and employee productivity – and the four most commonly recognized
areas of HRM practices (i.e., staffing, training, performance appraisal, and
compensation). The results showed that human-capital-enhancing HRM practices 4
have significant and positive effects on organizational performance (i.e., customer
alignment, machine efficiency, and employee productivity in the study), which
supports the universalistic perspective. Further analysis, however, revealed that the
main effect of human-capital-enhancing HRM practices on performance was
predominately a function of the performance enhancement obtained when firms
linked human-capital-enhancing HRM systems with a high quality manufacturing
strategy 5 . Therefore, the contingency perspective was much more supported. For
example, as seen in figure 5-1, machine efficiency, one of the operational
performance measures, appears to increase as a plant adopts more human-capitalenhancing HRM practices. When the data are analyzed further by categorizing
participating plants according to the manufacturing strategy they adopt (i.e., high
quality manufacturing strategy and cost reduction manufacturing strategy), we
observe that machine efficiency increases only when a plant adopts high quality
manufacturing strategy.

4

According to Youndt et al. (1996), human-capital-enhancing HRM practices are characterized by
selective staffing, comprehensive training, developmental behavioral-based appraisal, and group
incentive and external equity compensation. Administrative HRM practices have opposite
characteristics.
5
High quality strategy focuses on continually improving manufacturing processes to increase product
reliability and customer satisfaction, whereas organizations with cost reduction strategy creates
customer value by reducing costs and this can be done by diminishing the amount of human capital
needed in the production process. (Youndt et al, 1996)
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Figure 5-1. Human-Capital-Enhancing HRM Practices and Manufacturing Strategies
High quality
Manufacturing strategy
High
Overall participants
without differentiating
strategies they adopt
Machine
Efficiency

Cost reduction
Manufacturing strategy

Low

Low

Human-CapitalEnhancing HRM

High

Source: Youndt, Snell, Dean, and Lepak (1996)

In sum, mixed results have existed. Some studies (Huselid, 1995; Arthur,
1994; Macduffie, 1995) found the results that supported the universalistic
perspective, and other studies (Delery and Doty, 1996; Youndt et al., 1996) revealed
that the contingency perspective better predicted the relationship between HRM
practices and organizational performance.

5.4 Control theory and HRM practices
In order to achieve better performance through effective control over employees,
control researchers have suggested different control methods (or strategies), based on
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task programmability 6 and outcome measurability 7 ; the control methods, in turn,
lead to different HRM practices (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). For example,
Thompson (1967) suggested control methods such as computational 8 , compromise 9 ,
judgmental 10 , and inspirational 11 strategies; Ouchi (1979) and Eisenhardt (1985)
suggested behavioral control, output/outcome control, and input/clan controls,
depending on the task programmability (or knowledge of cause/effect relations) and
the outcome measurability (standards of desirable performance). Figure 5-2
summarizes the arguments of control theory researchers.

Figure 5-2. Administrative Information and HRM Control

Knowledge of Cause/Effect Relations
Complete

Incomplete

(Computational Strategy)

(Judgmental Strategy)

Behavior Control

Crystallized Output Control
Or Both

Outcome
Measurability

(Compromise Strategy)

Ambiguous

Behavior Control
- Centralization
- Articulated Procedures
- Close Supervision
- Behavior Appraisal

Output Control
- Decentralization
- Results Criteria
- Performance-Rewards
Link
(Inspirational Strategy)
Socialization/Clan Control
Input Control
- Rigorous Staffing
- Training-Development
- Socialization

Source: Adapted from Snell (1992), Thompson (1967), Ouchi (1979), and Eisenhardt (1985)
Note:
- Computational, judgmental, compromise, and inspirational strategies are Thompson’s (1967) terms.
- Behavior, output, and socialization/clan control are Ouchi’s (1979) terms

6

When we have knowledge about cause and effect of the task, it is task-programmable.
If outcomes are tangible, they are measurable
8
Where there is certainty regarding both cause/effect relations and outcome preferences, computers
have been most widely employed for making decisions.
9
Where there is certainty regarding cause/effect but uncertainty regarding outcome preferences.
10
Where outcome preferences are clear but cause/effect relationships are uncertain.
11
Where there uncertainty on both cause/effect relationships and outcome preferences
7
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From the perspective of control theory, we may say that better organizational
performance can be achieved through less control costs, and less control costs can be
possible through appropriate control methods and induced HRM practices. Of course,
any control methods can entail some costs. As Ouchi (1979) noted, for example,
costs for search and acquisition are associated with input control, and costs for
monitoring and evaluating are expected when we adopt behavioral and output
control. However, if we do not properly consider the task programmability (or
knowledge of cause/effect relations) and the outcome measurability (or standards of
desirable performance) that control theory scholars suggested before choosing any
type of control methods, more costs would be necessary.

According to Thompson (1967), as a classic control theory, decision issues in
controlling a complex organization always involve two major dimensions: beliefs
about cause/effect relations and preferences regarding possible outcomes. Therefore,
each type of decision issue calls for a different strategy of controlling. For example,
as seen in figure 5-2, when there is certainty regarding both causation and outcome
preferences, computational strategy is proper. In an opposite situation where there is
uncertainty on both dimensions, inspirational strategy is proper for controlling the
organization. However, judgmental or compromise strategy is necessary when either
of those two dimensions is not clear.

Ouchi (1979) introduced three fundamentally different mechanisms (i.e.,
markets, bureaucracies, and clans) through which organizations can seek to cope
with the problem of evaluation and control. According to Ouchi, bureaucratic form is
preferred in many situations despite its inadequacies since pure markets rarely exist.
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Informal social structure (i.e., clans) as an input control is effective in control when
behavior control or outcome control costs too much and is not possible. Ouchi
argued that a control mode which relies heavily on selecting the appropriate people
can expect high commitment as a result of internalized values, whereas a control
mode heavily depending on monitoring and evaluation in an explicit manner is likely
to offend people’s sense of autonomy and of self-control and result in an
unenthusiastic, purely compliant response, based on Etzioni (1965).

Eisenhardt (1985) considered control variables such as reward structure, task
characteristics, and information systems for organizational design from two
perspectives: organizational theory and agency theory. Based on Thompson’s (1967)
and Ouchi’s (1979) arguments, Eisenhardt argued that the control strategy an
organization would adopt is a function of task characteristics (or task
programmability) and outcome measurement from the perspective of organizational
theory. Eisenhardt also argued that the control strategy is a function of costs of
information systems and uncertainty from the perspective of agency theory. For
example, if a task is neither programmed nor has a measurable outcome from
organizational perspective, input control such as a selective recruiting becomes
appropriate, and the input control in this situation would also minimize divergence of
preferences and be least expensive among control means from the perspective of
agency theory. In sum, Eisenhardt (1985) integrated both organizational and agency
theory perspectives and predicted the type of control strategy for an organization. In
fact this integrated perspective can provide more practical choices than any single
perspective. From economic perspective (i.e., agency theory), the costs of
information system may become a major practical barrier to adopting behavioral or
output control system in many cases. Consequently an organization tends to rely on
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input control when monitoring and evaluating employee’s behavior or outcomes cost
too much and/or task is neither programmable nor measurable.

Snell (1992) empirically tested the theoretical arguments of control theory
that the type of control (behavioral, output, or input controls) an organization relies
on would depend on the knowledge of cause/effect relations as well as standards of
desirable performance. That is, Snell tested if an organization relies on a specific
type of control, depending on the administrative information that managers might
have. According to the results, Snell (1992) concluded that the input, behavior, and
output controls did not appear to be mutually exclusive and, therefore those control
types might serve different purposes and could be implemented together although the
three control types are different from each other with distinct patterns of practices. In
this section I reviewed the arguments of some control studies such as Thompson
(1967), Ouchi (1979), Eisenhardt (1985), and Snell (1992) in order to better
understand HRM practices that might be induced by control methods we choose.

5.5 Control/Commitment HRM practices, police organizations, and hypotheses
Although the best HRM practices are different depending on the researchers (see
table 5-1 for the summary of various best HRM practices) – that is, the concept of
“the best practices” is still developing, at their roots most studies focus on enhancing
the skill base of employees through HR activities such as selective staffing,
comprehensive training, and broad developmental efforts like job rotation and crossutilization, as Youndt et al. (1996) observed.

One strategic HRM researcher, Walton (1985) categorized HRM practices
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into control and commitment systems and argued that workers respond best not when
they are tightly controlled (i.e., under control HRM system), but when they are given
broader responsibilities, encouraged to contribute, and helped to take satisfaction in
their work (i.e., under commitment HRM system). As seen in table 5-2, Walton
compared control and commitment HRM system in various aspects and argued that
any organizations that adopt commitment HRM practices would achieve better
organizational performance than an organization with control HRM practices from
the universalistic perspective of HRM.

Among various typologies of HRM practices, I chose Walton’s (1985) HRM
typology as a basic perspective in my study because of two reasons. First, Walton’s
control/commitment HRM typology includes comprehensive aspects of HRM
practices that cover most of the common best practices summarized in table 5-1.
Second, although commitment HRM system is basically suggested from the
universalistic perspective, we also find that it is associated with human-capitalenhancing strategy and control HRM system matches with cost-reduction strategy
when we compare the characteristics of commitment and control HRM system with
those of the strategies. Therefore, it is also possible to investigate the connection
between the type of HRM system an organization has and the strategy an
organization adopts and to interpret the effect of HRM practices on organizational
performance from the contingency perspective. That is, if we find the positive effects
of commitment HRM system on organizational performance, we may interpret that
the organization likely to have HRM practices that are consistent with the
organizational strategy. Likewise if we find no significant relationship between the
effects of commitment HRM system and organizational performance, we may
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interpret that the organization likely to have HRM practices that are not consistent
with the organizational strategy. This interpretation is possible because the effects of
HRM practices on organizational performance can be explained by either
universalistic perspective or contingency perspective (Wright and McMahan, 1992).

Table 5-2. Comparison between Control and Commitment HRM Practices

Control HRM practices
Job design
principles

Commitment HRM practices

Individual attention limited to Performing
individual job
Job design deskills and fragments work and
separate doing and thinking
Accountability focused on individual

Individual responsibility extended to upgrading
system performance
Job design enhances content of work, emphasizes
whole task, and combines doing and thinking
Frequent use of teams as basic accountable unit

Fixed job definition

Performance
expectation

Measured standards define minimum
performance. Stability seen as desirable.

Management
organization:
structure, system,
and style

Structure tends to be layered, with top-down
controls.
Coordination and control rely on rules and
procedures
More emphasis on prerogatives and positional
authority
Status symbols distributed to reinforce hierarchy

Compensation
policies

Variable pay where feasible to provide individual
incentive.

Flexible definition of duties, contingent on
changing conditions
Emphasis placed on higher, “stretch objectives,
which tend to be dynamic and oriented to the
marketplace.
Flat organization structure with mutual influence
systems
Coordination and control based more on shared
goals, values, and traditions.
Management emphasis on problem solving and
relevant information and expertise.
Minimum status differentials to de-emphasize
inherent hierarchy
Variable rewards to create equity and to reinforce
group achievements: gain sharing, profit sharing

Individual pay geared to job evaluation

Individual pay linked to skills and mastery

In downturn, cuts concentrated on hourly payroll.

Equality of sacrifice.

Employees regarded as variable costs.

Priority for training and retaining existing
workforce.

Employee input allowed on relatively narrow
agenda.

Employee participation encouraged on wide
range of issues.

Business information distributed on strictly
defined on strictly defined “need to know” basis.
Adversarial labor relations; emphasis on interest
conflict.

Business data shared widely.

Employment
assurance
Employee voice
policies
Labormanagement
relations

Mutuality in labor relations. Unions,
management, and workers redefine their
respective roles.

Source: Walton (1985)

If the best HRM practices are universal, then they can be applied to any
organizations regardless of the characteristics an organization has. Likewise, if
police organizations have the best HRM practices that are likely to lead to better
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performance under any circumstances, we can predict the positive effect of the best
practices, too. More specifically, in the context of police organizations, I expect a
positive relationship between crime control performance and individual HRM
practices such as broad job design, more discretion allowed, formal grievance
resolution

mechanism,

information

sharing

policy,

employee

participation

encouraged, and more selective staffing, based on the HRM literature that explored
the correlations between organizational performance and individual HRM practices
from the universalistic perspective (e.g., Bartel, 1994; Becker et al., 1992; Gerhart et
al., 1992; Knoke et al., 1994; Schmidt et al., 1979; Wagner, 1994). I also expect a
positive relationship between crime control performance and commitment HRM
system (i.e., the bundle of best HRM practices) according to Walton (1985) and
Arthur (1992, 1994).

In addition to the best HRM practices concept that supports the positive
relationships between commitment HRM practices (individually and as a system)
and crime control performance from the universalistic perspective, the control theory
also suggests that commitment HRM practices will have more positive effects on
effective crime control performance than control HRM practices in the context of
police organizations because we see neither clear outcome measurability nor
complete knowledge of cause and effect relations. Actually it is doubtful that police
organizations themselves choose those organizational strategies and HRM practices
like other organizations in the private sector. According to Wright and McMahan
(1992), firms in the private sector tend to choose best strategies to be competitive
and are likely to have specific organizational characteristics and HRM practices that
may elicit and reinforce desirable behaviors from the employees (i.e., behavioral
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approach). In the public sector, however, organizations characteristics and HRM
practices are determined not by strategy, instead, but by non-strategy such as
institutional and political forces as explained in the resource-dependent model and
the institutional model. Simply put, in the public sector the behavioral approach (i.e.,
universalistic and contingency perspectives) may not explain well the HRM practices
in the context of public sector where organizational strategies are not usually
determined by organizations themselves and therefore consequent HRM practices are
not likely to be consistent with organizational strategies.

As a different approach to explain the link between HRM practices and
organizational performance (Youndt et al., 1996), control theory supports
commitment HRM practices in improving the crime control performance of the
municipal police departments. As seen in figure 5-2, employee control strategies are
categorized along two dimensions such as knowledge of cause and effect relations,
and outcome measurability (as we reviewed, these dimensions are differently named
by different control theory researchers). Although some costs are expected regardless
of the control methods we choose, we expect more overall cost (including loss) to an
organization when we do not choose a right control method, based on those two
dimensions. For example, if we choose output control even when knowledge of
cause and effect is incomplete and outcome measurability is ambiguous, monitoring
and evaluating costs would be tremendous and we are not likely to get the goals we
wants even with more money spent. Usually, costs of information system can be a
major barrier that prevents organizations from adopting behavioral or output control
system especially when we lack the knowledge of cause and effect relations and
outcome is not easily measurable as Eisenhardt (1985) noted.
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In the context of police organizations, we can imagine that there are lots of
demands and expectations from citizens that the police officers are to meet. Among
various demands that citizens want the police to take care of, the police do not seem
to have a clear idea about how to effectively reduce crimes, based on their crime
control statistics – that is, there is lack of knowledge of cause/effect relations. We
also do not properly measure the outcomes of crime control police activities, either.
The main reason for this is the fact that goals are usually vague and intangible in the
public sector. As we reviewed previously, the case of England Financial
Management Initiative (FMI) that adopted 435 performance indicators can be a good
example to show that police performance is not measurable with ease. Therefore, in
the municipal police departments in which we lack the knowledge of cause and
effect relations and outcome measurability is incomplete, input control (or clan
control) appears to be appropriate for police organizations. That is, as an input
control, we can adopt HRM practices such as rigorous staffing, developmental
training, and socialization for a police department as seen in figure 5-2, and those
HRM practices are part of commitment HRM characteristics.

In sum, we expect that commitment HRM system and its individual HRM
practices are more likely to result in better crime control performance in the police
organizations, based on the best HRM practice concept and control theory. In fact,
this expectation is consistent with Hatry and Greiner’s (1986) and Sparrow, Moore,
and Kennedy’s (1990) suggestion that for the police to perform better, the doctrine of
tight managerial control may need to be supplanted by doctrines of worker
participation, total quality management, and shared commitment to excellence as we
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reviewed in chapter two. This expectations is also consistent with Rainey and
Steinbauer’s (1999) effectiveness model, and government effectiveness studies such
as Hale’s (1996), Gold (1982), Wilson (1989), Denhardt (1993), and Holzer and
Callahan (1998) as we reviewed at chapter three. Therefore, I establish hypotheses
about the effects of individual HRM practices and HRM systems on crime control
performance of the municipal police departments as below.

H1: Municipal police departments that have individual HRM practices as below
(individual practices of commitment HRM system) are more likely to have
better crime control performance respectively.
(1) Broad job classification,
(2) More discretion allowed
(3) Formal complaint/grievance resolution mechanism
(4) Information-sharing-policy 12
(5) Employees’ participation encouraged in a wide range of issues,
(6) No bonus or incentive system for individuals, and
(7) More selective staffing

H2: Municipal police departments that have commitment HRM systems are
more likely to have better crime control performance.
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Most information is usually shared among employees regardless whether or not the information is
directly necessary to them.
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VI. Turnover, Measures, and Causes and Effects

In this chapter, I briefly review some basics of turnover study such as definitions,
turnover measures, and causes and effects of turnover, mainly based on Price (1977)
and Mobley (1982), which have been regarded as the most comprehensive, classic
turnover studies and have provided guidance for turnover studies so far. Later in this
chapter, I review some turnover studies in the context of police organization that
mainly focused on why police officers leave.

6.1 Voluntary and involuntary turnover
As Tai, Bame, and Robinson pointed out (1998), turnover researchers have not used
a consistent definition of turnover. Price (1977) defined turnover as the degree of
individual movement across the membership boundary of a social system. Mobley
(1982) defined turnover as the cessation of membership in an organization by an
individual who receives monetary compensation from the organization. Simply put,
turnover is defined as employees leaving their organizations due to whatever reasons.
Under the traditional turnover perspective, it is assumed that people leave
organizations due to either voluntary or involuntary reasons. Price (1977) and
Mobley (1982) also distinguished voluntary turnover (i.e., initiated by individual)
from involuntary turnover (i.e., initiated by organization, plus death and mandatory
retirement) and explained that the term "quits" is probably the most frequent label for
voluntary turnover and "quits" and "resignations" are generally used interchangeably.

Turnover researchers usually argue that the differentiation between voluntary
and involuntary turnovers is necessary. According to Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, and
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Gupta (1998), treating quits (i.e., voluntary turnover), discharge (i.e., involuntary
turnover), and total turnover as synonymous ignores the markedly different
etiologies and effects of those phenomena. For example, in an organization with high
quit rates, for various reasons employees find it more attractive to leave than to stay,
whereas in an organization with high discharge rates, presumably incorrect hiring
decisions are remedied through termination. Therefore, Shaw et al. (1998)
emphasized that voluntary and involuntary turnover must be treated differently
because their difference is not just superficial, but fundamental. McElroy, Morrow,
and Rude (2001) also stressed that the failure to separate the types of turnover might
mask or even exacerbate the effects of any single form of turnover on organizational
performance. In fact, voluntary turnover is more often studied than involuntary
turnover because of the following reasons that Price (1977) explained. First of all,
most turnover is voluntary. Second, the formation of theory is easier when the
phenomenon to be explained is homogeneous (i.e., it is very difficult to explain both
quits and dismissals by the same theory). Finally, voluntary turnover is more subject
to control by managers. That is, retirements and deaths are less easily controlled than
quits and it is natural for managers to focus their attention on phenomena over which
they have some degree of control.

Even when we differentiate voluntary turnover from involuntary turnover,
retirement needs special attention since the elimination of mandatory retirement
policies has had the effect of making retirement “a voluntary organizational
behavior” (Hanisch & Hulin, 1990). Therefore, voluntary retirement should be
differentiated from mandatory retirement (i.e., involuntary turnover). However, there
are important conceptual differences between voluntary retirement and quitting even
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after we differentiate voluntary retirement from mandatory retirement. Although they
are similar in that workers may withdraw from their current workplace due to workrelated variables such as job satisfaction and stress, quitting is usually followed by
continued regular employment whereas voluntary retirement is usually followed by
some type of decreased commitment to work (Adams & Beehr, 1998; Feldman,
1994). According to Adams and Beehr (1998), the differences between quitting and
voluntary retirement can be explained in terms of personal finances 1 , perception of
alternatives 2 , level of pay 3 , age 4 , and marital status 5 . In the present study, I basically
distinguish voluntary retirements from mandatory retirements, but no further
differentiation is made between voluntary retirements and quitting because most
municipal police departments do not keep turnover data in that detail and the results
of pilot survey 6 confirmed it.

According to Shaw et al. (1998), employee may find it more attractive to
leave than to stay when an organization has a high quit rate. High quit rate (i.e., high
voluntary turnover rate) may mean that an organization is less likely to have proper
human resource management (HRM) policies or practices, and consequently quality
employees are more likely to leave. If voluntary turnover has significant negative
effects on organizational performance, it is necessary to make serious efforts to

1

There is positive relationship between good financial condition and intent of voluntary retirement,
whereas no relationship between good financial condition and intent of quitting.
2
Workers considering voluntary retirement weigh their current situation against decreased
participation in the work force but workers considering quitting more often weigh their current
situation against other possible work alternatives.
3
Low pay may lead workers to quit their current jobs in favor of those that pay better, but voluntary
retirement workers are leaving their jobs for choosing to decrease participation in the work force.
4
Age would have a negative relationship with quitting intention but have a positive relationship with
the intention of voluntary retirement.
5
It is expected that there is a positive relationship between having spouse and voluntary retirement
but a negative relationship between being married and quitting.
6
Before conducting main survey, I surveyed 12 police departments with different population ranges to
see if the questionnaires are proper and if they can provide the data as requested.
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reduce voluntary turnover through adopting proper HRM policy or practices (e.g.,
direct investment, such as pay or benefit; and indirect investment, such as training,
job stability, or procedural justice).

6.2 Turnover measures
There are various turnover measures that we can use for the research but each
measure has both advantages and disadvantages. Table 6-1 summarizes the formula
for each measure, based on Price (1977) and Mobley (1982).

Table 6-1. Different Turnover Measures
Turnover
Measure

Formula

1. Average length of
Service (stayers)

=

2. Average length of
Service (leavers)

=

3. Accession rate

=

4. Separation rate

=

5. Stability rate

=

6. Instability rate

=

7. Survival rate

=

8. Wastage rate

=

Sum of length of service for each member
# of members
Median length of service of all members
who leave during a period
# of new members added during the period
Average # of members on payrolls during the period
(# of quit) or (# of discharges) or (# of total separation)
Average # of members on payrolls during the period
# of beginning members who remain during the period
# of members at beginning of period
# of beginning members who leave during the period
Average # of payroll during the period being studied
# of stayers in the cohort with specified length at service
# in the original cohort
# of leavers in the cohort with specified length at service
# in the original cohort

Source: Adapted from Price (1977) and Mobley (1982)

Average length of service 7 for stayers (i.e., the first measure in the table) has
advantages such as easy computation and understandability, but this measure does
7

Price (1977) preferred to use service rather than employment to encompass both work organizations
and voluntary associations such as churches and fraternal orders.
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not indicate the total number of members exposed to the possibility of turnover
during a period. As shown in Price’s (1977) example, even when an organization
experiences a very large rate of turnover among its low-service members (i.e., new
members), if an organization has a relatively large core of members with long tenure,
the average length of service for stayers would be high. That is, this measure will not
indicate most of the turnover of the low-service members. Although we can
overcome this disadvantage by using Van der Merwe and Miller’s (1971; 1973)
average length of service for leavers (i.e., the second measure in the table), it would
take a fairly large unit to have sufficient leavers to yield a stable statistic. Accession
rate and separation rate (i.e., the third and the fourth measures in the table) can
enhance the utility of turnover rates because they indicate how much turnover
characterizes an organization. These rates, however, have no precise meaning and
therefore their utility is limited. For example, a 100 percent separation rate (i.e.,
turnover rate is one) could indicate (1) the entire labor force had turned over once
during the year, (2) half the labor force had turned over twice, the other half
remaining stable, or (3) a quarter of the labor force had turned over four times, and
so on. Even with this drawback, however, the separation rate is probably the most
frequently used turnover measure in the literature as Price (1977) pointed out, and
the current study also adopted separation rate as turnover measure mainly due to data
availability.

Unlike accession and separation rates, stability and instability rates (i.e., the
fifth and sixth measures in the table) have precise meanings. For example, 50 percent
instability rate can be interpreted in only one-way: half of the members at the
beginning of the period leave by the end of the period. However, they do not control
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the length of service, probably the most important variable associated with turnover.
To overcome the drawbacks that separation/accession rates and stability/instability
rates, the survival and wastage rates (i.e., the seventh and eighth measures in the
table) were introduced. That is, these rates not only have a precise meaning, but also
control the length of service by restricting themselves to the new members who enter
during a period. However, the survival and wastage rates can be used only when the
organizations are quite large. For example, to obtain the cohort of 100 workers
recommended for this measure by Silcock (1955), we imagine that only quite large
organizations can have that size of cohort. Therefore, as Price (1977) noted, none of
the other turnover measures experiences the size disadvantage as seriously as the
survival and wastage rates although they are the most sophisticated of the turnover
measures.

In sum, Price (1977) suggested some combinations of turnover measures. For
example, if an organization is fairly large but not large enough to use the survival
and wastage rates, the average length of service for leavers can be used with the
separation rate because this combination can provide two important pieces of
information about organizational turnover – its location (i.e., who are leaving) and
volume (i.e., how many are leaving). In the current study, I use separation rates as s
turnover measure and divide them into voluntary and involuntary turnover. However,
there is no combination with any other turnover measures in this study simply
because I found in the pilot survey 8 that most municipal police departments do not
keep turnover records in details, so it is not possible to calculate other turnover

8

I surveyed 12 municipal police departments before conducting main survey.
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measure. In reality, even separation records are not well kept for many years
especially when the city size is small (e.g., population is under 100,000).

6.3 Turnover causes and effects
Since the causes and effects of turnover are differently argued, depending on
turnover studies, it would be meaningful to review how turnover researchers view
the causes and the effects of turnover, based on the classic turnover theories (Price,
1977; Mobley, 1982). After briefly summarizing the before-turnover part (i.e., what
causes turnover?), I review the after-turnover part (i.e., what are turnover effects?) in
more details.

According to Price (1977), the degree of satisfaction 9 is the most important
factor to voluntary turnover. Namely, higher satisfaction likely results in lower
turnover rates and lower satisfaction likely leads to higher turnover rates. Price,
however, noted that the influence of satisfaction to turnover can be moderated by job
opportunity in the market. For example, if there is little opportunity in a job market,
even lower level of satisfaction may not lead to higher turnover rate. In addition,
satisfaction itself may be also affected by other factors such as pay scale, the degree
of

integration

10

,

job-related

(or

instrumental)

communication,

formal

communication 11 , and the degree of centralization. Therefore, we can expect a low
level of turnover when an organization has a high pay level; a high degree of
integration; a high level of job-related/formal communication; a low degree of
centralization; and few opportunities in a job market. Figure 6-1 summarizes the
9

This is the degree to which the members of a social system have a positive and affective orientation
toward membership in the system (Price, 1972).
10
This is the extent of participation in primary and/or quasi-primary relationships (Blau, 1960).
11
This is officially transmitted information (Price, 1977).
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relationships among determinants, intervening variables, and turnover.

Figure 6-1. Relationships between Determinants, Intervening Variables, & Turnover

Pay

Job opportunity
Integration

Job-related
Communication

Satisfaction

Turnover

Formal
Communication

Centralization

Source: Price (1977)

Mobley’s (1982) turnover model looks more complicated than the Price’s
(1977) model. According to Mobley, although the negative relationship between job
satisfaction and turnover is established well, we need to move beyond the simple
replication of the satisfaction-turnover relationship toward research on the cognitive
and behavioral processes that may occur between satisfaction and actual turnover. In
his expanded model of the employee turnover process (Mobley, Griffeth, & Meglino,
1979), job satisfaction is affected by individual (occupational and personal) values,
organizational factors, and labor market factors. The Mobley et al. model also
includes expectations regarding present job and alternative jobs as variables that
might affect the perceived attraction of present job and alternative jobs. In addition,
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the type of gratification (immediate vs. delayed), belief regarding non-work
consequences of quitting, and impulsive behavior are also added as other affecting
factors to the model. In sum, the Mobley et al. (1979) tried to explain the reasons of
turnover in more depths by adding cognitive and behavioral factors to the Price’s
model. As a result, their model became more complicated.

More than two decades ago, Mobley (1982) noted that the bulk of the
research on turnover had focused on causes and correlates and relatively less
attention had been devoted to the consequences of turnover (i.e., the after-turnover
part), and Mobley’s description about turnover research trends is still right.
According to Price (1977), turnover may have effects on organizational variables
such as (1) the number of administrative staff, (2) formalization, (3) integration; (4)
employee satisfaction, (5) innovation, (6) centralization; and (7) effectiveness (see
figure 6-2 for the direction of effect).

Price (1977) divided these seven variables into three groups according to the
amount of supporting data in the literature. Administrative staff, formalization, and
integration are placed in the first group that has medium amount of supporting data.
The second group that has small amount of supporting data includes satisfaction,
innovation, and centralization. The third group has mixed supporting data, and
includes effectiveness (i.e., organizational performance). Since there has been mixed
empirical evidence on effectiveness as a result of turnover, Price (1977) concluded
that the conventional wisdom is probably right in its belief that turnover generally
has a negative effect on effectiveness in nonlinear fashion. The intermediate and
final effects of turnover are summarized in figure 6-2.
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Figure 6-2. The Effects of Turnover
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Note: + and – indicate the direction of turnover effect. For instance, + Administrative staff means
administrative staff would increase due to turnover.
Source: Adapted from Price (1977)

While Price (1977) approached turnover effects from the organizational
perspective (except satisfaction that is an individual level), Mobley (1982)
differentiated turnover effects according to the three different levels of perspectives
such as individual, organization, and society. Table 6-2 shows the summary of the
negative and positive effects of turnover from each perspective.
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Table 6-2. Turnover Effects on Individual, Organization, and Society

Negative Effects

Positive Effects

Individual

Organization

Society

Disruption of social and
communication pattern
Decreased
Satisfaction
Increased workload

Costs of recruiting, hiring,
assimilation, and training
Replacement costs

Increased cost of
production
Regional inability to
keep industry

Decreased
Commitment
Decreased
Cohesion
Increased internal
mobility opportunity
Stimulation, crossfertilization from new
coworker
Increased cohesion
Increased commitment

Disruption of social and
communication structure
Productivity loss
Decreased satisfaction
among stayers
Displacement of poor
performers
Infusion of new
knowledge/technology
Stimulate changes in policy
and practice
Increased structural
flexibility
Decrease in other
“withdrawal” behaviors
Reduction of conflict

Mobility to new industry
Reduced income
inequity
Decreased job stressrelated costs

Source: Adapted from Mobley (1982)

For example, as seen in table 6-2, several negative effects can be expected at
the organizational level such as costs of recruiting and training; productivity loss;
disruption of social and communication structure; and decreased satisfaction among
staying employees (i.e., decline in morale). At the same time, positive turnover
effects are also expected at the organizational level. That is, we may expect
displacement of poor performers; increased innovation, flexibility, and adaptability;
and reduction of conflict. Since positive and negative turnover effects usually coexist
as seen in the table, Mobley (1982) argued that what we need is a mechanism to
evaluate the net utility of turnover to the organization rather than the traditional
assumption that turnover has negative effects on the organizational performance.

6.4 Police Turnover Studies
Like other turnover research, turnover causes have been dominantly focused on by
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police turnover studies, too. The implicit assumption of police turnover studies is
that turnover is an important organizational problem, which is costly to the
organization and therefore, should be reduced (Staw, 1980). According to the
national surveys that asked police chiefs and sheriffs about the major concerns they
have, staff shortage due to turnover has been consistently ranked first or second
among major concerns that police chiefs have (Gettinger, 1984; Manili & Connors,
1988; Webster & McEwen, 1992). Turnover can be an even more serious concern
especially among small police agencies because they are particularly inclined to
reduce law enforcement services while new employees are being recruited or receive
basic training (Harris & Baldwin, 1999; Warrell, 2000a).

Turnover is also one of big concerns in the field of medical service. Therefore,
some researchers tried to calculate the costs of registered nurses’ turnover. For
example, Jones (1990a; 1990b) estimated that recruitment costs were more than
$10,000 per registered nurse termination which included the unfilled positions,
hiring costs, orientation and training costs, and new nurses’ low productivity. When
taking indirect and hidden turnover costs into account, however, Johnston (1991)
estimated that turnover costs per registered nurse might exceed $25,000. Likewise,
Phelan (1991) contended that $12,000 was a conservative estimate of the
replacement cost for a single police officer. But, when we take indirect and hidden
turnover costs into account as Johnson (1991) did, turnover costs per police officer
may be more than $25,000. Harris and Baldwin (1999) summarized the possible
costs and the negative effects of police officers’ turnover as follows. Turnover of
police officers may (1) increase recruitment, selection, and replacement costs; (2)
increase training and development costs, including more on-the-job orientation and
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supervisory coaching costs; (3) lower productivity while new officers learn their
jobs; (4) disrupt programs and organizational efficiency; and (5) decrease morale
among officers who remain.

Theoretical studies about the causes of police turnover show that job
satisfaction level (Favreau & Gillespie, 1978; Wilson & McLaren, 1950) and job
stress (Bopp, 1974; McDowell, 1971; Reiser, 1974) have been regarded as the most
probable reasons of turnover. For example, according to the congruency theory
suggested by Moriarty and Field (1990; 1994), when the expectations of new police
officers are not met during early years of their careers, the incongruency between
their expectation and real experience leads to police officers’ voluntary turnover.
While some empirical research exploring the negative relationship of job satisfaction
with pay and benefits, and turnover rate (Hoffman, 1993; McIntyre, 1990; Phelan,
1991; Teske, 1976; Wales, 1988) confirmed their predictions, other empirical studies
found the importance of management to raise their employees’ overall satisfaction to
reduce turnover rates (Lipson, 1987; White, 1991).
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VII. Turnover-Performance Relationships and Hypotheses

In this chapter, I review theoretical backgrounds for different arguments of turnoverperformance relationships and also I review some empirical research that tested the
arguments about turnover effects. At the end of this chapter, I establish some
hypotheses about turnover effect on organizational performance and the moderating
role of human resource management (HRM) system in the context of police
organizations. Before beginning to review theoretical backgrounds for different
arguments about turnover effects, I briefly outline different kinds of arguments about
turnover effects, based on Shaw, Gupta, and Delery (2005) in the introduction
section.

7.1 Introduction
Recently, Glebbeek and Bax (2004) pointed out that the research on turnover is
dominated by analyses in which turnover is treated as the dependent variable. Noting
that empirical studies that explored the effects of turnover are still rare, Glebbeek
and Bax asserted that there seems to be no tradition of empirical research into the
effects of employee turnover (p278). Among a few empirical studies that
investigated turnover effects, some studies (e.g., Alexander, Bloom, & Nuchols,
1994; Shaw et al., 2005) demonstrated that turnover has a significant effect on
organizational performance, and others (e.g., Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 2001;
Huselid, 1995; Koys, 2001) showed that turnover does not have a significant effect
at all. These empirical results are consistent with Price’ (1977) categorization. That
is, Price put organizational performance (or effectiveness) into the group that has
mixed results – some support negative effects of turnover on effectiveness and others
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do not - as reviewed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, even among the studies
that showed the significance of turnover effect, the sign (i.e., positive or negative)
and the shape (e.g., linear, curvilinear, U-shape, and inverted-U shape) of the
relationships are different, depending on the studies.

In this situation where there seems to be no consistency of the arguments and
the empirical demonstration about the relationship between turnover and
organizational performance, Shaw et al.’s (2005) categorizations help to understand
the different arguments developed so far. Shaw et al. (2005) categorized the
arguments about the relationships between turnover and organizational performance
into four theoretical patterns as follows: (1) the linear negative relationship, (2) the
inverted-U relationship, (3) the attenuated negative relationship, and (4) the human
resource management (HRM) -moderated relationship.

According to Shaw et al. (2005), human capital theory (I explain this in the
next section) appears to provide a formal platform for the arguments such as the
linear negative, the inverted-U, and the attenuated negative relationships, suggesting
that organizational performance is determined by the accumulation of firm-specific
human capital embodied in the work force (Strober, 1990). Therefore, when turnover
frequently occurs, an organization's firm-specific human capital accumulations
would be depleted, and therefore the level of organizational performance would be
lowered.

Beginning from Dalton and Todor’s (1979) question about the traditional
belief that turnover effects on organizational performance are always negative, the
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argument of the inverted-U relationship has been developed. In this perspective, as
suggested by human capital theory, high levels of voluntary turnover are detrimental
for work force performance. At low to moderate levels, however, voluntary turnover
may improve work force performance by playing a revitalizing role. That is, due to
the likelihood of stagnation or trained incapacitation at low levels of voluntary
turnover, some turnover can be functional in an organization. The argument of the
attenuated negative relationship is another variation of the human capital theory
foundation for the turnover-organizational performance relationship, built on
learning curve theory (I explain this later in this chapter, too). Based on Price's
(1977) proposal that successively higher amounts of turnover will be found
ultimately to produce, more often than not, successively lower amounts of
effectiveness at a decreasing rate, Shaw et al. (2005) explained that voluntary
turnover has negative effects on work force performance (i.e., organizational
performance) by diminishing firm-specific human capital accumulations, but these
losses are becoming less severe as turnover rate is getting higher (i.e., at a decreasing
rate).

So far, the three different theoretical patterns of the relationships were briefly
reviewed and these relationships are displayed in figure 7-1. From the perspective of
management, if the relationship were an inverted-U shape, it would be good if we
know the turnover level when organizational performance begins to decrease.
Likewise, if the relationship were a negative attenuated shape, it would be helpful to
know the turning point (i.e., when the slope becomes closer to zero). If the
relationship were a negative linear, knowing the slope of the linear relationship
would be helpful to predict the level of performance at a certain level of turnover. In
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Shaw et al.’s (2005) studies with concrete pipe manufacturing plants and with
trucking companies, the negative attenuated relationship was found and the turning
point of the relationship was actually calculated.

Figure 7-1. Alternative Forms of the Relationship of Voluntary Turnover and
Organizational Performance
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Source: Shaw, Gupta, and Delery (2005)

Although Shaw et al. (2005) classified the arguments of the relationship
between turnover and organizational performance into four patterns, the HRMmoderated relationship (the fourth one) can be related to any of the other three
patterns. Regardless of the shape or the sign of the relationship, the HRM-moderated
argument predicts that an organization with inducement- and investment-oriented
HRM system is more likely to lead to a more negative relationship between turnover
and organizational performance, whereas an organization characterized by less
inducement- and investment-oriented HRM system is expected to have a less
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negative relationship. For example, figure 7-2 shows the difference of turnover
effects on performance between an organization with control HRM system and an
organization with commitment HRM system when the relationship between turnover
and organization performance is negative and linear. As seen in the figure, an
organization with control HRM system would have higher performance level (point
A on y-axis) than an organization with commitment HRM system (point B on y-axis)
at the same turnover rate. In other words, as turnover rate increases, performance
would decrease at higher rate (i.e., a bigger negative slope) in an organization with
commitment HRM system than in an organization with control HRM system.

Figure 7-2. HRM-moderated Relationship
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Source: Adapted from Shaw, Gupta, and Delery (2005)

7.2 Theoretical argument for the linear negative relationship
The argument for the linear, negative relationship between turnover and
organizational performance mainly comes from human capital theory initiated by

96

Schultz (1961). Scholars who support human capital theory usually emphasize the
specific knowledge employees might have when they leave. For example, Pencavel
(1972) argued that the employer has to balance the advantages of operating with a
low turnover rate against the costs of higher remuneration paid to keep his labor
force contented. Therefore, if most employees do not have specific knowledge in a
company, their turnover is less likely to influence organizational performance in a
negative way. That is, spending too much money to keep low turnover rate in this
case may not be a good idea in terms of cost and benefit. Alchian and Demetz (1972)
and Williamson (1985) also argued that the firm experiences no dislocation costs
when human asset specificity is negligible and any team effects are of a primitive
kind.

The advice that if you want a good job, get a good education embodies the
essence of human capital theory (Strober, 1990). Although this theory was originally
developed to explain the relationship between education and earning, Strober (1990)
emphasized that human capital theory says more than the positive relationship
between educational level and income. Becker (1962) suggested a particular
mechanism explaining education effects on earning by human capital theory as
follows:

(1) Education increases skills
(2) Productivity is going up by increased skills
(3) Higher productivity is then rewarded through higher earnings.

In fact, human capital theory has been challenged. For instance, researchers
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ask a question of whether education/experience raises earnings by raising
productivity or by other behavioral relationships. According to Strober (1990), the
productivity connection between education/experience and earnings has been
explained by alternative theories such as screening hypothesis, efficiency wage
models, internal labor market theories, and radical theory, all of which have
challenged the human capital theory. Below are the brief reviews of those theories.

The screening hypothesis is that education is positively correlated with
earnings not because additional education yields higher productivity, but because
employers use additional education as a screen, or filter, or signal to hire bettereducated workers into jobs that pay more. Blaug (1976) even predicted that the
human capital theory would gradually fade away to be swallowed up by the new
theory of signaling (a variant of the screening hypothesis) formulated by Spence
(1973; 1974) and (Arrow, 1973). According to the signaling theory, employers may
pay higher wages to more educated employees even if education has no effect on
productivity. The signaling theory assumes that potential workers with relatively
high ability levels can invest more cheaply in education than can employees with
lesser ability 1 . Therefore, higher ability workers can “signal” their higher level of
ability productivity to employers. Now from the employer’s perspective, if
employers find those with more education more productive, they will continue to use
education as a signal of higher productivity even though education itself has nothing
to do with productivity enhancement.

Efficiency wage models challenge human capital theory with respect to the
1

If a person has relatively higher cognitive ability, he or she can go through school with less effort
and less pain than a person with lower level of cognitive ability.
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connections between experience and productivity, and between productivity and
earnings. According to this theory, employers may pay workers less than their value
added during the early years of employment, but pay them more than their value
added in later years, which provides incentives for employees to remain with the
firm and continue to remain maximally productive. The internal labor market theory
explains why wages at non-entry level positions do not depend on supply and
demand while external labor markets set wages based on supply and demand. The
internal labor market theory explains that non-entry level jobs are filled not from the
external market but through promotion and transfer of those who are already
employed by the firm. Therefore, administrative rules and procedures are the
determinants of the level of wages, not supply and demand. Finally, radical theorists
believe that education does increase productivity but the link between education and
productivity is not skill acquisition, as human capitalists maintain, but the
reproduction of the class structure of society. That is, schools teach students from the
working class those skills and behaviors that are useful in working-class occupation,
but they teach middle- and upper-class students skills and behaviors needed to
assume leadership roles in society.

In sum, although the human capital theory has been challenged by some
alternative theories, it still explains well the connection between training/education
and performance at an individual level and most arguments about turnover effects on
organizational performance are based on this theory as Shaw et al. (2005) noted.
According to the human capital theory, skills and knowledge would be increased by
education or training and human resources loss (i.e., turnover) with those skills and
knowledge likely have negative effects on organizational performance, especially

99

when those skills and knowledge are specific. In other words, if those skills and
knowledge acquired through education or training are not specific, organizational
performance may not be influenced even when organizations experience a high
turnover rate.

7.3 Theoretical argument for the inverted-U relationship
The inverted-U relationship predicts that organizational performance would be
increasing if turnover levels are from low to middle because turnover may play a
revitalizing role to an organization for that range. However, high levels of turnover
may be detrimental to organizational performance due to the same reasons that were
explained in the human capital theory.

Staw (1980), like a few other turnover researchers (e.g., Abelson &
Baysinger, 1984; Dalton et al., 1979; Price, 1977), paid attention to positive
consequences of turnover as well as negative consequences. Staw (1980) observed
that traditionally the implicit assumption underlying turnover study has been that
turnover is an important organizational problem, so it should be reduced. Although
the costs of turnover may include (1) selection and recruitment costs, (2) training and
development costs, (3) operational disruption, and (4) demoralization of
organizational membership, Staw (1980) identified some moderating variables that
can serve to minimize those adverse effects of turnover. That is, turnover will be less
costly for persons in lower level positions, in plentiful labor markets, in noninterdependent roles, and from non-cohesive work groups. Staw (1980) also
identified some positive consequences of turnover such as increased performances,
reduction of entrenched conflict, increased mobility and morale, and innovation and
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adaptation although the benefits of turnover are less obvious than the costs of
turnover because they are less quantifiable and less attainable in the near-term.

The traditional perspective about a new employee’s performance assumes
that the performance of a new employee is initially low and, only after getting
experience, reaches the level of the preceding employee (i.e., J- or S- shape curve).
Unlike the traditional perspective, Staw (1980) argued that newcomers may be more
highly motivated than the old employees and may possess greater abilities and
training. Therefore, Staw (1980) suggested the inverted-U shaped relationship
between tenure in the organization and performance. However, for some jobs such as
social work, nursing, and police work in which the psychological demands of the job
are relatively high, Staw explained that “early burn-out” or ”bureaucratic” curve
might describe the relationships better. That is, as some scholars argued, employees
in those jobs tend either to conform more to a bureaucratic role (Blau & Scott, 1962;
Van Maanen, 1975) or to a psychological 'burn-out' in which employees distance
themselves from the client being served (Maslach, 1978).

Basically Staw argued that performance is generally a joint function of skills
and effort. While experience may contribute positively to job skills and knowledge,
effort or motivation may be at its highest when the individual first arrives in the
organization especially for psychologically high demanding jobs. In sum, Staw
(1980) contributed to forming the inverted-U shaped argument about the relationship
between turnover and organizational performance through pointing out the positive
effects of turnover and suggesting a different approach to the relationship between
performance and employee’s tenure in the organization.
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Dalton and Todor (1979) also contributed to initiating the inverted-U
relationship between turnover and organizational performance by emphasizing the
positive consequences of turnover, but they pointed out the positive effects of
turnover not only from the organizational perspective but also from the economic,
sociological, and social psychological perspectives. From the organizational
perspective, Dalton and Todor (1979) criticized most organizational theorists who
had only focused on the negative aspects of turnover, and argued that turnover might
increase organizational effectiveness through the higher chance of innovation
because the process of mobility brings “new blood” and new ideas into the
organization. From the economic perspective, Dalton and Todor argued that neither
one person nor one firm should suffer from turnover with the assumption that wages
and marginal product are equal (i.e., marginal productivity theory). Based on
Gitlow’s argument (1971), Dalton and Todor argued that an employee, as a rational
and income-maximizer, will respond to existing structure of wages by moving away
from employment of less net attractiveness and toward employment of relatively
greater attractiveness according to marginal productivity theory. Therefore, turnover
would increase net national product, reduce inequitable distribution of income, and
contribute to the long-term growth rate of the economy from the economic
perspective.

Furthermore, Dalton and Todor (1979) argued that from the sociological
perspective, society does not necessarily gain by the reduction of turnover in the
organization because the reduction of turnover may involve important dysfunctions
to society. In other words, society's social and economic advancement could be
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accomplished by vertical (i.e., promotion) and horizontal mobility (i.e., turnover). In
fact, Blau and Duncan (1967) early argued that job changes are important
components of the vertical mobility process and horizontal migration has become
increasingly effective as a selection process by which individuals are channeled to
places where their potential can be realized more fully. Likewise, Adams (1963) also
argued that mobility might serve to reduce inequality or inequity in social exchange.
Dalton and Todor, citing Golant’s (1971) argument, also reviewed the positive
function of turnover from the psychological and social psychological perspectives,
and argued that an individual's decision to initiate a particular movement (i.e.,
turnover) can be defined as an adjustment process in an adaptive system maintaining
its homeostatic level, .

Unlike other researchers (i.e., Dalton and Todor, 1979; Staw, 1984) who
indirectly suggested the inverted-U shape, Abelson and Baysinger (1984) directly
showed why the relationship between turnover and organizational performance
should

be inverted-U shape using cost concepts. Abelson and Baysinger argued

that total turnover cost (TTC) is the combination of retention cost (RC) associated
with attempts to reduce the turnover rate and turnover cost (TC) associated with the
separation of incumbent employees plus the costs of searching for and training new
employees. As seen in figure 7-3, the optimal level of aggregate turnover for most
organizations will be greater than zero because RC will be the highest when an
employer wants to maintain turnover rate at the level close to zero and TC will be the
highest when turnover rate is at its highest level. Therefore, RC curve and TC will
move in an opposite direction and the intersection can be an optimal point for TTC
(i.e., minimum cost)
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Figure 7-3. Optimal Organizational Turnover

Total Turnover Cost
(TTC)

Turnover Cost
(TC)

Turnover Related Cost

Retention Cost
(RC)
Optimal Turnover Rate (TO0)

Turnover Rate (TO)

Source: Abelson and Baysinger (1984)

According to Abelson and Baysinger (1984), even when one focuses solely
on the turnover of employees whom the organization prefers to retain, there is some
portion of the turnover rate that is not necessarily organizationally dysfunctional.
Since total turnover cost (TTC) is viewed as a mixture of RC and TC (i.e., U-shaped
dot line) as seen in figure 7-3, the relationship between organizational performance
and turnover rate will be consequently inverted-U shape 2 . Abelson and Baysinger
(1984) explained that at a very low rate of turnover, organizational performance is
low because excessive financial resources and opportunities for productive
organizational structure and management process are being inappropriately
sacrificed in an effort to prevent the voluntary separation of preferred employees,
2

When TTC is at its lowest level, organizational performance (OP) is at it highest level because we
can say that OP and cost are in opposite positions. Therefore, we can draw inverted-U shape
relationship between OP and turnover as seen in figure 7-5.
104

which can be dysfunctional. Likewise, at a very high rate of turnover, excessive
turnover costs are being incurred in an inappropriate attempt to reduce retention cost,
therefore cost saving through low wages and poor work conditions may not be
enough to cover the cost incurred due to turnover.

Since turnover costs (TC) and retention costs (RC) may differ among
different organizations, Abelson and Baysinger (1984) argued that the optimal rate of
turnover (i.e., at the lowest point of total turnover cost as seen in figure 7-3) would
be different, depending on organizations. They also argued that these costs such as
TC and RC, in turn, should vary systematically with individual, organizational, and
environmental attributes that influence costs at any given rate of turnover for the
organization as a whole, as well as individually perceived costs and benefits of
quitting/staying behavior

7.4 Theoretical argument for the attenuated negative relationship
This perspective was built on the sociological literature on turnover and learning
curve theory. Originally, Price (1977) proposed that successively higher amounts of
turnover would be found ultimately to produce, more often than not, successively
lower amounts of effectiveness at a decreasing rate.

From this perspective, researchers argue that turnover would have negative
effects on work force performance by diminishing firm-specific human capital
accumulations, but these losses would be less severe and the negative effects of
turnover on organizational performance would be ameliorated at a high level of
turnover. Therefore, as Shaw et al. (2005) noted, this argument implies that a linear,
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negative formulation may underestimate the negative effects of turnover at a low
turnover rate and overestimates the effects of turnover at a high turnover rate.

As seen in figure 7-4, if turnover is at a low level (i.e., L on x-axis), the
predicted level of organizational performance is H1 when the relationship is linear
and negative, whereas the predicted level of organizational performance is L1 when
the relationship is attenuated and negative. Therefore, if the true relationship is
attenuated and negative, the reduced performance would be lower than the
organization level that linear, negative relationship predicts. Likewise, if turnover is
at a high level (i.e., H on x-axis), the predicted level of organizational performance is
L2 when the relationship is linear, negative, but the predicted level of organizational
performance is H2 when the relationship is attenuated, negative. Therefore, if the
true relationship is attenuated and negative, the expected organizational performance
would be overestimated if we think the relationship is linear, negative.
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Figure 7-4. The Linear and the Attenuated Negative Relationships

High
Performance
H1

L1

H2
L2
Low
Performance
(L)

(H)

Turnover Rate

Source: Adapted from Shaw et al. (2005)

Why are the negative effects less severe when turnover is at a high level?
According to Shaw et al.’s (2005) explanation, when turnover is at a low level,
input-throughput-output processes are disrupted and energy and resources are
redirected from safety concerns in order to maintain operations as skill levels are
reduced by turnover. When turnover is very high, however, increases in turnover
beyond some point are likely to be minimally disruptive because the organization is
already geared toward continual work force replacement. The amelioration of
negative turnover effects at a high turnover can be also explained by learning curve
theory. Logan (1992) basically explained the learning curve theory, based on Newell
and Rosenbloom's (1981) power law. According to the power law displayed in the
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equation as below, the time taken to perform a task decreases as a power function of
practice.

Where,
RT: reaction time

RT = a + bN-c

a: the asymptote
b: the difference between initial and asymptotic
performance;
N: the amount of practice
c: the learning rate.

In the equation, we see that if c (i.e., learning rate) is getting higher, b (i.e., the
difference between initial and asymptotic performance) is getting smaller with the
assumption that N (i.e., the amount of practice) is same. We can see this relationship
with ease in figure 7-5 where the functions differ only in the learning rate (c). Logan
explained this relationship with the instance theory of automacity. According to
Logan, when subjects have no experience on a task, they solve the problems by
applying a general algorithm. Then the solutions produced by the algorithm are
encoded into memory and retrieved when the problems are encountered again. After
sufficient practice, performance will become automatic in that all problems can be
solved by memory retrieval. Although Logan’s theory is about individual
psychological behavior, it can be applied to an organizational phenomenon such as
turnover. For example, when turnover is at a low level, an organization may not
know how to deal with it properly, so organizational performance may decrease
quickly. However, when turnover rate continues to increase, an organization may
come to know how to handle it from the experience (i.e., sufficient practice).
Therefore, organizational performance is less likely to be much affected. Of course,
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the learning rate may vary, depending on the kind of skills and knowledge
employees need to learn or the industrial fields.

Figure 7-5. Examples of Power Functions

RT = a + bN-c

Reaction Time
0.25
0.5
c=1.0

Practice
Note: the functions differ only in their exponents and the value of the exponent (i.e., learning rate) appears below
each function. Each function begins at the same point and asymptotes at zero. Source: Logan (1992)

7.5 Theoretical argument for the HRM-moderated relationship
So far I reviewed theoretical backgrounds for the arguments about turnover effects
on organizational performance, such as the negative linear, the inverted-U, and the
attenuated negative relationships. Some turnover researchers (Arthur, 1994; Guthrie,
2001; Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, and Gupta, 1998) also argue that human resource
management (HRM) systems may have a moderating effect on the relationship
between turnover and organizational performance such that the negative effects of
turnover would be severer in an organization with commitment (or inducement)
HRM characteristics.
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For example, if HRM characteristics of an organization have a moderating
effect on the relationship between turnover and organizational performance as they
argued, the linear, negative relationship would be different depending on HRM
characteristics an organization has, as seen in figure 7-6. As seen in the figure, even
at the same level of turnover, the expected level of organizational performance is
lower (i.e., L on the y-axis) in an organization with commitment HRM
characteristics than an organization with control HRM characteristics

Figure 7-6. Example of the HRM-moderated Relationship

Commitment HRM

High
Performance
H

Control HRM

L
Low
Performance
Low

Turnover Rate

High

Note: Based on the assumption that there is a negative, linear relationship between turnover and performance

The argument of the human resource management-moderated relationship
has been developed, based on Arthur (1994), Guthrie (2001), and Shaw, Delery,
Jenkins, and Gupta (1998). While the concept of fit (or the congruence) between
organizational policies and practices has emerged as an important subject of study
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among contingency theory researchers, Arthur (1994) argued that the negative
relationship between turnover and organizational performance would be stronger
among organizations whose human resource management (HRM) systems were
characterized by the use of inducement- (e.g., high pay and benefits level and
procedural justice) and investment (e.g., training and job stability)-oriented HRM
system. In those organizations, employees are expected to do their jobs with more
discretion and experience, rather than just following rules and standard operation
procedures (SOPs) that directly instruct employees to do what they are supposed to
do in a certain manner. Under these circumstances, new employees are more likely
to have difficulty in doing their jobs because they do not have enough experience
and less guidance (i.e., rules and SOPs) is provided. In his empirical research, Arthur
(1992) performed cluster analysis and categorized 30 steel minimills 3 into two
groups - cost reduction group and commitment maximizing group, based on
industrial relations functions as seen in table 7-1. Later Arthur (1994) changed each
group’s name into control HRM system and commitment HRM system to be
consistent with previous research on human resource strategy (Lawler, 1986; Walton,
1985).

3

They begin the steel making process with steel scrap instead of iron ore.
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Table 7-1. Two Systems of Workplace Industrial Relations

Industrial relations
functions
Organization of
work

Type of System
Cost Reduction
Job tasks narrowly defined

Employee relations No formal employee complaint/
grievance mechanisms

Commitment Maximizing
Broadly defined jobs

Formal dispute resolution
procedures

Little communication/socialization
efforts

Staffing/supervision Low skill requirement

Training
Compensation

Regularly share
business/economic information
with employees
High percent of skilled workers

Intense supervision/control

Self-managing teams

Limited training efforts

More extensive, general skills
training

Limited benefits

More extensive benefits

Relatively low wages

Relatively high wages

Incentive-based

All salaried/stock ownership

Source: Arthur (1992)

Unlike an organization with commitment HRM system, employees are
treated more like replaceable commodities in the organizations characterized by low
inducement and investment practices (i.e., control HRM system). Under these
circumstances, the negative relationship between turnover and organizational
performance would be attenuated because new employees can easily follow up what
prior employees did with more rules and SOPs provided that guide behavior in
relatively more situations (Guthrie, 2001). According to Arthur (1994), the goal of
control HRM systems is to reduce direct labor costs, or improve efficiency, by
enforcing employee compliance with specified rules and procedures and basing
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employee rewards on some measurable output criteria, whereas commitment HRM
systems shape desired employee behaviors and attitudes by forging psychological
links between organizational and employee goals. In sum, Arthur (1994) argued that
organizations with control HRM systems might benefit from employee turnover up
to some point and after that there may begin to be negative turnover effects on
manufacturing performance.

The different effects of turnover on organizational performance can be also
explained by Graen’s (1976) role-making theory. According to Graen, role-making
systems are those processes whereby the participant in the organization: (a) acquires
acknowledge about the content of the constraints and demands placed upon his
behavior and the sources of those constraints and demands, (b) receives and sends
persuasive communications regarding his behavior in the role, (c) accepts a
particular pattern of behavior, and (d) modifies this pattern over time. Graen (1976)
argued that the particular way a person comes to behave in his or her organizational
role may be a function of the formal, written job descriptions, when the person is
progressing from the status of “newcomer” to that of “established incumbent” in that
position. We can imagine that under control HRM system, there are relatively more
rules and procedures and more detailed formal job descriptions, so it would take less
time for newcomers to catch up the performance level of former employees than
under commitment HRM system.
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7.6 Empirical studies of turnover effect
Table 7-2 summarizes the hypotheses of empirical studies that explored the turnoverperformance relationship. Since the table includes most of the recent empirical
turnover studies, it is meaningful to review each empirical study in more depth.

In their study, Alexander, Bloom, and Nuchols (1994) hypothesized that
registered nurses’ (RN) turnover is likely to have significant and negative effects on
hospital performance because RNs directly participate in the core technology of
hospitals. After finding that RN turnover is associated with lower hospital operating
efficiency (i.e., H1 is supported as seen in the table), Alexander et al. suggested the
four possible reasons for cost inefficiency due to RN turnover. Firstly, costs of
recruiting and orienting replacement nurses are incurred; secondly, costs are incurred
from using temporary agency nurses to fill vacancies; thirdly, we can imagine
reduced efficiency of team-based care on patient care units, and finally,
administrative costs are incurred to supervise new nurses who have not internalized
the production norms of the hospital. In addition to those four possible reasons, as
Pencavel (1972) argued, turnover of an employee with specific knowledge [e.g.,
registered nurses in Alexander et al.’s (1994) study] that can be acquired through
education or training may be another reason of efficiency decreasing. Reflecting
Mueller and Price’s (1989) advice that cross-sectional data are problematic for
testing hypotheses about the consequences of turnover, Alexander et al. measured
turnover costs at different times such as one year after turnover and two years after
turnover. Rather than confirming the argument of the inverted-U shape relationship
(H2 in their study, see table), Alexander et al. (1994) confirmed the human capital
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theory (Strober, 1990; Pencavel, 1972) that predicts a linear, negative relationship
between turnover and organizational performance.

Table 7-2. Empirical Research on the Turnover-Performance Relationship

Studies
With sample
Alexander et al. (1994)

Hypotheses related to turnover effects
H1: Higher registered nurse (RN) turnover in hospitals is associated with lower hospital
operating efficiency (supported).

With 333 hospitals

Arthur (1994)

H2: Relative to hospitals with high or low turnover among staff RN, hospitals with
moderate turnover will experience greater operating efficiency (not supported).
H1: Turnover will be higher in control human resource systems than in commitment
human resource systems (supported).

With 30 minimills

McElroy et al (2001)
With 31 sales regions in which
about 5,200 employees working at
a national financial services
company headquartered in a midwestern state
Koys (2001)
With 28 stores in a regional
restaurant chain

Guthrie (2001)
With 164 multi-industry firms in
New Zealand that have more than
100 employees
Glebbeek and Bax (2004)
A temporary job agency that has
110 offices spread throughout The
Netherlands.
Shaw et al. (2005)
Study 1 - 141 plants of the
American Concrete Pipe
Association
Study 2 – 299 trucking
organizations

H2: There will be a stronger negative relationship between turnover level and
manufacturing performance in commitment human resource systems than in control HR
systems (supported).
H1. Involuntary turnover-that is, dismissals-will be positively related to organizational
performance measure (not supported).
H2. Voluntary turnover will not be significantly related to organizational performance
(not supported).
H3. Reduction-in-force will exhibit a negative relationship with organizational
performance measures (supported)
H1. There is a significant relationship between Year 1’s unit-level employee satisfaction
(positive), organizational citizenship behavior (positive), and employee turnover
(negative) and Year 2’s unit-level profitability (not supported for turnover effect)
H2. There is a significant relationship between Year 1’s unit-level employee satisfaction
(positive), organizational citizenship behavior (positive), and employee turnover
(negative) and Year 2’s unit-level customer satisfaction (not supported for turnover
effect).
H1. There is positive association between the use of high-involvement work practices
and employee retention and firm productivity (supported)

H1. The overall relationship between employee turnover and firm performance has an
inverted U-shape (not supported)

H1a. There is a significant negative relationship between voluntary turnover rates and
work force performance (not supported).
H1b. The relationship between voluntary turnover and work force performance is
curvilinear, such that higher performance levels are evident as voluntary turnover
increases initially, but the relationship becomes negative as turnover rates rise (not
supported).
H1c. The relationship between voluntary turnover and work force performance is
curvilinear such that the relationship is generally negative, but is attenuated as turnover
rates rise (supported)
H1d. The relationship between voluntary turnover and work force performance is
moderated by HRM inducements and investments such that the negative relationship is
attenuated when HRM inducements and investments are low (not supported).

Note 1. All data were collected in the U.S. except Guthrie (2001) and Glebbeek and Bax (2004).
Note 2. Multivariate regression was performed for all studies except McElroy et al. (2001) who used
partial correlation and Koys (2001) who used bivariate regression.
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Arthur (1994) tested hypotheses about turnover effect on organizational
performance, using the results of a previous study (i.e., Arthur, 1992) that adopted
cluster analysis technique to empirically identify two types of human resource
management systems (i.e., control HRM and commitment HRM). In his empirical
study, Arthur concluded that (1) specific combinations of policies and practices are
useful in predicting differences in performance and turnover across steel minimills,
and (2) HRM systems moderate the relationship between turnover and
manufacturing performance such that there is a stronger relationship between
turnover and manufacturing performance in an organization with commitment HRM
system than in an organization with control HRM system.

McElroy, Morrow, and Rude (2001) and Koys (2001) used simple methods
such as partial correlation and bivariate regression to investigate turnover effects on
organizational performance. In their study in which the regional subunit of finance
company constituted the unit of analysis, McElroy et al. (2001) found that only
reduction-in-force had significant effects on organizational performance among
voluntary turnover, involuntary turnover, and reduction-in-force as seen in table 7-2.
Unlike previous studies that used cross-sectional data, Koys (2001) used longitudinal
data in the study. Although the relationship between turnover and organizational
performance did not turn out significant, the results indicated that organizational
performance such as profitability and customer satisfaction is significantly
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influenced by HR outcomes such as employee satisfaction and organizational
citizenship behavior 4 rather than vice versa.

Guthrie (2001) examined the relationship between firms’ use of highinvolvement work practices and employee retention and productivity, using the
sample that consisted of multi-industry firms with more than 100 employees in New
Zealand. Since Guthrie selected the sample from multi-industries outside of the U.S.,
it actually offered a test of whether or not Arthur’s (1994) results can be generalized
beyond the small, U.S., single-industry sample. The results indicated that employee
turnover was associated with decreased productivity when high-involvement work
practices (i.e., commitment HRM system) were extensively adopted, whereas
employee turnover was associated with increased productivity when those highinvolvement practices were not much adopted (in other words, control HRM
practices were adopted). High involvement work practices represent a significant
investment in human capital. Therefore, these findings are supportive of generalizing
Arthur’s (1994) study. Guthrie concluded that although high-involvement work
practices may enhance employee retention, greater use of these practices may also
increase firms’ exposure to disruptions associated with employee turnover at the
same time.

Glebbeek and Bax (2004) investigated if Abelson and Baysinger’s argument
of inverted-U relationship between turnover and performance is correct. Following

4

According to Organ, D. W. 1988. Organizational citizenship Behavior. Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books., there are five categories of organizational citizenship behavior. Conscientiousness means
employees carry out individual task performance well beyond the minimum required levels. Altruism
implies that they give help to others. Civic virtue suggests that employees responsibly participate in
the political life of the organization. Sportsmanship indicates that people do not complain, but have
positive attitudes. Courtesy means that they treat others with respect.
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Koys’ (2001) approach to overcome the problem of causal interpretation of crosssectional analysis, Glebbeek and Bax employed cross-lagged regression analysis 5
and found that reversed causality was not the case. By adding the squared term of
turnover to the regression equation, the authors tested the Abelson and Baysinger’s
hypothesis and concluded that although curvilinearity was clearly indicated, the
nature of this nonlinearity (inverted-U or U shape) was not strongly supported, based
on the results.

Shaw, Gupta, and Delery (2005) tested four alternative 6 hypotheses about the
relationship between voluntary turnover and organizational performance. In their
study, they found that the relationship was curvilinear, such that the relationship was
generally negative, but was attenuated as turnover rates rose. Since this result is
different from the Glebbeek and Bax’ (2004) results that indicated an inverted-U
relationship (although the results did not provide compelling evidence for it), Shaw
et al. suggested two probable reasons as follows. The first reason may come from the
fact that Glebbeek and Bax used total turnover rate rather than voluntary turnover
that was used in Shaw et al’s study, based on the argument that quits and discharges
are distinct phenomena (McElroy et al., 2001; Shaw et al., 1998). The second
probable reason is that trained incapacity and stagnation underlying the inverted-U
proposition may be more relevant in some organization than others.

In sum, only a few hypotheses were supported in the empirical studies that
explored turnover effects on organizational performance. That is, the negative, linear
5

If the reversed-causality theory held, later year’s turnover should have been more strongly related to
early year’s performance than vise versa.
6
They are the linear negative relationship, the inverted-U relationship, the attenuated negative
relationship, and the HRM-moderated relationship as explained previously
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relationship and attenuated, negative curvilinear relationship were supported in
Alexander et al.’s (1994) study and Shaw et al.’s (2005) study, respectively. In
addition, Arthur (1994) showed the significant moderating role of human resource
management (HRM) system in the relationship between turnover and organizational
performance and Guthrie (2001) confirmed Arthur’s (1994) finding with multiindustry sample, indicating that Arthur’s results can be generalized.

7.7 Hypotheses on turnover effect and the moderating role of HRM system
As Shaw et al. (2005) pointed out, the existing arguments about the relationship
between turnover and organizational performance are based on human capital theory.
That is, specific knowledge (i.e., acquired through education or training) may impose
particular costs on the employer if an employee with specific knowledge quits. In the
police departments, we do not expect that any newcomer can properly perform the
police job without enough training. Experience on the job seems to be necessary to
perform police job properly even with proper training. In other words, police jobs
require a certain level of specific knowledge and experience. Therefore, I basically
expect the negative effects of turnover on police performance according to human
capital theory. More specifically, I expect an inverted-U relationship that predicts
negative turnover effects on police performance after a certain level of turnover,
based on Staw (1980), Abelson and Baysinger (1984), and Dalton and Todor (1979).

As we reviewed previously, Staw (1980) argued either a narrowly or widely
inverted-U relationship between turnover and performance especially for the jobs
such as police works or nursing that demand much psychologically. Therefore, in the
police organizations, turnover may have positive effects on performance rather than
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negative effects until a certain level of turnover. Abelson and Baysinger (1984) also
predicted the inverted-U shape relationship for all organizations using the cost
concepts such as total turnover cost (TTC) concept, turnover cost (TC), and retention
cost (RC). Under this approach, the optimal level of aggregate turnover for most
organizations will be greater than zero because RC will be the highest when an
employer wants to keep the turnover rate close to zero and TC will be the highest
when turnover rate is at its highest level. Since the RC curve and the TC curve move
in an opposite direction, the intersection can be a minimal cost point for TTC as seen
in figure 7-3 before. That is, a minimum level of cost requires a certain level of
turnover (i.e., above zero), and this also means the highest level of organizational
performance. Dalton and Todor (1979) viewed turnover effects from the different
perspectives such as organizational, economic, sociological, and socio-psychological,
and argued that turnover might increase organizational effectiveness through the
higher chance of innovation because the process of mobility brings “new blood” and
new ideas into the organization. In sum, the inverted-U shape relationship is
expected between turnover and police performance as below.

H3. Turnover initially has a positive effect on police performance until a certain
level of turnover and has a negative effect on police performance after that
point. (i.e., the relationship between turnover and police performance is
inverted-U shape).

In the public sector, there are relatively more rules and procedures that
employees are required to follow than in the private sector. Therefore, we may say
that public organizations (e.g., police organizations in this study) are more likely to
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have control-oriented human resource management (HRM) system. This general
tendency in the public sector, however, does not necessarily mean that every public
organization has a similar control-oriented HRM system. That is, for some reasons
such as financial conditions, task demands, and political environment, some
organizations may have more control-oriented (or less commitment-oriented) HRM
systems and others may have more commitment-oriented (or less control-oriented)
HRM systems.

Likewise, in the private sector, although we generally expect that firms are
more likely to have commitment-oriented (less control-oriented) HRM systems than
in the public sector, some firms employ control-oriented (less commitment-oriented)
HRM systems, others employ commitment-oriented (less control-oriented) HRM
systems. Arthur (1992) argued that firms usually choose their HRM systems (i.e.,
control-oriented or commitment-oriented HRM), depending on their business
strategies. Youndt et al. (1996) also argued that manufacturing strategy (i.e., cost
manufacturing strategy 7 and quality manufacturing strategy 8 ) moderates the
relationship between HRM systems and operational performance. That is, a cost
manufacturing strategy will positively moderate the relationship between
administrative HRM system and performance; and a quality manufacturing strategy
will positively moderate the relationship between Human-Capital-Enhancing HRM
system and performance.

7

Organizations can create customer value by either reducing costs. In many cases, programmed
production systems and highly structured jobs have become de facto methods for deskilling
manufacturing workers and reducing their discretion.
8
This focuses on continually improving manufacturing processes to increase product reliability and
customer satisfaction. In this setting, the technical and problem-solving skills of employees tend to be
more important.
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In the current study, rather than trying to find out the reasons why a police
organization employs a certain kind of HRM system – it may be another research
topic, I investigate if HRM characteristics an organization might have (i.e., controloriented

and

commitment-oriented

HRM)

moderate

turnover

effects

on

organizational performance in the public sector. I assume that police organizations
have different HRM characteristics due to different reasons such as financial
situation, task demands, or political environments. According to Arthur (1994) and
Guthrie (2001), in those organizations with commitment HRM system, employees
are expected to do their jobs with more discretion and experience, rather than by
many rules and procedures that directly instruct employees to do what they are
supposed to do in a certain manner. Therefore, if an employee quits in that
organization, we can expect that newcomers may have difficulties in doing their jobs
due to lack of experience and enough written guides. According to the role making
theory (Graen, 1976), the formal, written job descriptions are critical to the way a
person comes to behave in his or her organizational role. We can imagine that an
organization with a control HRM system usually tends to have more formal job
descriptions than an organization with a commitment HRM system, so newcomers
come to reach the expected level of performance within a relatively short time.

Figure 7-7 shows that same turnover levels may mean different things to the
organizations, depending on the HRM system they have. In the figure, for an
organization with commitment HRM system (or less control HRM system), point
“A” on the x-axis appears to exceed optimal turnover rate (TO0), so more turnover
would reduce organizational performance if the relationship between turnover and
organizational performance is inverted-U shaped. For an organization with control
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HRM system, however, point “A” does not exceed the optimal turnover rate (TO1)
yet, so more turnover may increase organizational performance until the optimal
turnover rate (TO1) is reached. That is, as seen in L1 and L2 that are tangent lines on
the points in which vertical dot line of point A meets the curves, the slope of L2 is
positive while the slope of L1 is negative. In sum, I expect that the turnover effects
on the police performance would be moderated by the HRM systems (or the bundle
of HRM practices) that police organizations might have. Therefore, I establish the
hypothesis as below.

Hypothesis 4. The negative effects of turnover on police performance are
greater in an organization with more commitment-oriented human resource
management (HRM) characteristics than in an organization with more controloriented HRM characteristics.

Figure 7-7. Optimal Turnover Rates with Different HRM Systems
High
Performance

Commitment
HRM system

L1

L2

Control
HRM system

Low
TO0

A

TO1

High

Turnover rate

Note: This is based on the assumption that there is an inverted-U shape relationship between turnover
and police performance and the optimum level of turnover is smaller in an organization with
commitment HRM system than in an organization with control HRM system
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VIII. Crime Control and Related Factors

8.1 Introduction
According to Worrall (2005), there are two major perspectives of crime control:
operational and political perspectives. Since the operational perspectives are
concerned about due process when crime is controlled, the main question will be
how the justice system should operate. In other words, a delicate balance has to be
achieved between crime control and due process perspectives (Packer, 1968). Unlike
the operational perspectives, the political perspectives (consisting of the liberal and
conservative perspectives) are interested in the causes of crime, the consequences of
crime for society, and what to do to deal with crime. In the current study, I am
basically interested in the causalities of crime and factors influencing crimes rather
than how the justice system should operate. Therefore, I review the crime control
literature from the political perspective.

In this chapter, I review the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)
program that has been conducted, based on the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act signed by President Clinton in 1994. The COPS program intended
to lower crime occurrence and to provide a better safety feeling by putting additional
sworn officers on the street (i.e., hiring grants), improving technology (i.e., Making
Officer Redeployment Effective grants 1 ), and paying more attentions to distressed
neighborhoods or jurisdictions with economic challenges (i.e., innovative grants).

1

The COPS' Making Officer Redeployment Effective (More) program expands the amount of time
current law enforcement officers can spend on community policing by funding technology, equipment,
and support staff, including civilian personnel.
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Therefore, it is meaningful to see how the COPS program planned to accomplish its
goals (i.e., the logic model). After reviewing the COPS program, I review what the
literature found in response to the question of whether hiring more police officers
reduces crimes – the most common and simple question in the traditional policing, as
well as in the literature about the effectiveness of police in reducing crime. I also
review the Service Efforts and Accomplishments (SEA) indicators for crime control
suggested by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board and crime control
effectiveness measures that Ammons (1996) suggested for crime control, which may
suggest the effectiveness measures of the police. In the conclusion section, I suggest
a Crime Control Model that reflects the influencing factors found in the literature.

8.2 The Crime Act and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)
In 1994, President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act (hereinafter, the Crime Act). Of the $30 billion in expenditures authorized by the
Crime Act, nearly $9 billion was allocated for Title I, which is also known as the
“Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act of 1994” (Roth & Ryan,
2000a). The crime act pursued two objectives: one is to increase the number of
sworn officers on the street 2 , and the other is to adopt community-oriented policing
(Gaffigan, Roth, & Buerger, 2000). Gaffigan et al. (2000) explained that community
policing stressed greater police responsiveness to the community at several levels,
including more personal service; greater citizen input into police priorities; increased
police attention to previously ignored “quality of life” issues; and an expanded
commitment to crime prevention. According to Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines, and
Bucqueroux (1998), community policing is both a philosophy and organizational
2

Responding to perceptions of increased levels and viciousness of violent crime during the late 1980s,
presidential candidate Bill Clinton pledged to put 100,000 new police officers on the streets on the
Nation, as part of his campaign.
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strategy – a philosophy that allows the police and residents to work together in new
ways

to

solve

problems

and

an

organizational

strategy

encompassing

decentralization and individual autonomy that supports the philosophy. Title I, the
legislative basis for the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program,
listed four specific goals 3 intended to change both the level and practice of policing
in the United States (Roth et al., 2000a).

When we look at the logic model of the COPS program in figure 8-1, we see
that the program output is not to directly lower crime occurrence that belongs to
community outcomes (the far right box in the figure). Rather it aims to increase
arrests (or clearance rates) through problem solving, partnership building, crime
prevention, and reorienting the organization. According to the logic model, through
problem solving, partnership building, and crime prevention, we can also achieve
high levels of social/physical quality of life, informal social control, information
sharing, and police respect/satisfaction; and the decreased fear of crime as
community outcomes. The logic model expects crime reduction by the combination
of increased arrests and other community outcomes mentioned above. In the logic
model, we also see that there are mutual negative effects between crime occurrence
and arrests. That is, a high level of crime occurrence is likely to result in a low level
of crime clearance, probably due to an increased workload; and high level of crime
clearance is likely to result in low level of crime occurrence according to deterrence
theory. As seen in the figure, organization reorientation (including officer discretion,
capacity for change, and so on) is one of the expected COPS program outputs, and
other program outputs such as problem solving, partnership building, and prevention
3

(1) to increase the number of officers deployed in American communities, (2) to foster problem
solving and interaction with communities by police officers, (3) to encourage innovation in policing,
and (4) to develop new technologies for assisting officers in reducing crime and its consequences.
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can be achieved through organization reorientation.

To test if the COPS program has significant negative effects on crime, Zhao,
Scheider, & Thurman (2002) focused on the effects of COPS Office grants that were
awarded between 1994 and 1998 on crime rates in 6,100 cities between 1995 and
1999. According to the results, they argued that hiring grants and innovative grants 4
had negative and significant effects on violent and property crimes. More specifically,
Zhao et al. found a negative and significant effect of COPS grants (i.e., increased
officers) on the crimes in the cities with more than 10,000 populations but did not
find the similar effects in the cities with less than 10,000 populations. They
speculated that in the smaller cities, additional officers may be involved in a wide
variety of community policing, and this interaction with residents would result in
more crime reporting due to increased trust in police. Therefore, the effects of
increased police officers on reduced crime rates might be cancelled out by the
increased crime reports.

4

Hiring grants are designed to directly assist local law enforcement in the deployment of additional
community police officers and innovative grants fund specialized programs targeted at specific
jurisdictions or categories of crime and social disorder.
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Figure 8-1. Logic Model of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program
(Program Output)

(Resources & Requirements)
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State/Local

• COPS

• Financial
• Governmental
• Community

• Other

programs

(Outcomes in Other CJAs)

(+)

(?)
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(–)
(+)
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•
•
•
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(+)
(+)
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Abbreviations and symbols: FTEs: Full Time Equivalents, CJAs: Criminal Justice Agencies
(+): Items listed in preceding box result in positive effect on, or increase in, items listed in the following box
(–): Items listed in preceding box result in negative effect on, or decrease in, items listed in the following box
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8.3 Traditional policing
Although some studies (e.g., Zhao et al, 2002) support the effect of increased number
of police officer on crime control, there has been a debate for decades in response to
the one simple question, “Does hiring more police officers reduce crime?” Traditional
policing prizes deterrence theory and people who favor more police on the streets
argue that the more visible the police presence is, the more likely it is that would-be
criminals will be deterred from violating the law (Worrall, 2005). According to
Ehrlich’s (1972) classic law enforcement study espousing deterrence theory, people
can be discouraged from committing crime by the threat of either serious sanctions or
apprehension. In this section, I review some major studies that investigated if
traditional policing (i.e., increasing police level and expenditures) effectively
suppresses crime rates.

The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (KCPPE), one of the most
important policing studies relevant to police hiring, was conducted with three groups
of patrol beats during 1972 and 1973. Each group consisted of five areas. The first
group (it was called the proactive beats) received two to three times the normal level
of patrol; the second group (it was called the reactive beats) received no patrol and
only responded to calls for service; and the third group (it was called the control
beats) kept police patrol levels to normal. In the results of the research, Kelling, Pate,
Dieckman, & Brown (1974) found that the level of patrol had no effect on crimes 5
that were suppressible by patrol. That is, the levels of public safety were almost the
same in all of the three groups regardless of the police patrol endeavors.

5

Those crimes are burglaries, auto thefts, larcenies, robberies, and vandalism.
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While most citizens and government officials were shocked at this result,
some researchers (e.g., Fienbert, Kinley, & Reiss, 1976; Larson, 1975) criticized the
KCPPE because it had weak experimental design and small sample size that
weakened the validation and reliability of the results. Larson (1975) reviewed the
KCPPE and questioned the approach of the KCPPE mainly on the ground of small
sample size (i.e., only 15 areas). Larson basically found two major problems. First of
all, typical patrol intensities in Kansas City were not large enough to encompass the
range of patrol intensities experienced in other cities. Even a doubling or tripling of
patrol effort might not adequately reflect routine levels of patrol experienced in other
cities. The second problem was that patrol visibility in the depleted areas (the reactive
beats areas) was relatively quite large and it even equaled the pre-experimental levels
during high workload periods. Consequently, Larson concluded that the KCPPE might
have fallen short in its attempt to prove or disprove the general value of preventive
patrol. According to Larson, however, the interesting result was the second problem
that Larson called as an unexpected by-product to a patrol administrator. That is,
patrol administrators can reduce the level of patrolling in one area and transfer those
patrolling officers to other areas (i.e., redeploying) to increase the levels of patrolling
without causing significant degradations in service if conditions warrant a change in
the spatial deployment of units within a confined region.

Fienbert et al. (1976) focused on the problems of the KCPPE design. They
pointed out that there was no actual difference in deploying manpower between the
control beats group and the proactive beats group, although the manpower was
doubled in the latter group. They also noted that the KCPPE only dealt with the
manpower levels although manipulating what officers actually do on patrol (i.e.,
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patrol strategy) might have great effects on the commission of crimes. Fienbert et al.
criticized that in the KCPPE control was lacking not only in the administration of the
treatments, but also in the handling of concomitant variables such as variables related
to dispatch procedures 6 . With respect to the layout of the experimental area 7 , Fienbert
et al. raised the question of whether randomization was used in assigning the
treatments to each of the 15 areas to avoid the possibility that officers in the proactive
beats group may help the adjacent reactive beats group.

In addition to the Kansas City Experiment, there are many studies that
investigated the relationship between police level (or expenditures) and crime rate
(e.g., Bahl & Wasylenko, 1978; Cornwell & Trumbell, 1994; Fox, 1979; Greenberg,
Kessler, & Loftin, 1983; Huff & Stahura, 1980; Kovandzic & Sloan, 2002; Land &
Felson, 1976; Levitt, 1997; Marvell & Moody, 1996). Indeed, whether a police levelcrime relationship exists is actually one of the most significantly researched questions
in criminal justice (Worrall, 2005). The findings of some studies that investigated a
police level-crime rate relationship are summarized in table 8-1. As seen in the table,
various studies were conducted using different data (i.e., cross-sectional, panel or time
series data), and ended up with mixed results. While some studies (i.e., Chapman,
1976; Fujii & Mak, 1980; Greenberg et al., 1983; Greenwood & Wadychi, 1973;
Hakim, Ovadia, & Weinblatt, 1978; Huff et al., 1980; Jacob & Rich, 1981; Levine,
1975) found a significantly positive effect of police on crime rates, others (i.e., Bahl et
al., 1978; Corman & Joyce, 1990; Howsen & Jarrell, 1987; Land et al., 1976; Levitt,
1997; McPheters & Stronge, 1974; Swimmer, 1974a, b) found a significantly negative

6

According to Fienbert et al. (1976), officers in one beat may feel compelled to help out their
colleagues in adjacent reactive beats, and thus negate the intended effects of the experiment.
7
All five reactive beats area were adjacent to one or two proactive beats areas in the KCPPE.
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effect of police on crime rates (i.e., as the number of police increases, crime rates tend
to decrease) 1 . Although we are not sure whether a high level of the police leads to
crime reduction based on the mixed results as seen in table 8-1, some recent studies
(e.g., Marvell and Moody, 1996; Kovandzic and Sloan, 2002) revealed that as police
level increases, crime rates tend to decrease.

Marvell and Moody (1996) reviewed 36 major empirical studies that
investigated the relationship between police level (number of police or police
expenditures) and crime rates, and found little evidence that supported the effects of
police efforts on reducing crime. Rather, some studies even suggested that more crime
leads to more police. Marvell and Moody (1996), however, pointed out that most
studies suffered from omitted-variable bias and simultaneity problems. Since crime
rates are usually affected by other factors in addition to police level, omitting those
influencing variables may cause omitted-variable bias. According to Marvell and
Moody, the simultaneity problem arises from the fact that crime rates may not only be
influenced by police level and but also influence police level at the same time, as
Cornwell and Trumbell (1994) showed in their study. Therefore, the positive effect of
crime on police levels may counteract the negative effect of police on crime. In their
study with the sample consisting of 49 states and 56 cities, Marvell and Moody found
a simultaneous effect between police level and crime rates using the Granger causality
test 8 , and explained that the magnitude of the effects of police level on crime rates
was substantial whereas the size of the effect of crime rates on police level was slight.
Kovandzic and Sloan (2002) partially replicated Marvell and Moody (1996) with

1

These studies found significant results at 5 percent alpha level.
This is a standard econometric procedure for exploring causal direction (Granger, 1969. Investigating
Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods, Econometrica 37: 424-438)

8
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county-level data collected from Florida for the period 1980-1998, and found that
there was a relationship between police levels and crime rates, such that increased
level of crime caused small increases in police levels, while increased police levels
caused substantial reductions in crime over time.

Table 8-1. Regression Results of Various Studies of Crime-Police Relationship
Study

Sample

Time

Effect of Police on Crime

Bahl & Wasylenko (1978)

79 cities

1972

Total crime (-)*

Chapman (1976)

147 Calif. cities

1970

Violent crime (+), Property crime (+)*

Corman & Joyce (1990)

New York City

1970-1986

Robbery (-)*

Corman, Joyce, & Lovitch (1987)

New York City

1970-1984

Property crime (+)

Cornwell & Trumbull (1994)

North Carolina counties

Deutsch, Hakim, & Spiegel (1990)

States

1970-1980

Property crime (-)*

Ehrlich (1973)

47 states

1960

Fujii & Mak (1980)

Hawaii

1961-1975

Furlong & Mehay (1981)

38 districts in Montreal

1973

Total crime (-)
Rape (+)*
Murder (-)
Property (-)

Greenberg & Kessler(1982)

130 cities

1960, 1962

Violent crime (-)

Greenberg et al. (1983)

269 cities

1960, 1970

Violent crime (+)*, Property crime (+)*

Greenwood & Wadycki (1973)

199 SMSAs

1960, 1962

Violent crime (+)*, Property crime (+)*

Hakim (1980)

94 New Jersey suburbs

1970

Property crime (+)

Hakim, Ovadia, & Weinblatt (1978)

61 Philadelphia suburbs

1970

Robbery (+)*

Total crime (+)

Howsen & Jarrell (1987)

120 Kentucky counties

1981

Robbery (-)*, Larceny (-)*, Burglary (-)*

Huff & Stahura (1980)

252 suburbs

1970-1972

Violent crime (+)*

Jacob & Rich (1981)

9 cities

1948-1978

Robbery (+)*

Land & Felson (1976)

Nation

1947-1972

Violent crime (-)*, Property crime (-)*

Levine (1975)

26 cities

1971

Murder (+)*, Robbery (+)*

Levitt (1997)

49 cities

1970-1992

Violent (-)*

McPheters & Stronge (1974)

43 cities

1970

Total crime (-)*

Mikesell & Pirog-Good (1990)

50 States

1970-1984

Property crime (+)*

Pogue (1975)

163 SMSAs

1962, 1967

Total crime (+)*, Rape (+)*, Assault (+)*

Swimmer (1974a)

118 cities

1960

Murder (-)*

Swimmer (1974b)

118 cities

1960

Violent crime (-)*

Wellford (1974)

21 cities

1960, 1970

Violent crime (-)

Source: Adapted from Marvell and Moody (1996)
Note: Asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient of police number or police expenditure (per capita) is
significant at five percent alpha level when crime types (e.g., violent, property, or total crimes) are
dependent variable. The signs (+/-) indicate that police efforts (i.e., number of sworn officers or
expenditures) have positive (+) or negative (-) effects on crime occurrences.

In this section, I reviewed how traditional policing worked in crime reduction.
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While some studies found significant effects of police level on crime reduction, others
found no significant cases probably due to weak research design, small sample size,
omitting variables, and other reasons. Since a lot of influencing factors are involved in
crime occurrence, we are less likely to find a right relationship between the police
efforts and crime occurrences if some factors are omitted.

8.4 Crime clearance and crime rates
The deterrence theory of traditional policing has been also tested by some studies
exploring the relationships between crime rates and clearance or arrest rates (this
implies the certainty of punishment) (e.g., Brown, 1978; Chapman, 1976; D'Alessio &
Stolzenberg, 1998; Greenburg, Kessler, & Logan, 1979; Logan, 1975; Phillips &
Votey, 1972; Tittle & Rowe, 1974b; Wilson & Boland, 1976, 1978; Yu & Liska, 1993).
Those studies investigated the effects of police activities (the outputs of those
activities can be arrest or crime clearance) on crime control rather than simply looking
at the effect of increased police level.

Since police departments do not have complete control over the prevention of
crime, we believe many uncontrollable factors, such as economic conditions,
employment, household income, population size, and so on, are correlated with crime.
Therefore, clearance rate can be used as a measure of police performance to avoid the
influence of those uncontrollable factors. Crime clearance rate is defined as the
number (or percentage) of crimes that have been “solved” by arrest or “exceptional”
means (Drebin and Brannon, 1992: 22). According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reports, an offense is “cleared by arrest” or solved for crime reporting purposes when
at least one person is (1) arrested, (2) charged with the commission of the offense; and
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(3) turned over to the court for prosecution. Of course, as Drebin and Brannon noted,
this definition also has problems because crimes are considered to be cleared even
when only one of the several persons who are involved in the crime is arrested. An
“exceptional 9 ” clearance is another variation of a clearance, and the death of the
offender can be regarded as an exceptional clearance.

Table 8-2 shows some examples of the studies that investigated the effect of
police activities such as arrest and crime clearance on crime rates. In the table, four of
the five studies found that arrest rates have negative and significant effects on crime
occurrence, whereas police levels have relatively more mixed effects on crime rates as
reviewed in the previous section. As seen in the table, however, among the four
studies that supported the negative and significant effect of clearance rate on crime,
three studies (i.e., D’Alessio and Stolzenberg, 1998; Logan, 1975; and Wilson and
Boland, 1978) tested their hypotheses with only one type (or category) of crime (e.g.,
total crime, major felony, and robbery, respectively), and found negative and
significant effects on those crimes. In addition, Yu and Liska (1993) pointed out that
while the predicted negative relationship between the certainty of punishment and
crime rates was observed, the causal direction of the relationship was rarely evident
and the relationship may be different depending on the type of crime or some other
variables.

9

According to Uniform Crime Reports, in certain situations, law enforcement is not able to follow the
three outlined steps under “clearance by arrest” to clear offenses known to them. Many times all leads
have been exhausted and everything possible has been done in order to clear a case.
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Table 8-2. The Effect of Crime Clearance Rate (or Arrest Rate) on Crime

Study

Sample/Data

Method

Effect of Crime
Clearance on
Crime

Chapman (1976)

147 California cities with
population between 20,000 and
100,000 in 1960 and 1970

Regression

Property crime (-)*

D’Alessio and
Stolzenberg (1998)

Orange County in Florida for
184 days in 1991

Time series
with daily
collected data

Total crime (-)*

Regression

None

Correlation,
Path analysis

Major Felony (-)*a

Regression

Robbery (-)*

Greenberg et al. (1979)
Logan (1975)
Wilson and Boland (1978)

98 U.S. cities from 1964 to
1970
FBI’s crime clearance by arrest
data for about 3,000 cities form
1964 to 1968
35 largest cities in the U.S. in
1975

Note:
a: According to the path analysis results, the causality (i.e., deterrence interpretation) is questionable.
- Asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient of crime clearance by arrest is significant at five percent
alpha level when crime types (e.g., violent, property, or total crimes) are dependent variable.
- The signs (+/-) indicate that the coefficients of police activity variable (i.e., crime clearance rate) have
positive (+) or negative (-) sign.

With respect to the effect of punishment, Tittle and Rowe (1974a) found
interesting results in Florida’s cities and counties that a high level of certainty of
punishment 10 (30 percent in their study) must be reached before a substantial decrease
in crime rates occurs (it is referred to as tipping effect). Brown (1978) noted that Tittle
and Rowe’s (1974) study of crime rates (reported UCR crimes) and certainty of
punishment (crimes cleared by arrest/crimes reported) added a potentially significant
proposition to deterrence theory and the tipping effect 11 of sanction certainty reported
by them is of considerable theoretical import. In fact, Brown (1978) attempted to
determine whether the tipping effect is peculiar to their data with California and

10

Clearance rates are used as a certainty of punishment index in their study.
That is, under a certain level, sanction certainty does not seem to work for deterring crimes.
However when sanction certainty reaches that level, crime rates decrease substantially.
11
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Florida cities and counties. Brown found the tipping effect only in cities and counties
with small populations and rejected the more general form of the tipping effect
proposed by Tittle and Rowe (1974). Chamlin (1991) also investigated this
relationship and reported a negative effect of punishment certainty on crime rates at
about 40 percent for only small cities. Why do we observe tipping effect in small
cities? Brown explained that one of main reasons is more social cohesion in the small
communities. That is, face-to-face contacts, and accompanying information links are
greater in the smaller cities (or counties) than in big cities (or counties). In addition,
arrest may be perceived as severer in smaller cities than in larger cities where even
high probabilities of arrest may have little effect on individuals’ decisions about
whether to engage in criminal behavior.

Yu and Liska (1993) extended tipping effect studies such as Tittle and Rowe
(1974), Brown (1978), and Chamlin (1991) by disaggregating the analysis by crime
and race because Yu and Liska observed that few large cities achieve tipping point for
most crimes. Yu and Liska tested the hypotheses for three major crimes (rape, robbery,
and assault) using the Uniform Crime Reports data and the National Crime Survey
data, and found that the punishment certainty rate 12 is higher for racial minorities than
for racial majorities and the effect of race-specific punishment certainty is non-linear
including a tipping point, a ceiling point 13 , or both. Therefore, Yu and Liska’s (1993)
study suggested that racial minorities may experience the certainty of punishment
above the tipping point although most citizens (i.e., racial majorities) do not
experience such level of punishment certainty.

12
13

Once a person commits crimes, he or she may be concerned about the possibility of being arrested.
After a certain level of punishment certainty, crime rates are not influenced any more.
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Phillips and Votey (1972) explained the relationship between crime clearance
rates and crime occurrence rates from a different perspective. Their argument shows
how crime occurrence (i.e., offense rate in figure 8-2) is influenced by other
socioeconomic conditions in addition to crime control efforts that the police make.
They argued that the level of crime occurrence can be set through the interaction
between crime generation function (CGF), mainly influenced by socioeconomic
conditions such as unemployment rate and poverty level and law enforcement
production function (LEPF) (i.e., crime control by arresting). When law enforcement
expenditures rise or the state of technology improves, the LEPF curve in the figure
moves upward and to the right (LEPF1), which moves an equilibrium (A0) with higher
level of offence rate (O0) to a new equilibrium (A1) with higher level of clearance and
lower level of offense rate (O1). Likewise, given law enforcement expenditures do not
change, when economic conditions worsen, the CGF curve in the figure will move in
the same manner (CGF1), which leads to a new equilibrium (A2) with lower level of
clearance and higher offense rate (O2) Therefore, they argued that if economic
conditions worsen, law enforcement expenditures should increase in order to maintain
the effectiveness of law enforcement (i.e., clearance rate).

Given that new equilibrium point is A2 where economic conditions become
worse LEPE does not change, even when law enforcement expenditures are increased
to maintain the same level of crime clearance rate at the new equilibrium (A3), the
offense rate will be a new offense rate (O3) that is bigger than a original offense rate
(O0) as seen in the figure. Therefore, they argued that more expenditure on law
enforcement (i.e., LEPF1 would move further to the right and upward) should be
necessary when economic conditions are worse if the police want to maintain the
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same level of crime rates based on auto theft data in their study.

Figure 8-2. The Interaction of Crime Generation and Crime Control
Law Enforcement Production Function (LEPF)
1.0
Crime Generation Function (CGF)
Equilibrium Points: A0, A1, A2, A3

Clearance Rate

CGF1

Offense Rates: O0, O1, O2, O3
LEPF
A2
A3

A1

A0

LEPF1
CGF

0
O1

O0

O3 O2

Offense Rate

Source: Adapted from Phillips and Votey (1972)

In sum, Phillips and Votey (1972) showed the mutual interaction between law
enforcement production function and crime generation function, seeing the crime
clearance rate as an effectiveness measure of law enforcement agencies. Since crime
rates and crime clearance rates are set after Enforcement Production Function (LEPF)
and Crime Generation Function (CGF) interact with each other, Phillips and Votey
argued that a heavy emphasis on law enforcement to the neglect of economic
conditions could have the effect of worsening social attitudes in the form of a
resentment of law enforcement and a general attitude of antagonism between levels of
society. Therefore, Phillips and Votey concluded that the solution to crime is largely
one of society’s willingness to pay both the costs of law and order and the costs of
maintaining healthy economic conditions and social attitudes.

139

8.5 The Service Efforts and Accomplishments (SEA) indicators for crime control
According to the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) (1987), in
establishing objectives of financial reporting, governmental financial reporting should
provide information to assist users in (a) assessing accountability and (b) making
economic, social, and political decisions. That is, financial reporting should provide
information to assist users in assessing the service efforts and accomplishments (SEA)
of a governmental entity. After completing and issuing its Concepts Statement No. 1,
Objectives of Financial Reporting, the GASB initiated research into ways to improve
the ability of public-entity financial reports to present information useful in
monitoring and assessing the results of operations of governmental entities (Drebin et
al., 1992). Police service is one of the twelve service areas 14 of the GASB’s SEA
research.

Police departments are often called on to provide a wide range of public
services, but their most visible function relates to crime prevention and suppression of
crime; and the apprehension of criminal offenders (Drebin et al., 1992). Table 8-3
shows SEA indicators of different categories for police department’s crime control
recommended by the GASB’s SEA research. In the bottom row of the table,
explanatory variables are suggested to provide information on factors that are likely to
affect the incidence and effects of criminal activity so that measures of output,
outcome, and efficiency may be viewed in proper context if explanatory variables are
included in the analysis. In addition, those explanatory variables can be helpful in

14

The service areas included in the research are police, fire, public health, hospitals, public assistance,
mass transit, road maintenance, economic development, elementary and secondary education,
sanitation collection and disposal, water and wastewater treatment, and colleges and universities.
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developing ratios to place different jurisdictions on a comparable basis.

Table 8-3. Recommended Police Department SEA Indicators
Indicator

Category
Inputs

• Budget expenditures
• Equipment, facilities, vehicles
• Number of personnel, hours expended

Outputs

•
•
•
•
•

Hours of patrol
Responses to calls for service
Crime investigated
Number of arrests
Persons participating in crime-prevention activities

Outcomes

•
•
•
•
•
•

Deaths and bodily injury resulting from crime
Value of property lost due to crime
Crimes committed per 100,000
Percentage of crimes cleared
Response time
Citizen satisfaction

Efficiency

• Cost per case assigned to a sworn officer
• Cost per crime cleared
• Personnel hours per crime cleared

Explanatory variables

•
•
•
•
•

Population by age group
Unemployment rate
Number of households; number of business firms
Land area
Demand: calls for service, cases assigned

Source: Drebin and Brannon (1992)

Although the relationships between inputs and outputs or outcomes are not
suggested, Drebin and Brannon (1992) emphasized that any outputs or outcomes must
be viewed in relation to the resource commitment involved. The most important input
to the police function is human resources, and personnel-related input data that have
been reported include personnel hours, training hours, total personnel, and number of
sworn personnel. Although reporting the number of officers per thousand population
might seem to lend itself to comparisons among cities, Hatry et al. (1992) pointed out
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the caveats that the number of businesses in and visitors to the community are not
taken into account; the make-up of the populations may be quite divergent, and the
expanse of area to cover for the same size population may vary greatly. Due to the
lack of empirical evidence linking police activities to crime reduction, it is very
difficult to infer causal relationships between them. Therefore, Drebin and Brannon
(1992) concluded that what we need is more empirical research that demonstrates the
relationships between police efforts and crime reduction.

8.6 Crime control comparison among municipalities
In order to draw an appropriate comparison of police service between municipal
police departments, Ammons (1996) suggested several performance indicators of
police for crime control rather than using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data. Ammons pointed out that using the UCR data
are problematic because of the following reasons. First of all, the UCR data includes
statistics only on reported crimes. Secondly, crime statistics can only be as accurate as
the data provided to the FBI by individual police departments. If they intentionally
misrepresent their performance statistics, the quality of the UCR is thereby
diminished. Finally, a host of community factors that are uncontrollable other than
police performance also contribute to a community’s rate of crime.
Although the employment 15 of police officers and support personnel is not an
end itself, since it is one of the input factors, Ammons explained that public officials
are interested in staffing levels and frequently are buffeted at budget time by claims of
inadequate staffing. If a police department consistently ranks below its counterparts
on various performance indicators, the possibility of understaffing is one potential
15

FBI reports municipal police staffing levels per 1,000 population, whereas Bureau of Justice reports
them per 10,000 population.
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factor worth exploring – that is, staffing information does have diagnostic value.
Ammons also noted that patrol availability (or police management proficiency) is the
other important factor that shows us, combined with staffing level, how many officers
are “on the street.” League of California Cities (1994) suggested that officers in highservice-level departments are able to devote at least 45% of their time to patrolling the
field uncommitted.

Ammons observed that crime rates (crime occurrence per 100,000
populations) are influenced not only by police efforts and economic factors but also
by whether a community is rural or urban, population size, and the state or region in
which it is located. For example, crime rates tend to be lower in cities lying outside
metropolitan statistical areas and lower in rural counties, whereas crime rates tend to
be higher in big cities and in the South and West. To adjust the influence of city size
and locale before making comparison between cities, Ammons (1996, p197)
suggested projected norm as below.

Projected
norm

=

Statistic for population
cluster

x

Statistics for state or region
National average

For example, when a city in the South region is interested in the safety level in that
city by comparing crime rates with those of other cities, Ammons suggested the
comparison among cities with similar population size and similar location (i.e.,
region) rather than the comparison with national average or with any other city. As
seen in the formula for the projected norm, we first need to check an average crime
rate for that population cluster of cities and we also need to check an average crime
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rate for that region to see if the region that a city is located has relatively higher or
lower crime rates compared to national average.

With respect to the crime clearance rates, Ammons observed that clearance
rates tend to be higher in small cities than in big cities, but did not observe a
difference between states or regions, unlike with crime rates. Response time can be
also a performance measurement since municipalities often judge their police
departments in part on the promptness with which they respond to emergencies.
According to the League of California Cities (1994), high-service-level departments
should respond to emergencies within five minutes. However, when non-emergency
calls are included in response statistics, the average response times are often in excess
of 10 minutes (Ammons, 1996).

8.7 Summary and a suggested crime control model
Before suggesting a crime control model, I review what ecological (i.e., macro-level)
factors are involved in crime occurrence, based on Pratt and Cullen’s (2005) metaanalysis. As we know, crime reduction cannot be easily achieved due to many
uncontrollable factors that need to be also considered when we investigate if police
efforts lead to crime reduction.

According to Pratt and Cullen (2005), although scholars pay more attentions to
the predictors of individual criminality (i.e., micro-level question of why individuals
break the law) and to formulating theories of individual criminality, the macro-level
approach reemerged as a salient criminological paradigm in the late 1970s and 1980s.
Broadly speaking, there are three domains of predictors (i.e., factors to predict
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crimes): social-structural predictors, socioeconomic predictors, and criminal justice
system-related predictors. Rather than defining each predictor of crimes, I summarize
what factors belong to those predictors as follows. First of all, the social-structural
predictors include racial heterogeneity, non-economic institutions (e.g., religious,
family, and political institutions), residential mobility, family structure or disruption,
region, urbanism, sex ratio, education, religion, and firearms ownership. Secondly,
socioeconomic predictors include percent below the poverty line, inequality, and
unemployment.

Finally,

criminal

justice

system-related

predictors

include

incarceration, police force size, arrest ratio, police expenditures, police per capita, and
get-tough policies (e.g., sentencing policy, firearms policy, and the death penalty). As
seen in table 8-4 that summarizes rank-ordered macro-level predictors 16 of crime, law
enforcement-related factors are ranked after 20th among 31 predictors of crime,
whereas social-structural and socioeconomic factors appear to be more influential
determinants of crimes.

At the beginning of this chapter, I reviewed the logic model of the Community
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. Zhao et al. (2002) found that the hiring
grants and the innovative grants under COPS program have significant, negative
effects on controlling crimes, especially when the city sizes are more than 10,000
populations. I then reviewed one of the most debatable issues in traditional policing,
the effects of police level on crimes. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment
(KCPPE), as one of the most important policing studies relevant to police patrolling
efforts, was conducted in 1972 and 1973, and Kelling et al. (1974) reported that the
level of police patrol had no effect on crimes that were suppressible by patrol.
16

From the 31 different macro-level predictors of crime across all 214 empirical studies, and 509
statistical models, the rank ordering is based on the relative magnitude of the mean effect size estimates.
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However, Larson (1975) and Fienbert et al. (1976) argued that the results of the
KCPPE might not be valid because it had a weak experimental design and the sample
size was small. Although some recent studies (e.g., Marvell and Moody, 1996;
Kovandzie and Sloan, 2002) supported the significant and negative effects of the
police level on crime, there have been mixed results about the effects of police level
on crime.

Table 8-4. Rank-Ordered Effect Size Estimates of Macro-Level Predictors of Crime
Rank

Macro-Level Predictor

Rank

Macro-Level Predictor

1

Strength of noneconomic institutions

17

Residential mobility

2
3
4

Unemployment (length considered)
Firearms ownership
Percent nonwhite

18
19
20

5

Incarceration effect

21

6
7

Social interaction or social tie
Percent black

22
23

Unemployment (with age restriction)
Age effects
Southern effect
Unemployment (no length
considered)
Socio economic status
Arrest ratio

8
9
10

Religion effect
Family disruption
Poverty

24
25
26

Unemployment (no age restriction)
Sex ratio
Structural density

11
12
13

Unsupervised local peer group
Household activity ration
Social support/altruism

27
28
29

Police expenditures
Get-tough policy
Education effects

14
15

Inequality
Racial heterogeneity index

30
31

Police per capita
Police size

16
Urbanism
Source: Pratt and Cullen (2005)

I also reviewed the studies that investigated the relationship between crime
clearance rates (i.e., as a result of police activity) and crime rates. Unlike the studies
examining the effects of the police level on crime, researchers found relatively
consistent and significant effects that the police efforts (e.g., clearance rates) had on
crime. Since crime clearance rates are directly related to the certainty of punishment, I
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reviewed tipping effect studies (e.g., Tittle and Rowe, 1974; Brown, 1978; Chamlin,
1991; Yu and Liska, 1993), which showed that above a certain level of punishment
certainty, crime decreases substantially. Phillips and Votey’s (1972) study showed that
crime occurrence is associated not only with police efforts to reduce crime (i.e., crime
clearance rates in their study) but also with socioeconomic conditions (the Crime
Generation Function in their study). Phillips and Votey’s study indicated crime rates
are the result of the interaction between the Crime Generation Function and the Law
Enforcement Production Function (i.e., police efforts to reduce crimes).

In order to provide information to assist users of financial report in assessing
accountability and making decisions (e.g., economic, social, and political decisions),
the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) recommended several
indicators of the Service Efforts and Accomplishments (SEA) for crime control, and
categorized them into inputs, outputs, outcomes, and efficiency. The GASB also
suggested that we also need to consider some explanatory variables such as
population, unemployment, and workload of the police when we examine the SEA for
crime control. According to Ammons (1996), when we need to make a comparison
among municipalities to know how well we are doing in controlling crimes, it is
desirable to use a projected norm for crime control measures such as crime rates and
crime clearance rates rather than to use a national average of crime control measures
in order to draw a fair comparison. Ammons noted that crime control measures are
different, depending on the populations of the cities and the region.

In figure 8-3, I suggest a Crime Control Model, based on the literature I
reviewed in this chapter. As seen in the figure, crime control outcomes (i.e., crime
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reduction and safety feeling in the model) are more likely to be affected by socialstructural and socioeconomic factors than the crime control outputs (i.e., crime
clearance in the model) are affected by them. We also see that the crime control
outputs are more directly influenced by criminal justice system-related factors
including the police level. As seen in the model, the crime control outcomes are likely
affected by exterior environments such as social-structural factors and socioeconomic
factors, whereas the crime control outputs are likely affected by interior environments
such as HRM practices, leadership, motivations, and others.
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Figure 8-3. Suggested Crime Control Model

+

Criminal Justice System
+
Police Expenditures

Turnover
+

149
-

+

Crime
Clearance

Number of Personnel
(Police Level)
-

OUTCOME

OUTPUT

+/-

Crime Reduction
Safety Feeling

+/-

+/-

Response Time

Policing strategies
(e.g., patrolling)

+/-

+/-

HRM
Characteristics

Leadership

Socioeconomic Factors

Racial Heterogeneity

Unemployment Rate

Family Disruption

Income Level

Urbanism

Poverty Level

Sex ratio

Inequality

Motivation

Get-tough policy
(e.g., sentencing policy)

INPUT

Social-structural Factors

Others

INTERIOR
ENVIRONMENTS

EXTERIOR
ENVIRONMENTS

In the model, I assume that employee turnover negatively affects the
relationship between criminal justice system-related factors and crime clearance,
based on the human capital theory. I also hypothesize that the effects of turnover are
also moderated by HRM characteristics of the police department among some
interior environmental factors. Since I predict that the influence of the HRM
characteristics will be different, depending on the type of HRM characteristics (e.g.,
control HRM and commitment HRM characteristics), I put +/- signs on the influence
of HRM characteristics on the effects of turnover. Based on the literature that shows
relatively consistent effects of law enforcement-related factors on crime clearance, I
expect the positive effects of police expenditure and the number of police personnel,
and the negative effects of response time of the police on crime clearance. For
example, I expect that the more police officers per population, the more crimes are
cleared. I also expect that the faster police respond to the citizen’s request (i.e., the
shorter time), the more likely crimes will be cleared. In the model, I also noted that
crime clearance rates are influenced by a crime occurrence level. As Drebin and
Brannon (1992) pointed out, if more cases are assigned to a sworn officer, workload
will go up, and crime clearance rates will decrease, consequently. It is obvious that a
sworn officer needs to take care of more cases if more crimes occur. Therefore, the
relationship between crime occurrence and crime clearance will be negative. As I
reviewed in the literature, I

predicted a positive relationship between crime

clearance level and safety feeling or crime reduction, based on the certainty of
punishment theory. In other words, the more crimes are cleared, the less crimes
would occur.
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According to Pratt and Cullen’s (2005) meta-analysis of crime control
literature, criminal justice system-related factors are the least influential to the crime
reduction among the three categories of crime predictors such as criminal justice
system-related factors, social-structural factors, and socioeconomic factors. The
inconsistent (i.e., positive, negative, and none) effects of the police level on crime
reduction in the literature (see table 8-1 of Marvell and Moody’s (1996) review) also
supported the results of Pratt and Cullen’s (2005) meta-analysis. However, it seems
inevitable for governments at any level to depend more on the criminal justice
system-related factors (e.g., increasing police level) because they are much more
controllable than social structural and socioeconomic factors that are more influential
but hard-to-control.

In this study, I investigate if HRM characteristics have effects on crime
control performance of municipal police departments, if turnover influences crime
control performance, and if HRM characteristics moderate the effects of turnover on
crime control performance. The goal of crime control is not to achieve outputs, but to
reduce crimes and increase safety feeling. However, those ultimate outcomes can be
achieved by achieving outputs such as high crime clearance rates, as seen in the
model, although other crime predictors such as social-structural factors and
socioeconomic factors are also involved. If we focus on the effects of turnover and
HRM characteristics on crime control outcomes rather than on crime control outputs,
we are less likely to detect the significant relationship due to more uncontrollable
factors involved. From the management perspective, if we examine the influence of
employee turnover or specific HRM characteristics on crime control performance,
we are more likely to find meaningful relationships when we focus on crime control
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outputs rather than crime control outcomes because the latter is much more
associated with uncontrollable factors as seen in the model. In sum, I focus on the
relationships between police efforts and crime clearance rates as a crime control
output in this study and examine the effects of turnover and HRM characteristics on
those relationships.

Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007
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IX. Methodology

9.1 Survey and data sources
To collect the data about turnover and HRM characteristics of the municipal police
departments, in May 2006 I sent surveys to 205 police departments of U. S. cities
whose population range was between 100,000 and 500,000. While I collected the
data such as HRM characteristics, turnover, the budget for salary and benefits
through surveying, the data such as the number of sworn officers, crime occurrence,
and crime clearance data came from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Before initiating the main survey, pilot questionnaires were sent to 12 cities 1
of a wide population range to see if the questionnaires were appropriate for
collecting the data I wanted and to decide target cities to which main surveys would
be sent. The pilot survey results indicated that police departments did not seem to
keep turnover records over time in the small cities, especially when their populations
were less than 100,000. In addition, responses are less likely from big cities
especially when their populations are more than 500,000. According to the
respondents, there are usually too many survey requests from anywhere. This would
make big cities too selective in responding to surveys. Based on the pilot survey
results, I decided to survey in-between size cities of which the population range was
between 100,000 and 500,000. Among the cities with that population range, I
excluded some cities in which sheriff offices (e.g., Lancaster, CA; AugustaRichmond, GA) are in charge of crime control rather than police departments, based

1

The population range of the 12 cities was as follows. More than 500,000 - one city; 100,000 ~
500,000 - four cities; 10,000 ~ 100,000 - four cities; and less than 10,000 - three cities.
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on the assumption that their organizational structures and characteristics are different
from those of police departments.

When I determined the survey target police departments, I tried to get
endorsement for my research from police organizations 2 to increase a response rate,
but I failed to get their endorsement. Two months after sending the first surveys to
the target cities, the response rate was about 10 percent. So, I contacted nonresponding police departments and found that majority of the police departments
seemed to ignore the survey 3 . I sent the surveys again to the non-responding cities
and this time the response increased to about 20 percent when one and half months
had passed. Finally, I sent reminder postcards to non-responding cities and I could
increase the response rate up to 32 percent (i.e., 65 cities participated as seen in table
9-1).

As seen in the actual survey (appendix 9-1), before asking the survey
questions, I made it clear that the survey was only regarding full time employees
(FTE). That is, I asked them not to include any data about trainees, part-time
employees, and temporary job employees because there may be different HRM
characteristics for non-FTE and the organizational performance will be differently
calculated if non-FET is included, based on the turnover literature (e.g., Shaw et al.
2005). For example, we imagine that trainees are more likely to quit than FTE and
there may be more control-oriented HRM characteristics for temporary employees
rather than more discretion allowed.
2

I send the letters to International Association of Chiefs of Police, Police Executive Research Forum,
and Kentucky State Police Commissioner, asking endorsement for my research.
3
Generally, staffs in charge of responding to surveys kept them in their drawers and did not do
anything. In other cases, the survey seemed to be missing.
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Table 9-1. Survey Participants List

No

City

1

Chandler

AZ

211299

23

2

Mesa

AZ

3

Tempe

4

Populatio
No
n

City

State

Populatio
n

City

State

Miami

FL

376815

45 Albuquerque NM

471856

432376

24 Port St. Lucie FL

105507

46

North Las
Vegas

NV

144502

AZ

158880

25 St. Petersburg FL

247610

47

Reno

NV

193882

Bakersfield

CA

271035

26 Tallahassee

FL

153938

48

Cincinnati

OH

317361

5

Daly City

CA

100819

27

Tampa

FL

317647

49

Toledo

OH

308973

6

Fresno

CA

451455

28

Columbus

GA

185702

50

Tulsa

OK

387807

7

Glendale

CA

200499

29

Savannah

GA

127573

51

Allentown

PA

105958

8

Long Beach

CA

475460

30

Boise City

ID

190117

52

Providence

RI

176365

9

Modesto

CA

206872

31 Springfield

IL

113586

53

Columbia

SC

117357

10

Ontario

CA

167402

32 Fort Wayne

IN

219495

54

Amarillo

TX

178612

11

Rancho
Cucamonga

CA

151640

33

Olathe

KS

105274

55 Brownsville TX

156178

12

Santa Ana

CA

342510

34

KY

266798

56

Mesquite

TX

129270

13

Sunnyvale

CA

128549

35

Lexington
Baton
Rouge

LA

225090

57

Pasadena

TX

144413

14

Thousand
Oaks

CA

124192

36

Shreveport

LA

198364

58

Wichita
Falls

TX

102340

15 West Covina CA

108251

37

Ann Arbor

MI

114498

59

Alexandria

VA

128923

16

Aurora

CO

290418

38

Warren

MI

136016

60

Newport
News

VA

181647

17

Colorado
Springs

CO

370448

39

St. Paul

MN

280404

61

Norfolk

VA

241727

CO

103648

40 Kansas City MO

442768

62

Virginia
Beach

VA

439467

18

State Population No

19

Pueblo
Coral
Springs

FL

127005

41 Fayetteville NC

124372

63

Bellevue

WA

112344

20

Fort
Lauderdale

FL

162917

42 Greensboro NC

229110

64

Green Bay

WI

101467

21

Gainesville

FL

109146

43

NC

316802

65

Madison

WI

218432

22

Hollywood

FL

143408

44 Jersey City

NJ

239097

Raleigh

Note: Populations are as of July 1, 2003 (source: http://www.citypopulation.de/USA.html)

In panel (a) of table 9-2, I summarize the descriptive statistics of population for all
205 surveyed cities, 65 participating cities, and 140 non-participating cities. As seen
in the table, it seems that there is no difference of populations between participating
cities and non-participating cities although participants have a little more populations
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than non-participants. To test if there is a relationship between participation in the
survey and city’s population, I ran analysis of variance and the result is in panel (b)
of table 9-2. As seen in panel (b) of the table, the participation of the survey is not
associated with city population.

Table 9-2. Descriptive statistics and analysis of variance (ANOVA) results
(a) Comparing descriptive statistics between participants and non-participants

All cities (205)
Participants (65)
Non-participants (140)

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min.

Max.

187,219
214,057
175,408

92,154
107,927
82,004

100,138
100,819
100,138

475,460
475,460
469,032

(b) ANOVA results
Source

Sum of
square

Degree of
freedom

Mean
Square

Between groups*
43.39024
202
0.214803
Within groups
1
2
0.5
Total
44.39024
204
0.217599
*: It means between participating cities and non-participating cities

F

Prob > F

0.43

0.8999

In the survey, I asked the questions about HRM characteristics such as job
design (Q1 ~ Q3), unionization (Q4 ~ Q6), employee voice policy (Q7 ~ Q10),
compensation (Q11), and staffing (Q12) (see appendix 9-1 for the actual survey
questionnaires) based on Arthur (1992, 1994) and Walton (1985), who investigated
the effects of control and commitment HRM characteristics in the private sector. I
also asked police departments to provide three years’ (2002 ~ 2004) voluntary and
involuntary turnover data for sworn officers and civilian employees. To collect the
data about control variables that I use for this study, I asked questions about response
time (the first column of Q14), number of sworn officers on patrol service (the
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second column of Q14), sick leave absence (Q15) 4 , salary and benefit budgets for
sworn officers and civilian employees (Q16), and caseload per sworn officers (Q17).
Although most survey participants answered the questions about HRM
characteristics, turnover data were provided by only about 40 percent of the
participants 5 . Most police departments also had a problem providing the data such as
sick leave absence and caseload per sworn officers, so I could not use those data as
control variables.

9.2 Factor analysis with HRM characteristics
As mentioned in the previous chapters, this study examines if HRM characteristics
(both individually and systematically) have an influence on crime control
performance of the municipal police, and if HRM characteristics moderate turnover
effects on crime control performance such that the negative effects of turnover would
be severer in an organization with commitment HRM characteristics than with
control HRM characteristics. In order to extract underlying factors of HRM
characteristics that police departments might have, I ran factor analysis using
principal component factor method and varimax rotation option (see StataCorp,
2003).

4

Turnover studies usually include sick leave absence in the regression analysis as a control variable
because it may mask the effects of turnover. In this study, I asked participants to provide total sick
leave days except pregnancy and maternity leaves according to the literature (Glebbeek and Bax,
2005).
5
Some cities provided three years’ turnover data, other cities provided only one or two year’s
turnover data among 40 percent participants.
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Table 9-3. Expected Results for the Underlying Factors of HRM Characteristics

Question
Number

Contents of the questions
Number of job classification for sworn
officers

Q1-a

Number of job classification for civilians

Q1-b

Control
HRM system

Commitment
HRM system

More

Less

More

Less

Discretion not
allowed

Discretion allowed

Discretion not
allowed

Discretion allowed

Less

More

Q4-a

Job description for sworn officers (1-3)
1: Discretion not allowed
3: Discretion allowed
Job description for civilians (1-3)
1: Discretion not allowed
3: Discretion allowed
The number of registered unions for
sworn officers

Q4-b

The number of registered unions for
civilians

Less

More

Q5,6-a

Percent of sworn officers who are eligible
and join one of the unions

Less

More

Q5,6-b

Percent of civilians who are eligible and
join one of the unions

Less

More

No

Yes

No

Yes

In a limited range
of issues

In a wide range
of issues

Yes

No

Q2

Q3

Do you have formal employee
complaint/grievance resolution
mechanism
Do you have information-sharing-policy 6

Q7
Q8

Employees’ participation in a wide range
of issues or in a limited range of issues

Q9

Do you have incentive or bonus system

Q11
Q12-a

How long does it usually take to recruit
sworn officers

It doesn’t take
long

It takes long

Q12-b

How long does it usually take to recruit
civilians

It doesn’t take
long

It takes long

According to Arthur (1992, 1994) and Walton (1985), the expected results of
the HRM questions in the survey for each control and commitment HRM systems
are as in table 9-3. That is, based on the literature, we expect that an organization
with control HRM system would have more number of job classifications for both
6

If a department has an information-sharing-policy, most information is usually shared among
employees regardless whether or not the information is directly necessary to them.
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sworn officers and civilians, more detailed job description that does not allow
discretion for both sworn officers and civilians, less number of unions for both sworn
officers and civilians, lower percentage of employees’ joining unions for both sworn
officers and civilians, and bonus or incentive system. But we also expect that
organization with control HRM characteristics would neither have formal employee
complaint/grievance resolution mechanism nor information-sharing-policy. In
addition, employees are expected to participate in a limited range of issues, and it
would not take long to recruits sworn officers or civilians for an organization with
control HRM characteristics.

9.3 Independent Variables

Turnover rates. As reviewed in the previous chapter, turnover is defined as
the cessation of membership in an organization by an individual who received
monetary compensation from the organization (Mobley, 1982, p10). Among a variety
of different turnover measures, such as accession rate, separation rate, stability rate,
and survival rate 7 , I adopted the most commonly used measure, the separation rate as
follows.

(# of quit) or (# of total separation)
Separation rate

=
Average # of members on payrolls during the period

7

The definitions of these turnover measures were reviewed in the previous chapter, based on Price
(1977 ) and Mobley (1982).
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Although the combination of two or three turnover measures is suggested for better
understanding turnover (e.g., Mobley 1982; Price 1977), only separation rates could
be used for voluntary, involuntary, and total (i.e., voluntary and involuntary turnover)
turnovers in the current study because most municipal police departments do not
keep the detailed turnover records that are necessary to calculate other turnover
measures. Furthermore, even the number of employee separations is not well kept
over a few years in many police departments, especially when the city size is
relatively small. In this study, I differentiated voluntary turnover (i.e., initiated by
employees) from involuntary turnover (i.e., initiated by organizations, death, and
mandatory retirement) following the suggestions that voluntary turnover and
involuntary turnover should be dealt with differently because their etiologies and
effects are different from each other (e.g., McElroy et al., 2001; Shaw et al., 1998). I
also separated sworn officer’s turnover from civilian employees’ turnover because
their functions are different and sworn officers are more directly involved in crime
control. In addition, I combined sworn officer’s turnover and civilian’s turnover to
investigate if there is another effect of all employees’ turnover that may be different
from each group’s (i.e., sworn officers and civilians) separate turnover effect. In sum,
this study used nine kinds of turnover rates as follows. For sworn officers, I collected
the data of voluntary turnover, involuntary turnover, and total (i.e., voluntary and
involuntary) turnover. For civilian employees, I collected the data of voluntary
turnover, involuntary turnover, and total turnover. And for all employees (i.e., sworn
officers and civilians), I collected the data of voluntary turnover, involuntary
turnover, and total turnover.

Turnover rate differences. I also used turnover rate differences between year
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2003 turnover and year 2004 turnover (i.e., deducting 2003 turnover rate from 2004
turnover rate) as an independent variable. When I found no significant relationships
in the regression analysis that used different kinds of turnover rates as an
independent variable, I adopted different kinds of turnover rate differences as an
independent variable to examine if changes of turnover rates have influences on
crime control performance. Again, I used the same nine kinds of turnover rate
differences as in turnover rates.

9.4 Dependent Variables

Police performance. Performance is generally defined as effective and
efficient use of resources to achieve outcomes (Berman, 1998; Morley, 1986; Rosen,
1993). Unlike for-profit organizations with a clear goal of profit maximization,
governments at any level are generally forced to pursue several objectives at the
same time to meet citizens’ various needs. Municipal police departments are not the
exception. For example, as Skogan (1976, 278-279) noted, the police are expected to
facilitate the smooth flow of traffic through the city, to intercede in family disputes,
and often to perform mundane tasks of city management such as checking tavern
washrooms for the presence of soap and escorting children across busy streets, in
addition to their traditional role (i.e., crime control). However, the organization of
police departments and the self-image of their officers are rooted in crime fighting,
despite the multiplicity of their tasks (Reiss & Bordua, 1967), and crime control still
comprises a major part of the police service (Bratton, 1998; Moore & Braga, 2004).
Therefore, rather than measuring the whole performance of the various police
functions, which is not practical due to data availability, I focus on crime control
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performance in this study, as Skogan (1976) suggested.

Performance indicators of crime control. Probably the best way to see how
well crimes are being controlled is to measure the level of crime occurrence. For
example, if a small number of crimes occurred in a city, we may say that crimes are
well controlled in that area and, therefore, a good level of safety is provided to its
citizens. As we know in the suggested crime control model in the previous chapter,
however, crime occurrence is likely to be influenced by various uncontrollable
factors

such

as

social-structural

factors

(e.g.,

racial

heterogeneity)

and

socioeconomic factors (e.g., unemployment rate, poverty level) in addition to police
efforts (e.g., Pratt et al., 2005). Therefore, even when the police make serious efforts
to control crimes, it is not likely to observe significant crime reduction if other
uncontrollable factors work unfavorably in reducing crimes. Likewise, we may
observe crime reduction even when the police do not make serious efforts to reduce
crimes if other uncontrollable factors work favorably.

While the positive effects of the police level (e.g., the number of sworn
officers and expenditure level) on reducing crimes have been debatable, the
deterrence theory of traditional policing has been supported by studies that
investigated if high crime clearance rates lead to crime reduction (e.g., Chapman,
1976; D'Alessio et al., 1998; Wilson et al., 1978). According to the results of those
studies, crimes are likely to be reduced by increasing the certainty of punishment
(i.e., a high level of crime clearance). In fact, I found a significant and negative
relationship (r = - 0.5 ~ - 0.7) between crime clearance rates and crime occurrence
rates in the current study. As the logic model of the Community Oriented Policing
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Services Program (Roth et al., 2000b, 3) indicated, police efforts such as police level,
police expenditures, and quick responses to citizen requests are more directly related
to crime clearance rather than to crime occurrence. In addition, crime clearance is
less likely to be affected by the uncontrollable variables, as we reviewed in the
previous chapter. Since I am more interested in examining the effects of turnover and
the effect of HRM characteristics on crime control performance of the police, we are
more likely to find the effects when we focus on crime control output such as crime
clearance rates rather than focusing on crime control outcomes such as crime
reduction and safety feeling because the latter is more associated with uncontrollable
factors that may screen the effects of turnover and HRM characteristics.

In sum, as a crime control performance measure for the police, the crime
clearance rate has more advantages than the crime occurrence rates in the current
study. The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data are the most widely used criminal
statistics in the U.S. and have been maintained by FBI. In the current study, I only
used crime clearance rates for UCR part I crimes as dependent variables and did not
count crime clearance rates for UCR part II crimes because part II crimes are less
severe than part I crimes and get less attention from the police accordingly. As we
reviewed in the previous chapter, clearance rate is usually defined as the number (or
percentage) of crimes that have been “solved” by arrest or “exceptional” means
(Drebin and Brannon, 1992, p22). An offense is “cleared by arrest” or solved for
crime reporting purposes when at least one person is (1) arrested, (2) charged with
the commission of the offense; and (3) turned over to the court for prosecution. An
“exceptional” clearance is another variation of a clearance, and the death of the
offender can be regarded as an exceptional clearance. In this study, I did not adopt
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crime clearance rates for each individual crime. Rather, total violent crimes
(hereafter, violent crimes) and total property crimes (hereafter, property crimes) are
used as dependent variables. Based on the classification of the UCR Part I, in the
study, violent crimes consist of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault; and
property crimes consist of burglary, larceny, and motor theft. Since violent crimes are
usually more urgent, thus have higher priority than property crimes when the police
assign their efforts to clear them, and it is reasonable to treat them separately.

9.5 Control Variables
Based on the crime control literature, I included three factors that are normally
expected to influence the crime clearance rates: police level (i.e., the number of
patrol police officer per 10,000 populations), police expenditure level (i.e., budget
for salary and benefits per employee), and crime occurrence rate (i.e., crime
occurrence per 10,000 populations). As seen in the suggested crime control model,
there may be other factors involved in producing crime clearance rates, such as
response time, police strategies (e.g., patrolling), and get-tough policy. However, I
could not include them as control variables due to data unavailability. Although I
tried to collect the data such as response time and patrolling efforts by asking
questions in the survey, few police departments could provide those data. Socialstructural factors and socioeconomic factors are also included in the crime control
model I suggested, but those factors are more likely to have influences not on crime
clearance rates but on crime occurrence (or crime reduction) as seen in the model.

Although crime occurrence rates are negatively influenced by crime
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clearance rates as seen in the crime control model, we also see that crime occurrence
rates have negative influence on crime clearance rates at the same time (i.e.,
simultaneous relationship). For example, a higher level of crime occurrence may
lead to higher workloads for the police departments, and this, in turn, will lower the
level of crime clearance rates. However, no cancel-out effects are expected in this
simultaneous relationship because the correlation sign of each relationship is
commonly negative. That is, we expect that high clearance rates will lead to low
crime occurrence rates, and low crime occurrence rates will lead to high clearance
rates. In this study I did not include organization age as a control variable, unlike
other turnover effect studies (e.g., Arthur, 1994; Guthrie, 2001; Shaw et al. 2005),
because most cities were founded a long time ago, unlike for-profit organizations.

Copyright © Yongbeom Hur 2007
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X. Results and Discussion

10.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 10-1 summarizes means and standard deviations for the dependent variables,
the independent variables, and the control variables, and the correlations between
them. In table 10-1 we observe that there are negative relationships between crime
clearance rate and crime occurrence rates for both violent (r = - 0.51, p < 0.01) and
property (r = - 0.69, p <0.01) crimes, as expected.

No significant correlations were found between traditional policing (number
of police level and level of police expenditure) and crime clearance rates. That is, we
only observe suggestive, positive relationships between the number of patrol police
officers per 10,000 population and crime clearance rates (r = 0.27 for the violent
crime clearance rate; r = 0.10 for the property crime clearance rate) and between the
salary and benefits budget per employee and the crime clearance rates (r = 0.28 for
the violent crime clearance rate; r = 0.14 for the property crime clearance rate). We
also generally observe negative correlations between turnover rates and crime
clearance rates and between turnover rate differences and crime clearance rates,
indicating the importance of human resources in crime controlling. Since we do not
observe high correlations between any variables 1 in the table, we need not be
concerned about multicollinearity in the regression analysis.

1

Although high correlations exist between some independent variables (e.g., variables 7 and 10;
variables 8 and 10; variables 9 and 10), they do not cause multicollinearity in the regression analysis
because different independent variables are not included in the regression equation at the same time.
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Table 10-1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Obs

Mean

Std.
Dev.

1

1. Crime clearance rate
for total violent crimes

60

45.08

14.51

1.00

2. Crime clearance rate
for total property crimes

60

17.30

7.90

.77

1.00

3. Violent crime occurrence
per 10000 populations

62

66

39

-.51

-.48

1.00

4. Property crime occurrence
per 10000 populations

63

482

192

-.70

-.69

.81

1.00

5. Number of patrol police
officers per 10000
populations

42

11

6

.27

.10

-.06

-.10

1.00

6. Salary and benefits
per employee

51

82974

63025

.28

.14

-.19

-.49

-.25

1.00

7. Voluntary turnover
per 100 sworn officers

45

5.66

2.84

-.22

-.24

.26

.19

-.01

-.26

1.00

8. Voluntary and involuntary
turnover per 100 sworn
officers

42

6.39

3.29

-.19

-.23

.26

.20

-.02

-.28

.99

1.00

9. Voluntary turnover
per 100 employees
(sworn and civilian)

48

6.62

3.50

-.17

-.20

.09

.10

-.06

-.32

.91

.90

1.00

10. Voluntary and involuntary
turnover per 100 employees
(sworn and civilian)

45

7.25

3.58

-.14

-.19

.10

.11

-.04

-.35

.88

.90

.98

1.00

11. Voluntary turnover rate
difference
per 100 sworn officers

44

.17

2.78

-.24

-.26

-.12

-.11

.08

-.08

.31

.25

.17

.17

1.00

12. Voluntary and involuntary
turnover rate difference
per 100 sworn officers

41

-.04

3.01

-.23

-.34

-.09

-.09

.12

-.04

.26

.47

.13

.11

.82

1.00

46

.19

2.55

-.13

-.28

-.24

-.17

.15

-.20

.30

.28

.36

.35

.86

.76

1.00

43

-.11

2.50

-.14

-.32

-.17

-.21

.23

-.09

.25

.23

.31

.32

.81

.72

.95

Variable

13. Voluntary turnover rate
difference per 100
employees (sworn and
civilian)
14. Voluntary and involuntary
turnover rate difference
per 100 employees
(sworn and civilian)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1.00

Note: year 2004 data

10.2 HRM characteristics of municipal police departments
Although I asked various questions about HRM characteristics in the survey, it
turned out that some questions were not appropriate in the context of municipal
police departments. For example, according to the results, recruiting time for sworn
officers is not much related with cautiousness in selecting employees unlike in the
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private sector, rather it is more related with how often municipal governments recruit
new employees. Therefore, if a city government does not recruit new employees
frequently, it will take longer to fill in vacancies than a city government with a
frequent recruiting. Unionization is another example. Most employees seem to join
at least one of the unions as long as their government allows unionizations for sworn
officers and civilian employees at the police department. Therefore, I could not tell
the difference in the degree of unionization among police departments except when
unions are not allowed for the police employees. In this study, I tried to include a
variety of HRM characteristic variable as long as they showed an acceptable level of
internal consistency reliability.

I checked internal consistency reliability of different sets of HRM
characteristic variables by using Cronbach’s alpha. Since a widely-accepted social
science cut-off is 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978), I chose one set that included relatively more
HRM characteristic variables and had over 0.7 Cronbach’s alpha. As seen in table
10-2, the chosen HRM variable set included different HRM characteristics such as
job classifications for sworn officers and civilian employees, job descriptions for
sworn officers and civilian employees, information sharing policy, employee’s
participation in a wide range of issues, and performance-related incentive system.
Although the chosen HRM variable set include the mix of continuous variables (i.e.,
job classification numbers for sworn officers and civilian employees), dichotomous
variables (i.e., information sharing policy, employee’s participation in a wide range
of issue, and performance-related incentive system), and trichotomous variables (i.e.,
job descriptions for sworn officers and civilian employees), I ran factor analysis with
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them. 2 The chosen HRM variable set, however, did not include recruiting time for
sworn officers and civilians and unionization-related variables due to the reasons I
explained previously.

Table 10-2. Cronbach’s Alpha for the Chosen Set of HRM Characteristic Variables
Obs

Avg. inter-item
correlation

# of job classification for sworn officers

51

0.3269

# of job classification for civilian employees

50

0.3425

Job task description for sworn officers
(1: most details 3: discretion allowed)
Job task description for civilian employees
(1: most details 3: discretion allowed)
Information sharing policy
(1: yes 0: no)
Employee’s participation in a wide range of
issues (1: yes 0: no)
Performance-related incentive system
(1: yes 0: no)

65

0.2155

65

0.401

62

0.2544

62

0.2452

63

0.2605

Item

Test scale

Alpha

0.7436

0.2929

When the variable set of HRM characteristics was determined, I ran factor
analysis using principal components factor method, and rotated the results with
varimax option 3 in order to extract underlying factors with the expectation that
commitment HRM characteristics and control HRM characteristics are separately
identified. I obtained two factors, both of which had more than one eigenvalue 4 . As
seen in table 10-3, uniqueness 5 is not very high except civilian employees’ job
classification number (v2) and Job task description for civilian employees (v4).
2

Although factor analysis with mixed variables of continuous and dichotomous variable may result in
clustering around variables, I ran factor analysis with those mixed variables because at least those
dichotomous and trichotomous variables are ordinal level of measurements, so that we can do factor
analysis (e.g., UCLA website information about the factor analysis with non-continuous variables,
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed231a1/notes2/morefa.html).
3
I assumed that commitment HRM factor and control HRM factor were not related.
4
The eigenvalue for a given factor measures the variance in all the variables that is accounted for by
that factor. As a rule of thumb, when eigenvalue is more than one, we can retain as an extracted factor.
5
It is the percentage of variance for the variable that is not explained by the factors.
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According to Walton (1985) and Arthur (1992, 1994), we expect that an organization
with commitment HRM characteristics is likely to have smaller number of job
classification, more discretion-allowed job description than an organization with
control HRM characteristics. We also expect that an organization with commitment
HRM characteristics is likely to have information-sharing policy, and encourage
their employees to participate in a wide range of issues, whereas an organization
with control HRM characteristics is likely to have a performance-related incentive
system. Table 10-3 shows that factor 1 and factor 2 have consistent HRM
characteristics according to the definitions of control HRM characteristics and
commitment HRM characteristics except job task description for civilian employees.
Therefore, I can conclude that factor 1 represents commitment HRM characteristics
and factor 2 represents control HRM characteristics.

Table 10-3. Obtained Factors of HRM Characteristics
Factor 1
Loading

Factor 2
Loading

Uniqueness

0.19831

0.69098

0.48321

0.1286

0.68322

0.51668

Job task description for sworn officers (v3) / Q2
(1: most detailed 2: middle 3: discretion allowed)

0.93074

0.12085

0.11912

Job task description for civilian employees (v4) / Q3
(1: most detailed 2: middle 3: discretion allowed)

-0.08762

0.54984

0.68999

Information sharing policy (v5) / Q8
(1: yes 0: no)

0.93788

-0.0042

0.12036

Employee’s participation in a wide range of issues (v6)
(1: yes 0: no) / Q9

0.88571

0.08528

0.20824

Performance-related incentive system (v7)
(1: yes 0: no) / Q11

-0.82435

-0.11769

0.30659

Variable/ Question No.
# of job classification for sworn officers (v1) / Q1a
# of job classification for civilian employees (v2) / Q1b
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10.3 The effects of HRM characteristics on crime control performance
In the previous chapters, I hypothesized that a certain kind of HRM characteristics
would have positive effects on crime control performance from the universalistic
perspective. Based on the literature, I expected that commitment HRM system and
its individual HRM practices both have positive effects on crime control
performance as below.

H1. Municipal police departments that have individual practices of commitment
HRM system are more likely to have better crime control performance respectively.
(1) Broad job classification,
(2) More discretion allowed
(3) Formal complaint/grievance resolution mechanism
(4) Information-sharing-policy
(5) Employees’ participation encouraged in a wide range of issues,
(6) No bonus or incentive system for individuals, and
(7) More selective staffing

H2. Municipal police departments that have commitment HRM systems are more
likely to have better crime control performance.

In order to test these hypotheses, I ran regression with independent variables such as
each individual practice of commitment HRM – from broad job classification to
more selective staffing as seen in hypothesis 1 – and the extracted HRM factors that
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seem to represent commitment (factor 1) and control (factor 2) HRM characteristics
as seen in the previous section. Clearance rates for violent crimes and property
crimes are used as dependent variables as I explained in the previous section of this
chapter. I also included three control variables that are normally expected to
influence the crime clearance rates: police level (i.e., the number of patrol police
officer per 10,000 populations), police expenditure level (i.e., budget for salary and
benefits per employee), and crime occurrence rate (i.e., crime occurrence per 10,000
populations). Although other factors may be involved in producing crime clearance
rates, such as response time, police strategies (e.g., patrolling), and get-tough policy
as seen in the suggested crime control model in the previous chapter, I could not
include them as control variables due to data unavailability. In order to examine how
each HRM practice and extracted HRM factors contribute to explaining the variance
of crime control performance – checking adjusted R2 in table 10-4 – in addition to
exploring the effect of those HRM practices and factors, I conducted stepwise
regression. As in the table, first, I ran regression with only three control variables
(model C) and added different individual HRM practices and HRM factors. The
regression results are summarized in table 10-4 and table 10-5. As seen in table 10-4,
neither individual HRM practices (M1 ~ M7) nor HRM systems (M8 and M9) have
significant effects on violent crime control performance. In sum, I failed to show
meaningful effects of individual HRM practices and extracted HRM factors on
violent crime control performance. Some possible reasons are as follows. Violent
crime clearance rates (i.e., dependent variable) are more likely affected by public
attentions than policing resources and human resource management practices. For
example, if a violent crime gets more public attention, we imagine that the police
tend to make efforts to clear that crime. Small number of observations might be
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another reason. Even among 65 participating cities, they usually answered some
questions that do not require much time for answering.

Table 10-4. Effects of HRM Practices on Violent Crime Control Performance
Models

Variables

C

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

Violent crime occurrence
per 10000 populations (C1)

-.13

-.20†

-.16

-.14†

-.14†

-.14

-.15†

-.13

-.23*

-.19†

Salary and benefit per employee (C2)

-.00

-.00

-.00

-.00

-.00

-.00

-.00

-.00

-.00

-.00

Number of patrol police officers
per 10000 populations (C3)

.40

1.33

1.56

.02

.70

.52

.28

.59

1.81

1.77

Number of job classification
for sworn officers (M1)

-.54

Number of job classification
for civilian employees (M2)

-.14

Job task descriptions for sworn officers
(1: detailed 3: discretion) (M3)

-5.88

Job task descriptions for civilian employees
(1: detailed 3: discretion) (M4)

5.66

Information sharing policy
(1: yes, 0: no) (M5)

-4.00

Employees' participation
in a wide range of issues (1: yes, 0: no) (M6)

-15.7

Incentive or bonus system,
based on performance? (1: yes, 0: no) (M7)

-.83

Commitment
HRM factor (M8)

-8.6

Control
HRM factor (M9)

Note

-2.64

F

1.00

1.37

1.62

1.12

1.04

.81

2.01

0.83

2.45†

1.56

Adjusted R2

.01

.06

.10

.02

.00

.00

.13

.00

.22

.10

- Dependent variables are violent crime clearance rates

†p＜ .10

- Unstandardized coefficients are reported

* p＜ .05

- Number of observations: 21-31

** p＜ .01
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Table 10-5. Effects of HRM Practices on Property Crime Control Performance

Models

C

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

-.03**

-.04**

-.04**

-.03***

-.03**

-.03**

-.03**

-.03**

-.03**

-.04**

Salary and benefit per employee (C2)

-.00

-.00

-.00

-.00†

-.00

-.00

-.00

-.00†

-.00

-.00

Number of patrol police officers
per 10000 populations (C3)

-.13

-.34

-.23

-.47

.06

-.42

-.25

-.08

-.39

-.46

Variables
Property crime occurrence
per 10000 populations (C1)

Number of job classification
for sworn officers (M1)

-.42

Number of job classification
for civilian employees (M2)

-.05

Job task descriptions for sworn officers
(1: detailed 3: discretion) (M3)

-5.41*

Job task descriptions for civilian
employees (1: detailed 3: discretion) (M4)

3.42

Information sharing policy
(1: yes, 0: no) (M5)

-5.16

Employees' participation
in a wide range of issues (1: yes, 0: no)
(M6)

-7.33*

Incentive or bonus system,
based on performance? (1: yes, 0: no) (M7)

-2.11

Commitment
HRM factor (M8)

-3.62

Control
HRM factor (M9)

Note

-.38

F

4.32*

3.09*

3.03*

5.44**

3.80*

4.24*

5.12**

3.14*

3.67*

2.88†

Adjusted R2

.25

.27

.27

.37

.27

.32

.37

.23

.35

.27

- Dependent variables are property crime clearance rates

†p＜ .10

- Unstandardized coefficients are reported

* p＜ .05

- Number of observations: 21-31

** p＜ .01
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Unlike violent crime cases, however, we observe bigger adjusted R2 for the
property crime cases. Basically the variance of property crime control performance
(i.e., clearance rates in this study) was well explained with traditional policing efforts
and most individual HRM practices, and HRM systems also contributed to
explaining the variance of property crime control performance (see adjusted R2 in
table 10-5) although most of them didnot have significant effect on property crime
clearance. As in violent crime cases, we do not observe significant influences of
traditional policing efforts on crime control performance. Rather, we observe that
crime occurrence rates are the most significant factor for both violent and property
crime cases. That is, the more crimes occurred, the fewer crimes are cleared.

When we look at the effects of individual HRM practices and HRM
characteristics (i.e., commitment and control HRM), two kinds of individual HRM
practices, job task descriptions for sworn officers (M3) and employees' participation
in a wide range of issues (M6), show significant effects on crime control
performance (p < 0.5). Unlike my prediction, however, there are negative
relationships between those individual HRM practices of commitment HRM
characteristics (i.e., M3 and M6) and property crime control performance. With
respect to the effects of HRM characteristics, we do not observe any significant cases.
Therefore, no hypotheses (H1 and H2) about the effect of commitment HRM
practices and HRM characteristics (i.e., commitment and control HRM
characteristics) were supported.
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Interpretation of the results. Why did we not observe significant effects of
individual HRM practices or HRM characteristics on crime control performance?
Are there not significant correlations between those individual HRM practices or
HRM characteristics and crime control performance in the municipal police
departments? We may not answer those questions in this study. Probably, we may
find the answers in the relationship between HRM practices/systems and
organizational strategies/directions in the context of municipal police departments, as
we reviewed in chapter four. Although I found two underlying factors of various
HRM characteristics that municipal police departments might have, it is less likely
that those HRM practices and characteristics are formed in consistency with
organizational strategies, unlike for-profit organizations. Likewise, each individual
HRM practice is also less likely to be determined from the viewpoint of
organizational strategy. That is, commitment HRM practices and characteristics may
not be the proper option to improve organizational performance in the municipal
police departments, even though we need to more investigate this research topic in
order to confirm this speculation. According to organizational characteristics such as
defender, prospector, analyzer, and reactor suggested by Miles and Snow (1984),
police organizations, like most public organizations, may belong to reactors who do
not have consistency between strategy and environment and between strategy and
process.

Among different competitive strategies such as innovation, quality
enhancement, cost reduction suggested by Schuler and Jackson (1987), it appears
that police organizations may have cost reduction strategy when we consider the
expected role behaviors of each strategy (see section 4.5). Especially when the police
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need to show that safety environment is being provided to the citizens, the police
tend to pay attention to quantity and results (e.g., crime clearance rate, crime
occurrence rate) rather than to quality (e.g., citizen’s satisfaction, due process when
crime is controlled). If the police are usually under the pressure to show their cities
are safer than other cities, we can imagine that they are more likely to adopt cost
reduction strategy, based on Shuler and Jackson (1987), and therefore control HRM
practices may be more appropriate to have a better crime control performance.

As explained in chapter four, Wright and McMahan (1992) argued that in the
private sector HRM practices and activities are likely to be determined by proactive,
strategically intended decisions, whereas non-strategic models (i.e., resource
dependence and institutional model) may be more persuasive to explain the HRM
practices and activities in the public sector. According to the interview with a sworn
officer at the local police department, major parts of the HRM characteristics are
more likely to be determined by the personal preferences of police chiefs. For
example, if a police chief likes subordinates to participate in a wide range of issues,
employees are encouraged to do so. The problem in this situation is that those HRM
practices are not proactive, strategically intended decisions. Even when a police
department has HRM practices that really contribute to improving organizational
performance, a new police chief may change them, simply according to his or her
preference. As Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988) argued, achieving
competitive advantage through human resources requires that theses activities should
be managed from a strategic perspective because integration provides a broader
range of solutions for solving complex organizational problems, and reciprocity in
integrating human resource and strategic concerns limits the neglect of human
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resources as a vital source of organizational competence and competitive advantage.

10.4 Turnover effects on crime control performance
In order to investigate if turnover has significant effects on crime control
performance, I conducted stepwise regression analyses separately with two different
dependent variables: the violent crime clearance rate and the property crime
clearance rate. Firstly, I ran regression with only three control variables, and then I
added different types of turnover rates respectively (i.e., voluntary, involuntary, and
total turnover rates for both sworn officers and civilians) as an independent variable.
Finally, I added a quadratic term of each turnover rate variable in each regression
equation, following the conventional way to check whether the relation shapes are
linear or curvilinear (Glebbeek and Bax 2004, 284). No significant cases were found
when I used turnover rates as independent variables and the results are not shown in
this paper.

Stepwise regression. After finding no significant relationships in the
regression results using the turnover rate as an independent variable, I ran regression
with different kinds of turnover rate differences as independent variables to examine
if turnover changes have effects on crime control performance. Table 10-6 (a & b)
shows the regression results when violent crime clearance rate was used as a
dependent variable and table 10-7 (a & b) shows the results when property crime
clearance rate was used as a dependent variable. Like the regression analysis with
turnover rate itself, I added turnover rate difference variables respectively after
running regression with only three control variables. That is, I added different kinds
of turnover rate differences such as sworn officer’s voluntary turnover rate
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difference (in model A-1), sworn officer’s total (i.e., voluntary and involuntary
turnovers) turnover rate difference (in model B-1), all employee’s (i.e., sworn
officers and civilians) voluntary turnover rate difference (in model C-1), and all
employee’s total turnover rate difference (in model D-1). Although I checked the
effects of civilian employee’s turnover rate difference (voluntary and involuntary) on
the crime control performance, I found no significant results and omitted the results
in the table. As in table 10-6 (a & b) and table 10-7 (a & b), I only included the
regression results of sworn officer’s turnover rate differences and total employee’s
(i.e., sworn officers and civilian employees) turnover rate differences. After adding
each turnover rate difference separately, I added a quadratic term of each turnover
rate difference (i.e., in model A-2, B-2, C-2, and D-2) to check whether the shape of
relationship is linear or curvilinear. Finally, I added commitment HRM factor and its
interaction term (i.e., in model A-3, B-3, C-3, and D-3) and control HRM factor and
its interaction term (i.e., in model A-4, B-4, C-4, and D-4) to examine if HRM
characteristics moderate the effects of turnover on crime control performance.
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Table 10-6-a. Turnover Effects on Violent Crime Control Performance and
Moderating Effects of HRM Factors

Model
Variabl

A-1

A-2

A-3

A-4

B-1

B-2

B-3

B-4

Violent crime occurrence
per 10000 populations

-.13

-.14

-.11

-0.29

-0.19

-0.13

-0.11

-0.27

-0.19

Salary and benefit per employee

.01

.01

.01

0.00

0.00

.01

.01

0.00

0.00

Number of patrol police officers
per 10000 populations

.40

1.62

1.68

3.05

4.77*

1.38

1.36

2.95

4.57*

-2.63

-3.36

-2.12

-2.24

.72

1.19

1.05
-2.07

-2.34

-1.38

-1.19

.60

1.14

1.02*

Voluntary TRD
per 100 sworn officers (A)
Quadratic term (A2)
Voluntary and involuntary TRD
per 100 sworn officers (B)
Quadratic term (B2)

Commitment
HRM factor (F1)

-7.35

Control
HRM factor (F2)

-4.19
-9.98

F1 * TRD a

-10.50

-1.63

F2 * TRDa

-1.63
0.16

1.03

F

1

2.13

2.29†

1.49

2.14

2.28

2.37†

1.61

2.62

Adjusted R2

.01

.18

.23

.18

.35

.20

.26

.22

.43

Note

- TRD is the acronym of turnover rate difference

†p＜ .10

- Turnover rate difference = 2004 turnover rate – 2003 turnover rate

* p＜ .05

- Unstandardized coefficients are reported

** p＜ .01

- Number of observations: 21-31

***p＜ .001
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Table 10-6-b. Turnover Effects on Violent Crime Control Performance and
Moderating Effects of HRM Factors

Model
Variabl

C-1

C-2

C-3

C-4

D-1

D-2

D-3

D-4

Violent crime occurrence
per 10000 populations

-.13

-.22*

-.18*

-0.32*

-0.27*

-0.21*

-.17*

-0.24

-0.24*

Salary and benefit per employee

.01

.01

.01

0.00

0.00

.01

.01

0.00

0.00

Number of patrol police officers
per 10000 populations

.40

.03

.34

0.77

1.58

.09

.21

0.95

1.68

-2.45

-4.12*

-3.30

-4.34†

1.62**

1.60

1.04

-1.99

-3.66*

-1.89

-4.42*

1.60**

0.66

0.86

Voluntary TRD
per 100 employees (officer and
civilian) (C)
Quadratic term (C2)
Voluntary and involuntary TRD
per 100 employees (officer and
civilian) (D)
Quadratic term (D2)

Commitment
HRM factor (F1)

-7.28

Control
HRM factor (F2)

-8.81
1.72

F1 * TRD a

0.71

-2.45

F2 * TRDa

1.54
2.24

3.35

F

1

1.65

4.84**

4.15*

3.01†

1.54

5.28**

3.38*

3.53*

Adjusted R2

.01

.10

.47

.60

.48

.09

.49

.53

.54

Note

- TRD is the acronym of turnover rate difference

†p＜ .10

- Turnover rate difference = 2004 turnover rate – 2003 turnover rate

* p＜ .05

- Unstandardized coefficients are reported

** p＜ .01

- Number of observations: 21-31

***p＜ .001
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Table 10-7-a. Turnover Effects on Property Crime Control Performance and
Moderating Effects of HRM Factors
Model

A-1

A-2

A-3

A-4

B-1

B-2

B-3

B-4

-.03***

-.04***

-.03***

-0.03

-0.04**

-.04***

-.03***

-0.02

-0.03*

Salary and benefit per
employee

.01*

.01

.01

0.00

0.00*

.01

.01

0.00

0.00*

Number of patrol police
officers
per 10000 populations

-.13

-.13

-.02

0.82

1.10

-.04

.01

0.70

1.04

-1.87*

-2.47**

-1.81

-2.23**

.57**

0.65*

0.74**

-1.94*

-2.17**

-1.50

-1.59*

.50**

0.57

0.67**

Variable
Property crime occurrence
per 10000 populations

Voluntary TRD
per 100 sworn officers (A)
Quadratic term (A2)
Voluntary and involuntary
TRD per 100 sworn officers
(B)
2

Quadratic term (B )

Commitment
HRM factor (F1)

-3.21

Control
HRM factor (F2)

-2.53

F1 * TRD a

-2.70

1.14

F2 * TRDa

0.82
-1.50

F
Adjusted R2

Note

-1.48

-1.19

4.32*

5.62**

8.69***

6.66**

8.33**

6.15**

9.99***

7.4**

11.77**

.25

.47

.65

.73

.77

.51

.69

.75

.83

- TRD is the acronym of turnover rate difference

* p＜ .05

- Turnover rate difference = 2004 turnover rate – 2003 turnover rate

** p＜ .01

- Unstandardized coefficients are reported

***p＜ .001

- Number of observations: 21-31
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Table 10-7-b. Turnover Effects on Property Crime Control Performance and
Moderating Effects of HRM Factors

Variable

Model

Property crime occurrence
per 10000 populations
Salary and benefit per
employee
Number of patrol police
officers
per 10000 populations
Voluntary TRD
per 100 employees (officer
and civilian) (C)

C-1

C-2

C-3

C-4

D-1

D-2

D-3

D-4

-.03***

-.05***

-.04***

-0.03

-0.04*

-.05***

-.04***

-0.03**

-0.04*

.01*

.01**

.01*

0.00

0.00

.01**

.01*

0.00*

0.00

-.13

-.16

-.04

-0.53

-0.47

-.08

-.04

-0.50

-0.44

-2.38**

-2.94**

-3.01*

-2.97*

.60*

0.54

0.91*

-2.49**

-2.84**

-1.81*

-2.85*

.45*

-0.04

0.51

Quadratic term (C2)
Voluntary and involuntary
TRD per 100 employees
(officer and civilian) (D)
Quadratic term (D2)

Commitment
HRM factor (F1)

-2.95

Control
HRM factor (F2)

0.00

F1 * TRD a

0.34

0.88

F2 * TRDa

2.00*
-1.51

F
Adjusted R2

Note

-7.65*

-0.64

4.32*

8.46***

10.7***

6.52**

6.87**

10.7***

11.1***

15.52***

5.53*

.25

.58

.69

.72

.73

.64

.70

.93

.70

- TRD is the acronym of turnover rate difference

* p＜ .05

- Turnover rate difference = 2004 turnover rate – 2003 turnover rate

** p＜ .01

- Unstandardized coefficients are reported

***p＜ .001

- Number of observations: 21-31
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Turnover effects on crime control performance. In the previous chapter, I
hypothesized that police performance would be influenced by employee turnover
such that there might be an inverted-U shape relationship between turnover and
crime control performance as below, based on the turnover literature:

H3. Turnover initially has a positive effect on police performance until a certain
level of turnover and has a negative effect on police performance after that point.
(i.e., the relationship between turnover and police performance is inverted-U shape).

Above all, the results showed that crime control performance is significantly
influenced by turnover change, although turnover change influences crime control
performance in a different way from the prediction in the hypothesis 3. That is, there
is a U-shape relationship between the turnover rate differences and the crime
clearance rates 6 . In the violent crime cases (i.e., table 10-6), models C-2 and D-2
have positive and significant coefficients of the quadratic terms, and in the property
crime cases (i.e., table 10-7), models A-2, B-2, C-2, and D-2 have positive and
significant coefficients of the quadratic terms. In sum, the hypothesis 3 in which I
predicted an inverted-U shape relationship between employee turnover and crime
control performance was not supported although the results confirmed significant
effects of turnover on crime control performance.

Practical interpretation of turnover effects and turning points. Since the
relationships between the turnover rate differences and the crime clearance rates are
U-shaped, there are turning points where the slope is zero. In this study, I calculated
6

In the quadratic equation, ax2 + bx + c = 0, we know that the graph is U-shaped when the coefficient
of x2 (i.e., a) is positive and inverted U-shaped when it is negative.
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the predicted turning points by taking derivative of the quadratic expressions (Q: ax2
+ bx + c = 0) as other turnover studies did (e.g., Shaw et al. 2005). Since the
equation Q’s derivative is 2ax + b =0, x = - b/2a. For example, in model A-2 of the
property crime cases, the predicted turning point can be calculated by inserting a and
b values into the formula, x = -b/2a. Therefore, the turning point is 2.17 [i.e., - (2.47)/2(0.57)] standard deviations from the mean or 6.14 percent of the sworn
officer’s voluntary turnover rate difference 7 between 2004 and 2003. Likewise, in
models B-2, C-2, and D-2 of the property crime cases, Z values are 2.17, 2.45, and
3.16 standard deviations from the mean and their actual turnover rate differences are
6.49, 6.44, and 7.79 percent, respectively. In the violent crime cases, Z values are
1.27 in model C-2 and 1.14 in model D-2, and their actual turnover rate differences
are 3.17 percent and 2.74 percent, respectively.

As seen in figure 10-1, the relationships between the turnover rate differences
and the crime clearance rates are curvilinear. Therefore, if we think the relationship
is linear and negative, in the part between point A and point B, the negative effects
of turnover change will be underestimated, and the part before point A or after point
B, the negative effects of turnover will be overestimated. Theoretically, crime
clearance rates will increase after passing turning points as seen in figure 10-1, but
according to the standard normal distribution probability table (Wonnacott &
Wonnacott, 1990, 672), the possibility that the Z value is more than 2.17 (i.e., the Z
value in figure 1) is less than 1.5 percent, which means it is very rare to find
observations after the turning point if the Z value of the turning point is 2.17.
7

To convert Z value to actual turnover rate difference, the formula Z = (x-mean)/standard deviation is
used. Therefore, x = Z *(standard deviation) + mean. When inserting Z, standard deviation, and mean
(check table 3 for standard deviation and mean of sworn officer’s voluntary turnover), x =
(2.17)(2.78) + 0.11 = 6.14.
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Therefore, as Shaw et al. (2005) suggested, we may interpret the shape of the
relationship as attenuated, negative instead of U-shaped especially for the property
crime cases. In the current study, only one out of 44 observations has more than 6.14
percent turnover rate difference (i.e., Z = 2.17) in the sworn officer’s voluntary
turnover cases.

Figure 10-1. The Relationship Between the Sworn Officer’s Voluntary Turnover Rate
Difference (TRD) and Crime Clearance Rates

High
Crime
Clearance
Rate

Property crimes

Violent crimes

Low
Crime
Clearance

Rate

0%

A 0.11%
Z=0

2.89%

B 5.67%

Z=1

Z=2

8.45%
Z=3

Sworn officer’s voluntary TRD

When we see the violent crime cases, only two models (C-2 and D-2) have
the significant coefficients of the turnover-related terms, whereas all models have the
significant coefficients of the turnover-related terms in the property crime cases. This
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may mean that the violent crime clearance rates are less influenced by turnover
changes than the property crime clearance rates. The predicted turning points are
also smaller in the violent crime cases than those in the property crime cases. That is,
as the turnover change increases, the turning points of the negative effects are earlier
reached in the violent crime cases than in the property crime cases. Since violent
crimes are usually more urgent, more police officers are likely to be assigned even
when the police experience the lack of human resources. Therefore, for the violent
crime cases, negative effects of turnover change would cease at some point of
turnover rate difference and positive effects may begin 8 (see the dotted curve in
figure 10-1). But we need to be careful to interpret this because police departments
may not assign more police officers to clear violent crime cases when they really
suffer from lack of human resources at their departments.

When we compare the negative effects of turnover rate differences between
the sworn officers (model A-2 and B-2) and the civilian employees, we observe that
the civilian employee’s turnover rate difference does not have significant effects on
neither violent crime clearance rate nor property crime clearance rate as expected
(the results are omitted). Interestingly, however, all employees’ (i.e., sworn officers
and civilians) turnover rate differences have significant and negative effects on the
crime control performance as seen in models C-2 and D-2 of table 10-6 and table 107 9 . Therefore, we may need to pay attention to all employees’ turnover rate

8

Since Z-values of turning points for the violent crime cases are relatively small than those for the
property crime cases, it is practically possible to observe police departments who experience
increased crime control performance after the turning point unlike the property crime cases.
9
More sworn officers might be the reason. That is, in most cases police departments have more than
two times as many sworn officers as civilian employees. Therefore, in property crime clearing cases
although civilian employee’s turnover change does not have significant effects on the crime clearance
rates, all employees’ turnover change may show significant effects simply because the effect of sworn
officers is much bigger than that of civilian employees.
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differences as well as the sworn officer’s turnover rate differences. When we look at
the correlation coefficients of the control variables, we observe that the property
crime occurrence rate has more negative effects on the property crime clearance rate
than the violent crime occurrence rate does on the violent crime clearance rate as
expected. Since violent crimes tend to get more public attention, the police may
focus more on clearing violent crimes regardless of workloads each sworn officer
has due to increased crime occurrence.

10.5 The moderating effects of HRM factors on turnover effects
With respect to the moderating effects of HRM characteristics, I predicted that the
negative effects of turnover might be bigger when municipal police departments
have commitment HRM characteristics, based on human capital theory.

H4. Negative effects of turnover on police performance are greater in an
organization with more commitment-oriented human resource management (HRM)
characteristics than in an organization with more control-oriented HRM
characteristics.

As in table 10-6 (a & b) and table 10-7 (a & b), in most cases, we do not
observe significant moderating effects of HRM characteristics on turnover
consequences although adjusted R2 was increased in most violent and property crime
clearance cases 10 . Only one significant case [model D-3 in table 10-7 (b)] indicates

10

For violent crime clearance cases - i.e., table 10-6 (a) and (b), adjusted R2 was increased in A-4, B-4,
C-3, C-4, D-3, and D-4. For property crime clearance cases - i.e., table 10-7 (a) and (b), adjusted R2
was increased in A-3, A-4, B-3, B-4, C-3, C-4, D-3 and D-4. Adjusted R2 decreases if irrelevant
variables are added in the regression equation.
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that when a police organization has commitment HRM characteristics, the
relationship between turnover change and crime control performance will be linear
rather than curvilinear. In most cases, however, there still existed attenuated,
negative relationships between the turnover rate differences and the crime clearance
rates after adding HRM factors and interaction terms to the regression equations.
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XI. Summary and Conclusion

11.1 HRM characteristics and crime control performance
From the universalistic perspective, I predicted that municipal police departments
with individual commitment HRM practices or commitment HRM system are likely
to have better crime control performance. In this study, however, no significant
relationships were found between HRM practices or system and crime control
performance. Thererfore, my predictions about the influence of individual
commitment HRM practices and commitment HRM characteristics (i.e., H1 and H2)
were not supported.

From the strategic perspective, the results might be interpreted such that there
is inconsistency between commitment HRM practices or system and organizational
strategies that the police departments might have. Based on the literature (e.g.,
Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 1988; Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Miles and
Snow, 1984), integration between HRM practices and organizational strategies or
organizational characteristics is necessary to have a better organizational
performance. Maybe control HRM practices and control HRM characteristics are
more fitted to the municipal police organizations although the study showed only
suggestive results 1 . As an alternative explanation, municipal police organizations
may be less likely to have consistency between strategies and environments. Police
organizations may be one of the “reactors” who do not have good alignment among
1

As seen in table 10-4 and 10-5, the narrower job take description for sworn officers a municipal
police a police department has or the narrower range of issues employees are encouraged to
participate in, the higher clearance rate for property crimes the police department has (p < .5). In
addition, the commitment HRM factor seems to have more negative effects on crime control
performance than the control HRM factor for both violent and property crimes although those effects
are not significant.
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strategy, structure, and process (Miles and Snow, 1984).

According to Wright and McMahan (1992), the formation of HRM practices
in an organization can be explained by strategic and non-strategic models, and the
latter models such as institutional and political forces models seem to better explain
the dysfunctional determinants of HRM practices in the municipal police
departments. The determinants of HRM practices in the public organizations are not
likely to be the results of rational strategic decision-making processes, but rather
likely to be derived from institutional and political forces, so it is hard to expect the
positive relationship between HRM practices or characteristics and organizational
performance in the municipal police departments.

11.2 Turnover effects on organizational performance & HRM moderating
effects

Since I found attenuated negative relationships between turnover rate differences and
crime clearance rates, the human capital theory was also supported in the public
sector. As reviewed in the previous chapter, however, the results did not support the
prediction about the relationships between turnover and crime control performance
(i.e., H3 was not supported). Unlike my prediction that the relationship would be an
inverted-U shaped between turnover and crime control performance, the results
showed an attenuated, negative relationship between turnover change and crime
control performance.

According to the results, the crime control performance was not influenced
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by turnover itself; rather it was influenced by turnover changes (i.e., turnover rate
difference) unlike extant turnover studies, mostly conducted in the private sector.
The possible interpretation of the difference between the current study and the other
turnover studies is as follows. Probably most police organizations might be already
used to their usual levels of turnover – in fact the police departments need to get used
to a certain level of turnover due to a long recruiting time 2 . Therefore, their
organizational performance is not less likely to be affected by the turnover itself if
their turnover rates are within the usual ranges they have usually experienced.
However, when the turnover level becomes higher than a usual level, the police
organizations might need extra time to adjust themselves to this change and this
might lead to organizational performance reduction. For example, some police
organizations may have higher turnover levels than others, but this does not
necessarily lead to reduced crime control performance if those turnover levels are
within normal ranges they usually experience. Likewise, even when a police
department has a lower turnover rate than others, their crime control performance
might be worse than others if their current turnover level is much higher than a usual
turnover level - that is, if they experience a big turnover change between the current
and the past years.

As mentioned before, the attenuated, negative relationships were found in
this study. As reviewed in chapter seven, Shaw et al. (2005) and Newell and
Rosenbloom (1981) provided hints about why the relationship was attenuated and
negative. From the organizational control perspective, Shaw et al. (2005, 52)
explained, “As skill levels are reduced by turnover, input-throughput-output
2

According to the survey, the average length of recruiting and filling vacancies for sworn officers is
195 days.
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processes are disrupted and energy and resources are redirected from safety concerns
in order to maintain operations.” When turnover is very high, Shaw et al. argued that
turnover is less likely to be disruptive because the organization is already geared
toward continual work force replacement. The learning curve theory also helps us
understand the attenuation of the relationship. Newell and Rosenbloom (1981)
argued that the time taken to perform a task (i.e., short time means a high level of
performance) decreases as a learning rate increases. In the context of police
organizations, we can imagine that if a municipal police department experiences a
positive 3 , bigger turnover rate difference than other police departments, they will
come to better know how to handle turnover in a proper manner than others, and this
will lead to smaller negative effects of the turnover change on organizational
performance.

According to the results, turnover effects on the crime control performance
were not moderated by the HRM characteristics (i.e. H4 was not supported).
Although I could extract two underlying HRM characteristic factors 4 as HRM
characteristics that police departments might have, I only found suggestive results
that indicated moderating effects of HRM characteristics. That is, I found that in an
organization with control HRM characteristics it took a little bit longer to reach the
bottom level of crime control performance when turnover changes. Why did we not
observe significant moderating effects of HRM characteristics? One of the reasons
might come from that the survey questions were mainly based on the extant studies
(e.g., Arthur, 1994; Guthrie, 2001) that examined HRM factor’s moderating role in

3

Positive turnover change means the turnover rate in the current is bigger than the previous year in
this study.
4
Both extracted HRM factors had more than 0.7 Cronbach’s alpha
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the private sector, instead of developing the questions that would be more proper to
identify the HRM characteristics of the municipal police departments. Another
reason might be due to the different organizational characteristics between private
and public organizations. Since there are relatively more rules and guidelines for the
public employees than employees in the private sector, newcomers may not have
much difficulty in catching up the performance level former employees might have
reached even when a police department has more commitment HRM characteristics.
Therefore, we may not find the difference in turnover effects between organizations
with different HRM characteristics.

11.3 Implications and limitations
This study may be one of the first studies that not only empirically confirmed the
importance of human resources (i.e., human capital theory) in effective delivery of
public services, but also investigated the consequences of employee turnover in the
public sector. In this study, I investigated if best HRM characteristics and
commitment HRM system have significant effects on crime control performance
from the universalistic viewpoint. Although we need more studies to reach a
conclusion about the effects of HRM characteristics, the contingency perspective
might be more persuasive to explain the relationships between HRM characteristics
and organizational performance than the universalistic perspective, at least in the
municipal police departments. That is, in the context of municipal police
departments that seem to have military organizational characteristics, universalistic
HRM practices or commitment HRM characteristics are less likely lead to a high
level of organizational performance due to inconsistency between HRM practices
and organizational strategies.
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Since we found significant effects of turnover change on crime control
performance unlike other turnover studies in the private sector, we may need to
understand that the way human resources influence organizational performance is
different from that in the private sector due to the different characteristics of
environments that surround organizations. As reviewed in the previous chapter,
recruiting process in the governments is different from that in the private sector. That
is, police departments usually have to wait longer until the openings are filled than
for-profit organizations because recruiting activities are less frequent in the police
departments.

Since we found attenuated, negative relationships between turnover change
and crime control performance, cautions are required in predicting the negative
effects of turnover in the police departments. That is, we may overestimate or
underestimate the negative effects of turnover depending on the range of turnover
change if we think the relationship between turnover change and crime control
performance linear and negative. Although we only found suggestive evidence that
indicated the moderating role of HRM characteristics on turnover effects, control
HRM characteristics are more likely to alleviate the negative effects of turnover
change on crime control performance. Of course, we need more studies to generalize
the finding of this research about the effects of HRM characteristics and turnover
effects on organizational performance to other public organizations. However, the
findings in this study may help set up HRM policies especially when quality
employees tend to quit (i.e., we suffer from “brain drain” phenomenon) especially at
the federal government level.
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Due to limitations of this study, we need to be careful to interpret the findings
as follows. First, I explored the effects of the turnover change (i.e., turnover rate
difference) only on the crime control performance. Although we may say that crime
control has comprised a major part of the police mission, the results might be
different if the study focused on other aspects of police functions such as traffic
control, increasing safety feeling, and community problem solving. Second, the
results of this study may be only applicable to the cities whose population ranges are
between 100,000 and 500,000. As some police turnover studies pointed out (e.g.,
Hoffman, 1993; Warrell, 2000b), even low level of turnover can be detrimental to
crime control functions especially in small cities. Therefore, unlike the results of this
study, turnover itself may have significant, negative effects on crime control
performance in those small cities. Third, maybe we might have found significant
effects of HRM characteristics on turnover effects and on crime control performance
if the survey was conducted with different HRM questions to identify more specific
HRM characteristics of municipal police departments. Finally, needless to say, we
need more empirical studies before the results of this study can be generalized even
at the municipal police departments.

(Bernstein, 1955; Downs, 1967; Lowi, 1979; Moe, 1989; Olson, 1982)
(Barnard, 1938; Machiavelli, 1965; Nash, 1952) (Goodnow, 1900; Weber, 1965; Wilson, 1887) (Barnard, 1938; Bernstein, 1955; DiIulio, 1987; Heclo, 1977; Kaufman, 1960; Simon, 1976) (Downs, 1967; Hirschman, 1970; Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1965)
(Lawrence et al., 1986) (Chubb et al., 1990; Peterson et al., 1989) (Kaufman, 1985)
(Price, 1972)
(Blau, 1960)
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APPENDIX
Appendix 2-1. Typical mission statements of municipal police departments

Dayton, OH
“We, the members of the Dayton Police Department, are committed to providing the highest quality of
professional police service. We strive in all that we do to protect life, enforce the law, preserve order,
protect property and arrest violators. In cooperation with the citizens and with reverence for the law,
we commit ourselves to improving the safety and quality of life.”

Indianapolis, IN
“We are dedicated to upholding the highest professional standards while serving the community in
which we work and live. We are committed to the enforcement of laws to protect life and property,
while also respecting individual rights, human dignity, and community values. We are committed to
creating and maintaining active police/community partnerships and assisting citizens in identifying
and solving problems to improve the quality of life in their neighborhoods.”

Jacksonville, FL
“The mission of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office is to protect the lives and property of the citizens of
this community, to preserve the peace and to prevent crime and disorder while constantly guarding
personal liberties as prescribed by law.”

Atlanta, GA
“The mission of the Atlanta Police Department is to reduce crime and promote the quality of life, in
partnership with our community.”

Austin, TX
“Our mission is to protect and serve Austin's diverse community so that residents and visitors feel,
and are, safe.”

Phoenix, AZ
"Our mission is to ensure the safety and security for each person in our community."
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Appendix 9-1. Actual survey sheet with a cover Letter

May, 2006

To whom it may concern:
We are investigating human resource issues and characteristics of police departments
that can affect their performance. We are particularly interested in the effect of
employee turnover on police departments. The relationships among employee
turnover, human resource management (HRM) system policies and practices, and
organizational performance have been studied in the private sector, but remain
unexamined in the public sector.
Since this research will help identify factors that affect police department
performance, your participation in this survey is very important. The findings of the
research will help establish proper human resource management policy to enhance
the performance of police organizations.
We hope that this study will yield important findings that may help police
departments improve their operations.

Sincerely,

Edward T. Jennings, Jr.
Professor and Director

Yongbeom Hur
Ph.D. Candidate
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Please provide contact information below.
Name:
Title/Position:
Department:
E-mail address:
Phone Number:

If you have questions, please contact Yongbeom Hur (Ph.D. candidate),
research associate. (E-mail: yhur2@uky.edu; phone: 859-523-8149)

Martin School of Public Policy and Administration
University of Kentucky
415 Patterson Office Tower
Lexington, KY 40502

Please return this survey as soon as possible. If you need to ask other sections or
departments to answer some questions, please do so, although it may take additional
time. Thank you very much in advance for your participation.
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All questions in this survey are only regarding full time employees (FTE). Please
do not include any data about trainees, part-time employees, and temporary job
employees.

Q1. How many job classifications are there in your department?
a. For sworn FTE:
b. For civilian FTE:
Q2. Which of the following best describes sworn FTE’s job tasks in your
department?
a. Job tasks are described in detail, and sworn FTEs are expected to strictly follow
them. That is, discretion is not allowed in most situations. ( )
b. Although job tasks are described in detail, sworn FTEs are allowed to use
discretion in many situations. ( )
c. Job tasks are described generally, and sworn FTEs are expected to use
discretion in many situations. ( )
Q3. Which of the following best describes civilian FTE’s job tasks in your
department?
a. Job tasks are described in detail, and civilian FTEs are expected to strictly
follow them. That is, discretion is not allowed in most situations. ( )
b. Job tasks are described in detail, but civilian FTEs are allowed to use discretion
in many situations. ( )
c. Job tasks are described generally, and civilian FTEs are expected to use
discretion in many situations. ( )
Q4. How many unions are registered in your department?
a. For sworn FTE:
b. For civilian FTE:
Q5. How many FTEs at your department are eligible to join unions?
a. Sworn FTE:
b. Civilian FTE:
Q6. How many FTEs at your department are members of unions?
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a. Sworn FTE:
b. Civilian FTE:
Q7. Does your department have a formal employee complaint/grievance resolution
mechanism?
Yes

No

Q8. If a department has an information-sharing-policy, most information is usually
shared among employees regardless whether or not the information is directly
necessary to them. Does your department have a similar information-sharing-policy?
Yes

No

Q9. Which of the following best describes your department.
A. Employees are encouraged to participate in a wide range of issues. ( )
B. Employees are encouraged to participate in a limited range of issues. ( )

Q10. If you check “A” at question 9, please indicate the issues that employees are
encouraged to participate in.
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

Q11. Does your department have any kind of incentive or bonus system, based on
performance?
Yes

No

Q12. How long does it usually take to recruit new employees?
- Sworn FTE:
- Civilian FTE:
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The following questions are about necessary data in this study. Although it may
not be easy to provide the data for prior years, please provide as much as possible.

Q13. Please provide the following information about turnover. Voluntary turnover
means quitting and voluntary retirement (i.e., termination initiated by employees).
Involuntary turnover means all other types of turnover (e.g., mandatory retirements,
death, layoffs). If data are not available for sworn and civilian FTEs separately,
please provide data for total police FTEs in the bottom row.

Year
Items

2002
Number of
Voluntary
Turnovers

Number of
Involuntary
Turnovers

Number of
Voluntary
Turnovers

Number of
Involuntary
Turnovers

2003
Number of
FTE*

Number of
Voluntary
Turnovers

Number of
Involuntary
Turnovers

Number of
FTE*

Sworn FTE
Civilian FTE
Total Police
FTE

Year
Items

2004
Number of
FTE*

Sworn FTE
Civilian FTE
Total Police
FTE
*: Number of FTEs on the payroll at the end of each year.

Q14. Please provide the following information about response time and patrol
service. A top priority call includes immediate threat to life, violent criminal act in
progress, suspect pursuing citizen, imminent critical danger, or the possibility of
major property loss.
Average time
From receipt of top priority call
To arrival
2002
2003
2004
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Number of
Sworn FTEs
On patrol service

Q15. Please provide the following information about absenteeism due to sickness. If
data are not available for sworn and civilian FTEs separately, please provide
absenteeism data for total police FTE.

Year

Classification

Number of absenteeism*

Sworn FTE
2002

Civilian FTE
Total police FTE
Sworn FTE

2003

Civilian FTE
Total police FTE
Sworn FTE

2004

Civilian FTE
Total police FTE

*: Total sick leave days except pregnancy and maternity leaves.

Q16. Please provide the following information about salary and benefit budgets of
your department? If data are not available for sworn and civilian FTEs separately,
please provide budget data for total police FTE.
Year

Classification

Salary and benefit budget (unit: $1,000)

For sworn FTE
2002

For civilian FTE
For total FTE
For sworn FTE

2003

For civilian FTE
For total FTE
For sworn FTE

2004

For civilian FTE
For total FTE
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Q17. Please provide the following information about caseload and crime clearance.
When you calculate caseload, count all number of crimes assigned (i.e., regardless of
UCR part I or part II crimes)
Caseload per
Sworn FTE
Assigned to investigate
Violent crimes

Caseload per
Sworn FTE
Assigned to investigate
Property crimes

Caseload per sworn FTE
Assigned to investigate
UCR part I violent &
property crimes

2002
2003
2004

Thank you very much!!!

204

Number of
Violent crimes
Cleared per
Sworn FTE assigned

Number of
Property crimes
Cleared per
Sworn FTE assigned
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